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* feat(base): per-(user,org) multitenant store + gateway-upstream middleware
claims: AssertGatewayUpstream (boot refusal unless HANZO_GATEWAY_UPSTREAM=1),
Inject / RequireGateway / RequireRole middleware wired onto the canonical
3-header contract (X-User-Id, X-Org-Id, X-Roles). RequireGateway returns
503 (deployment topology bug, not an auth failure). RequireRole returns
404 (existence-leak defense). 18 subtests pass.
store: MultiTenantStore holds one SQLite handle per (org, user) in a luxfi/
cache LRU, hydrates on miss from hanzoai/base/tools/filesystem (S3/GCS/
local), checkpoints dirty handles to object storage on idle-TTL, LRU-cap,
explicit Evict, and SIGTERM. Org-wide DB via ForOrg. 13 tests pass (miss,
hit, isolation, checkpoint-uploads, eviction-rehydrates, close-flushes,
concurrent-readers, gateway-bypass). Works around luxfi/container v0.0.2
onEvict-silently-dropped bug via explicit shadow set + flushAndCloseLocked.
* fix(claims): reject CTL bytes + cap slug length on identity headers (P7-H3/H4/M1)
FromHeaders now sanitizes X-User-Id, X-Org-Id, and each X-Roles element
through hasControlByte + MaxIdentityValueLen=256. Any header containing
a byte below 0x20 or equal to 0x7f, or exceeding the length cap, is
discarded — the field becomes "" and RequireGateway 503s instead of
forwarding attacker-controlled bytes into log / path / audit code.
parseRoles gains the same defense at the per-role level: CRLF-smuggled
roles are dropped without breaking the rest of the list.
Red P7-H3 / P7-H4 / P7-M2 verified: CRLF response-splitting primitive
and NUL / TAB / zero-width / DEL injection primitives all closed.
Tests:
TestFromHeaders_RejectsControlBytesInSlug (6 subcases)
TestFromHeaders_RejectsOverlongValue
TestParseRoles_DropsCRLFRoles
go test -race -count=3 ./tools/claims/... green.
* feat(claims): Chain(h) canonical middleware order enforcement (P7-H3)
Chain is the sole approved way to mount a tenant-scoped handler:
mux.Handle("/v1/", claims.Chain(tenant))
It wires Strip → Inject → RequireGateway in the required order. Services
MUST NOT compose the three middlewares by hand — the PHILOSOPHY.md
"one and only one way" principle applies. A misordered hand-wired chain
silently defeats the forged-header defense (verified by Red probe
P7-H3: Inject before Strip allowed attacker headers through).
Tests:
TestChain_EnforcesCanonicalOrder
TestChain_DirectAccess_IsRejected
go test -race -count=3 ./tools/claims/... green.
* fix(store): P7 hardening — SQLite magic, upload errors, chunked reaper, slug cap, CAS=false
Bundles the six Red P7 findings on store/multitenant.go that touch the
same file into one atomic review unit. Each sub-fix has its own test and
its own commentary in the code so the diff reads as six independent
changes with no cross-dependencies.
P7-C1 (option B — sticky-session v1)
Package doc spells out: single-writer per (org,user) is provided by
gateway sticky-session affinity on X-Org-Id, NOT by object-storage CAS.
Exports `CAS = false` so any consumer that requires generation-checked
writes can feature-gate and refuse to boot until CAS flips true. The
ARCHITECTURE.md §5.5 reconciliation lands in the next commit.
Test: TestCAS_ConstantExposed.
P7-C2 (object-store poisoning)
Hydrate now validates the SQLite 3 magic (`SQLite format 3\x00`) on
the downloaded blob BEFORE handing bytes to modernc.org/sqlite. A
non-SQLite blob (or short/truncated) is rejected with ErrCorruptDB
and the local file is removed — the poisoned bytes never reach the
driver, so hostile sqlite_master rows cannot fire on the next query.
Empty blobs (fresh-tenant slot) are allowed.
Tests: TestHydrate_RejectsPoisonedBlob, TestValidateSQLiteMagic_AcceptsEmpty.
P7-H1 (silent upload failures)
ErrUploadFailed is the canonical sentinel. flushAndCloseLocked now
returns error; Evict propagates it; Close aggregates via errors.Join
and reports "flushed N/M, K upload failures". On upload failure the
handle is re-opened and retained in the LRU + shadow so the next
reap/Checkpoint can retry — no silent data loss. The LRU-cap-eviction
path inside hydrate surfaces the same error instead of falling back
to a different victim (which would have silently dropped the retry).
OnReapFailure is a new observer hook on Options for ops to wire a
structured logger or Prometheus counter to reap-cycle failures.
Tests: TestEvict_SurfacesUploadError, TestClose_AggregatesUploadFailures,
TestEvictionReturnsError_RecoversOnRetry.
P7-H2 (reaper O(N) under s.mu)
reapOnce now snapshots idle keys under s.mu, RELEASES the lock, and
then calls s.Evict per-key (each Evict reacquires briefly). Close
follows the same pattern. A cold Get for a new tenant made during a
reap blocks for a single handle's flush latency, not the entire
reap cycle. Documents the lock discipline on both methods.
Test: TestReaper_LockHoldTimeChunked (fills 100 handles, probes
latency; must stay < 500ms).
P7-M1 (slug length)
MaxSlugLen = 128. validateSlug rejects overlong inputs before any FS
call; the attacker-controlled slug no longer reaches the error
message with ENAMETOOLONG.
Test: TestKey_Valid_RejectsLongSlug.
Test-infra
newTestStore default IdleTTL bumped to 5s so standard-flow tests
aren't racing the reaper while operating on a DB handle. Tests that
exercise reap/idle behavior pass a short IdleTTL via the variadic.
go test -race -count=3 ./store/... green: 21 tests pass.