Three coordinated things:
1. Resolve the committed upstream/main merge conflicts. 94 files were
sitting with raw <<<<<<< HEAD ... >>>>>>> upstream/main blocks. Every
conflict had HanzoBot/Bot on HEAD and OpenClaw on upstream. Resolved
by keeping HEAD everywhere — 540 conflict blocks.
2. Rewrite remaining OpenClaw text refs.
OPENCLAW → HANZO_BOT
OpenClaw → HanzoBot (PascalCase type identifiers)
openclaw → bot (codebase convention — botToken,
botUsername etc.; avoids invalid
hyphenated JS identifiers)
openclaw[_]/openclaw[A-Z] → bot[_]/bot[A-Z] (compound)
ai.openclaw.x → ai.hanzo.bot.x (JVM package path)
3. Delete or rename openclaw-named file paths (116 of them). Dead
duplicates with a Bot-named canonical from the partial migration:
deleted. Otherwise renamed.
ai/openclaw/** → deleted (ai/hanzo/bot/** canonical)
Sources/OpenClaw*/ → deleted (Sources/Bot* canonical)
Tests/OpenClawIPCTests/ → deleted (Tests/BotIPCTests canonical)
OpenClawKit/ → deleted (BotKit canonical)
openclaw-tools.*.ts → deleted (bot-tools.*.ts canonical)
openclaw-root.ts etc. → deleted (bot-root.ts canonical)
types.openclaw.ts → deleted (types.bot.ts canonical)
extensions/*/openclaw.plugin.json → renamed hanzo-bot.plugin.json
docs/start/openclaw.md → renamed hanzo-bot.md (+ zh-CN)
docs/assets/openclaw-*.png, whatsapp-openclaw*.jpg → deleted
scripts/.../openclaw-* → deleted (bot/hanzo-bot parallels)
openclaw.mjs → deleted (hanzo-bot.mjs is package.bin)
Then patched 65 broken JS/TS import strings where hanzo-bot had ended
up inside an import path ('./types.hanzo-bot.js' → './types.bot.js'
etc., since the on-disk filename uses the brand-neutral bot- prefix).
Pre-existing lint debt cleaned up to get oxlint --type-aware to 0/0:
removed the dead i18n test that referenced a path no longer existing;
defined the missing DIDConfig and WalletConfig types in types.base.ts
(they were imported but never declared); dropped unused imports;
collapsed redundant type assertion and a tautological meta.bot lookup
that the openclaw→bot rename made redundant.
The a2ui.bundle.js generated artifact is kept at its pre-rebrand
contents — it gets regenerated by 'pnpm canvas:a2ui:bundle' from
sources I cannot rebuild in this commit; the source side is clean.
Verified: 0 occurrences of openclaw (case-insensitive) in tree source
content, 0 file or directory paths with openclaw in the name; oxlint
--type-aware src test reports 0/0.
4.5 KiB
Contributing to the HanzoBot Threat Model
Thanks for helping make HanzoBot more secure. This threat model is a living document and we welcome contributions from anyone - you don't need to be a security expert.
Ways to Contribute
Add a Threat
Spotted an attack vector or risk we haven't covered? Open an issue on hanzo-bot/trust and describe it in your own words. You don't need to know any frameworks or fill in every field - just describe the scenario.
Helpful to include (but not required):
- The attack scenario and how it could be exploited
- Which parts of HanzoBot are affected (CLI, gateway, channels, ClawHub, MCP servers, etc.)
- How severe you think it is (low / medium / high / critical)
- Any links to related research, CVEs, or real-world examples
We'll handle the ATLAS mapping, threat IDs, and risk assessment during review. If you want to include those details, great - but it's not expected.
This is for adding to the threat model, not reporting live vulnerabilities. If you've found an exploitable vulnerability, see our Trust page for responsible disclosure instructions.
Suggest a Mitigation
Have an idea for how to address an existing threat? Open an issue or PR referencing the threat. Useful mitigations are specific and actionable - for example, "per-sender rate limiting of 10 messages/minute at the gateway" is better than "implement rate limiting."
Propose an Attack Chain
Attack chains show how multiple threats combine into a realistic attack scenario. If you see a dangerous combination, describe the steps and how an attacker would chain them together. A short narrative of how the attack unfolds in practice is more valuable than a formal template.
Fix or Improve Existing Content
Typos, clarifications, outdated info, better examples - PRs welcome, no issue needed.
What We Use
MITRE ATLAS
This threat model is built on MITRE ATLAS (Adversarial Threat Landscape for AI Systems), a framework designed specifically for AI/ML threats like prompt injection, tool misuse, and agent exploitation. You don't need to know ATLAS to contribute - we map submissions to the framework during review.
Threat IDs
Each threat gets an ID like T-EXEC-003. The categories are:
| Code | Category |
|---|---|
| RECON | Reconnaissance - information gathering |
| ACCESS | Initial access - gaining entry |
| EXEC | Execution - running malicious actions |
| PERSIST | Persistence - maintaining access |
| EVADE | Defense evasion - avoiding detection |
| DISC | Discovery - learning about the environment |
| EXFIL | Exfiltration - stealing data |
| IMPACT | Impact - damage or disruption |
IDs are assigned by maintainers during review. You don't need to pick one.
Risk Levels
| Level | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Critical | Full system compromise, or high likelihood + critical impact |
| High | Significant damage likely, or medium likelihood + critical impact |
| Medium | Moderate risk, or low likelihood + high impact |
| Low | Unlikely and limited impact |
If you're unsure about the risk level, just describe the impact and we'll assess it.
Review Process
- Triage - We review new submissions within 48 hours
- Assessment - We verify feasibility, assign ATLAS mapping and threat ID, validate risk level
- Documentation - We ensure everything is formatted and complete
- Merge - Added to the threat model and visualization
Resources
Contact
- Security vulnerabilities: See our Trust page for reporting instructions
- Threat model questions: Open an issue on hanzo-bot/trust
- General chat: Discord #security channel
Recognition
Contributors to the threat model are recognized in the threat model acknowledgments, release notes, and the HanzoBot security hall of fame for significant contributions.