agency/.pnpm-store/v3/files/4d/50662dc17ff697d517075f85922e6e7ddc5456367d5580f818d41227d136c7fe4ac96634b9e4d2161fd1592f015b26df288edcbb6ad7fec2cb5bd7c36c86ca

/** redactCredentialParams removes the VALUE of any query parameter whose NAME
 *  says it carries a credential, leaving the name so the URL still reads. */
export declare function redactCredentialParams(s: string): string;
/** redactSecrets removes known secret shapes. Always applied. */
export declare function redactSecrets(s: string): string;
/** scrubPII masks emails and IPs. Applied unless PII capture is enabled. */
export declare function scrubPII(s: string): string;
/** Longest free-text field this module will scrub. Every pattern here is a regex
 *  run synchronously on the main thread, and the input is attacker-influenced —
 *  `throw new Error(await res.text())` against an HTML error page is a one-line
 *  way to hand us 128KB. Bounding the INPUT bounds the work regardless of which
 *  pattern is pathological. 8KB is far beyond any real error message. */
export declare const MAX_SCRUB_LEN = 8192;
/** truncate caps a string at MAX_SCRUB_LEN, marking that it was cut so a reader
 *  never mistakes a truncated message for the whole one. */
export declare function truncate(s: string, max?: number): string;
/** scrubText applies the redaction policy to a free-text field. Input is capped
 *  first: unbounded text is a denial-of-service surface, not just a size problem. */
export declare function scrubText(s: string | undefined, capturePII?: boolean): string;
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