bot/docs/cli/security.md

summary, read_when, title

summary	read_when	title
CLI reference for `hanzo-bot security` (audit and fix common security footguns)	You want to run a quick security audit on config/state You want to apply safe “fix” suggestions (chmod, tighten defaults)	security

hanzo-bot security

Security tools (audit + optional fixes).

Related:

• Security guide: Security

Audit

hanzo-bot security audit
hanzo-bot security audit --deep
hanzo-bot security audit --fix
hanzo-bot security audit --json

The audit warns when multiple DM senders share the main session and recommends secure DM mode: session.dmScope="per-channel-peer" (or per-account-channel-peer for multi-account channels) for shared inboxes. This is for cooperative/shared inbox hardening. A single Gateway shared by mutually untrusted/adversarial operators is not a recommended setup; split trust boundaries with separate gateways (or separate OS users/hosts). It also emits security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic when config suggests likely shared-user ingress (for example open DM/group policy, configured group targets, or wildcard sender rules), and reminds you that HanzoBot is a personal-assistant trust model by default. For intentional shared-user setups, the audit guidance is to sandbox all sessions, keep filesystem access workspace-scoped, and keep personal/private identities or credentials off that runtime. It also warns when small models (<=300B) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled. For webhook ingress, it warns when hooks.defaultSessionKey is unset, when request sessionKey overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes. It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when gateway.nodes.denyCommands uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries (exact node command-name matching only, not shell-text filtering), when gateway.nodes.allowCommands explicitly enables dangerous node commands, when global tools.profile="minimal" is overridden by agent tool profiles, when open groups expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy. It also flags gateway.allowRealIpFallback=true (header-spoofing risk if proxies are misconfigured) and discovery.mdns.mode="full" (metadata leakage via mDNS TXT records). It also warns when sandbox browser uses Docker bridge network without sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange. It also flags dangerous sandbox Docker network modes (including host and container:* namespace joins). It also warns when existing sandbox browser Docker containers have missing/stale hash labels (for example pre-migration containers missing hanzo-bot.browserConfigEpoch) and recommends hanzo-bot sandbox recreate --browser --all. It also warns when npm-based plugin/hook install records are unpinned, missing integrity metadata, or drift from currently installed package versions. It warns when channel allowlists rely on mutable names/emails/tags instead of stable IDs (Discord, Slack, Google Chat, MS Teams, Mattermost, IRC scopes where applicable). It warns when gateway.auth.mode="none" leaves Gateway HTTP APIs reachable without a shared secret (/tools/invoke plus any enabled /v1/* endpoint). Settings prefixed with dangerous/dangerously are explicit break-glass operator overrides; enabling one is not, by itself, a security vulnerability report. For the complete dangerous-parameter inventory, see the "Insecure or dangerous flags summary" section in Security.

JSON output

Use --json for CI/policy checks:

hanzo-bot security audit --json | jq '.summary'
hanzo-bot security audit --deep --json | jq '.findings[] | select(.severity=="critical") | .checkId'

If --fix and --json are combined, output includes both fix actions and final report:

hanzo-bot security audit --fix --json | jq '{fix: .fix.ok, summary: .report.summary}'

What --fix changes

--fix applies safe, deterministic remediations:

• flips common groupPolicy="open" to groupPolicy="allowlist" (including account variants in supported channels)
• sets logging.redactSensitive from "off" to "tools"
• tightens permissions for state/config and common sensitive files (credentials/*.json, auth-profiles.json, sessions.json, session *.jsonl)

--fix does not:

• rotate tokens/passwords/API keys
• disable tools (gateway, cron, exec, etc.)
• change gateway bind/auth/network exposure choices
• remove or rewrite plugins/skills