Files
c28383ed14 Worktree findings batch 2 (#17)
* Fix issues F-003, 006, 001, 022

* Fix issues F-025, 026, 010, 008

- Login tokens name their identity provider in the `provider` claim;
  SelectOrg and GetUserToken read it with pb.IDPFromString, which also
  takes the number older tokens carry, and AuthenticateAPIKey answers
  Provider Undefined.
- A login that fails after the callback decodes its state lands on the
  redirect URI of the client, in its response mode, with `error` and
  `error_description` (RFC 6749 section 4.1.2.1); a server-side failure
  is described by its status text only. The calls to an IdP take the
  request context and a client with a timeout, and the answer of the IdP
  stays in the server log.
- The platform bootstrap reads its ca-config with ca.LoadBootstrapConfig,
  which refuses an issuer URL template with `${ISSUER_ID}` or
  `$ISSUER_ID`: the loader expands them to an empty string. The proto,
  README and CLI help name `:ISSUER_ID`.
- CaDb.RegisterIssuer takes the trust anchor of a root issuer and writes
  both in one transaction; the backend service and the bootstrap pass it,
  and an anchor registered in another scope is AlreadyExists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

* Address PR review comments

- Invite acceptance deletes the invite in its transaction
  (query.TakeInvite, DELETE ... RETURNING) and grants from the deleted
  row: a withdrawn or already accepted invite grants nothing, a re-issued
  one grants its current role, and an email mismatch, an expired invite or
  a failed grant rolls the delete back.
- CaDb.RegisterIssuer requires the anchor of a root issuer and refuses one
  for any other issuer; the service always builds it for a root.
- The OAuth response is merged into the query of a redirect URI that has
  one, and replaces its fragment in fragment mode.
- The codemap describes the transactions of RegisterOrg and the invite
  acceptance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
2026-10-23 19:59:28 -05:00

