Files
zeekay 189ce08e51 Regenerate against the document the deployment answers for
The projection these were generated from was a month old and predated the
compute migration, so every one of them described /v1/visor — which the API
serves at zero paths now. That is why a hand-written console client and a
generated one had drifted the same way at the same time.

No /v1/visor path survives here. The word still appears as a source-plane
value and inside gvisor and supervisor, which are not this rename.
2026-09-05 18:07:13 -07:00

133 lines
5.1 KiB
C++

/**
* Hanzo Cloud API
* The Hanzo Cloud API as a customer calls it: every operation under /v1/ except the operator's admin product, relay routes, legacy spellings and capabilities still reached by flag. Tagged by product: the first path segment after /v1/.
*
* The version of the OpenAPI document: v1
*
* NOTE: This class is auto generated by OpenAPI-Generator 7.14.0.
* https://openapi-generator.tech
* Do not edit the class manually.
*/
/*
* RiskLabelOut.h
*
*
*/
#ifndef HANZO_MODEL_RiskLabelOut_H_
#define HANZO_MODEL_RiskLabelOut_H_
#include <boost/optional.hpp>
#include "hanzo/ModelBase.h"
#include <cpprest/details/basic_types.h>
#include "hanzo/model/RiskLabelResult.h"
#include <vector>
namespace hanzo {
namespace model {
class RiskLabelResult;
class RiskLabelOut
: public ModelBase
{
public:
RiskLabelOut();
virtual ~RiskLabelOut();
/////////////////////////////////////////////
/// ModelBase overrides
void validate() override;
web::json::value toJson() const override;
bool fromJson(const web::json::value& json) override;
void toMultipart(std::shared_ptr<MultipartFormData> multipart, const utility::string_t& namePrefix) const override;
bool fromMultiPart(std::shared_ptr<MultipartFormData> multipart, const utility::string_t& namePrefix) override;
/////////////////////////////////////////////
/// RiskLabelOut members
/// <summary>
/// Duplicate is how many members this tenant already held, byte for byte. The idempotency key is the assertion&#39;s CONTENT digest — kind, subject, at, seen, disposition, source, evidence, the asserting identity and confidence, folded in length-prefixed — so a webhook redelivering one chargeback is a duplicate and costs nothing, while an assertion differing in ANY of those fields is a DIFFERENT assertion and is recorded beside the first. Nothing was written and nothing was overwritten; it is an outcome, never an error. The asserting identity is in the digest, so the same claim filed by a second credential is two assertions and not a redelivery.
/// </summary>
int64_t getDuplicate() const;
bool duplicateIsSet() const;
void unsetDuplicate();
void setDuplicate(int64_t value);
/// <summary>
/// Mirror names why the columnar copy did not take this batch, when it did not. The record is already durable in the tenant&#39;s own store by then — the warehouse copy exists to make a training join cheap, and its absence is a gap in that join, never a lost label.
/// </summary>
utility::string_t getMirror() const;
bool mirrorIsSet() const;
void unsetMirror();
void setMirror(const utility::string_t& value);
/// <summary>
/// Pending is how many assertions the derived copy is still to take. Every write attempt carries the backlog forward as well as its own batch, so a warehouse that was unreachable closes its gap on the next write rather than leaving a hole in a training join nothing would report. It is counted under a cap and saturates there: zero means caught up, and a large number means a backlog to work through rather than an inventory to reconcile.
/// </summary>
int64_t getPending() const;
bool pendingIsSet() const;
void unsetPending();
void setPending(int64_t value);
/// <summary>
/// Recorded is how many members became a NEW row in the tenant&#39;s record. Recorded + Duplicate + Refused is exactly the number of labels sent, so a caller reconciling a webhook delivery can do it on the counts alone.
/// </summary>
int64_t getRecorded() const;
bool recordedIsSet() const;
void unsetRecorded();
void setRecorded(int64_t value);
/// <summary>
/// Refused is how many members failed admission and were NOT recorded. Refusal is per member and never discards the rest of the batch: an empty or over-512-byte subject or evidence, a kind, disposition or source outside the closed vocabulary, an &#x60;at&#x60; or &#x60;seen&#x60; that is not RFC 3339, a &#x60;seen&#x60; before the &#x60;at&#x60; it judges, either instant more than five minutes past the server clock, or a confidence outside [0,1]. Results names which member and why, so the refused ones are exactly the ones to fix and resend.
/// </summary>
int64_t getRefused() const;
bool refusedIsSet() const;
void unsetRefused();
void setRefused(int64_t value);
/// <summary>
/// Results is per fact, in the order sent, so a caller can retry exactly the members that were refused and can log the content digest of the ones that landed.
/// </summary>
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<RiskLabelResult>> getResults() const;
bool resultsIsSet() const;
void unsetResults();
void setResults(const std::vector<std::shared_ptr<RiskLabelResult>>& value);
protected:
int64_t m_Duplicate;
bool m_DuplicateIsSet;
utility::string_t m_Mirror;
bool m_MirrorIsSet;
int64_t m_Pending;
bool m_PendingIsSet;
int64_t m_Recorded;
bool m_RecordedIsSet;
int64_t m_Refused;
bool m_RefusedIsSet;
std::vector<std::shared_ptr<RiskLabelResult>> m_Results;
bool m_ResultsIsSet;
};
}
}
#endif /* HANZO_MODEL_RiskLabelOut_H_ */