295 lines
9.8 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/effective-security/porto/restserver"
"github.com/effective-security/porto/xhttp/correlation"
"github.com/effective-security/porto/xhttp/header"
"github.com/effective-security/porto/xhttp/httperror"
"github.com/effective-security/porto/xhttp/marshal"
"github.com/effective-security/trustyca/api/pb"
"github.com/effective-security/trustyca/internal/authctx"
"github.com/effective-security/trustyca/internal/events"
"github.com/effective-security/xdb"
"github.com/effective-security/xlog"
"github.com/effective-security/xpki/certutil"
"github.com/effective-security/xpki/dataprotection"
"github.com/effective-security/xpki/jwt"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/emptypb"
)
// AuthenticateAPIKeyHandler is the handler for the AuthenticateAPIKey endpoint
// It is used to authenticate API keys.
// It expects the following headers:
// Date: <timestamp>
// Authorization: APIKey <key_id>:<signature>
func (s *Service) AuthenticateAPIKeyHandler() restserver.Handle {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, _ restserver.Params) {
authzHeader := r.Header.Get(header.Authorization)
dateHeader := r.Header.Get("date")
if authzHeader == "" {
marshal.WriteJSON(w, r, httperror.Unauthorized("missing authorization header"))
return
}
if dateHeader == "" {
marshal.WriteJSON(w, r, httperror.Unauthorized("missing date header"))
return
}
res, err := s.authenticateAPIKey(r.Context(), authzHeader, dateHeader)
if err != nil {
marshal.WriteJSON(w, r, err)
return
}
marshal.WriteJSON(w, r, &res)
}
}
// AuthenticateAPIKey authenticates an API key and returns a user token response
func (s *Service) AuthenticateAPIKey(ctx context.Context, req *emptypb.Empty) (*pb.UserTokenResponse, error) {
md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "missing metadata")
}
authHeaders := md.Get("authorization")
if len(authHeaders) == 0 {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "missing authorization header")
}
timestamp := md.Get("timestamp")
if len(timestamp) == 0 {
timestamp = md.Get("date")
}
if len(timestamp) == 0 {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "missing timestamp")
}
// Extract API Key ID and Signature
var authHeader string
for _, h := range authHeaders {
if strings.HasPrefix(h, "APIKey ") {
authHeader = h
}
}
if authHeader == "" {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid authorization format")
}
return s.authenticateAPIKey(ctx, authHeader, timestamp[0])
}
func (s *Service) authenticateAPIKey(ctx context.Context, authHeader, timestamp string) (*pb.UserTokenResponse, error) {
ctx = correlation.WithID(ctx)
key, err := s.validateHMAC(ctx, pb.Auth_AuthenticateAPIKey_FullMethodName, authHeader, timestamp)
if err != nil {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.PermissionDenied, "failed to authenticate API key").WithCause(err)
}
// TODO: add a config option for the email domain
email := fmt.Sprintf("%[email protected]", key.ID)
// the token identifies the key, its org and optional project; the
// authorizer checks the key scopes against the method scopes
claims := jwt.MapClaims{
authctx.ClaimOrg: key.OrgID,
authctx.ClaimOrgRole: pb.Role_APIKey.String(),
authctx.ClaimScope: key.Scopes,
"sub": key.ID,
"email": email,
claimProvider: "apikey",
"iss": s.JwtSigner.Issuer(),
"aud": s.getAudience(false),
"nonce": certutil.RandomString(8),
}
if key.ProjectID != "" {
projectID, err := xdb.ParseID(key.ProjectID)
if err != nil {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.Internal, "invalid project ID of the key")
}
project, err := s.db.GetProject(ctx, projectID.UInt64())
if err != nil {
return nil, httperror.WrapWithCtx(ctx, err, "failed to get project")
}
if project.OrgID.String() != key.OrgID || project.Status != pb.ItemStatus_Active {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.PermissionDenied, "project is not available")
}
claims[authctx.ClaimProject] = key.ProjectID
}
// give only one hour
jwt.SetClaimsExpiration(claims, time.Hour)
tokenStr, err := s.JwtSigner.Sign(ctx, claims)
if err != nil {
return nil, httperror.WrapWithCtx(ctx, err, "failed to sign JWT")
}
// the IDs come from the key row, so they parse; an empty project is zero
events.New(ctx, ServiceName, pb.EventType_APIKeyLogin, "API key signed in").
Org(xdb.TryParseID(key.OrgID)).
Project(xdb.TryParseID(key.ProjectID)).
Reference(xdb.TryParseID(key.ID)).
Email(email).
Description("API key %q signed in", key.Label).
Emit(s.db)
res := &pb.UserTokenResponse{
Token: &pb.Token{
TokenType: "Bearer",
AccessToken: tokenStr,
ExpiresAt: claims.TimeVal("exp").Format(time.RFC3339),
IssuedAt: claims.TimeVal("iat").Format(time.RFC3339),
Issuer: claims.String("iss"),
Audience: claims.String("aud"),
// an API key signs in without an identity provider
Provider: pb.IDP_Undefined,
},
UserInfo: &pb.UserInfo{
ID: key.ID,
Name: key.Label,
Email: email,
OrgID: key.OrgID,
OrgRole: pb.Role_APIKey.String(),
OrgRoleSource: authctx.RoleSourceDirect,
Role: "user", // App role, not Org role
},
}
return res, nil
}
func (s *Service) validateHMAC(ctx context.Context, method, authHeader, timestamp string) (*pb.APIKey, error) {
// Prevent replay attacks (5 min tolerance)
reqTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, timestamp)
if err != nil || time.Since(reqTime) > 5*time.Minute {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid or expired timestamp")
}
if time.Until(reqTime) > 5*time.Minute {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "timestamp is in the future")
}
authParts := strings.SplitN(authHeader, " ", 2)
if len(authParts) != 2 {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid authorization header")
}
if !strings.EqualFold(authParts[0], "APIKey") {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid authorization scheme")
}
credentials := strings.SplitN(authParts[1], ":", 2)
if len(credentials) != 2 {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid authorization credentials")
}
keyStr, receivedSignature := strings.TrimSpace(credentials[0]), strings.TrimSpace(credentials[1])
key, err := s.findAPIKey(ctx, keyStr)
if err != nil {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.PermissionDenied, "invalid API key").WithCause(err)
}
// Recompute expected signature
expectedSignature := generateHMACSignature(method, timestamp, key.Secret)
// Compare signatures
if !hmac.Equal([]byte(receivedSignature), []byte(expectedSignature)) {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.PermissionDenied, "invalid HMAC signature")
}
return key, nil
}
func (s *Service) findAPIKey(ctx context.Context, keyStr string) (*pb.APIKey, error) {
// sk_<OrgID>_<encryptedKeyID>
parts := strings.SplitN(keyStr, "_", 3)
if len(parts) != 3 || parts[0] != "sk" {
logger.ContextKV(ctx, xlog.DEBUG,
"reason", "invalid_key_format",
"key_id", keyStr,
"parts", len(parts),
"prefix", parts[0],
)
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid key")
}
orgID, err := xdb.ParseID(parts[1])
if err != nil {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid key")
}
var decryptedKeyID string
err = dataprotection.UnprotectObject(ctx, s.dataprotection, parts[2], &decryptedKeyID)
if err != nil {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.PermissionDenied, "invalid key").WithCause(err)
}
keyID, err := xdb.ParseID(decryptedKeyID)
if err != nil {
logger.ContextKV(ctx, xlog.DEBUG,
"reason", "unable_to_parse_api_key_id",
"key_id", keyStr,
)
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid key ID")
}
m, err := s.db.UseAPIKey(ctx, orgID.UInt64(), keyID.UInt64())
if err != nil {
if xdb.IsNotFoundError(err) {
logger.ContextKV(ctx, xlog.DEBUG,
"reason", "UseAPIKey",
"org_id", orgID.String(),
"key_id", keyID.String(),
"err", err.Error())
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.PermissionDenied, "invalid key").WithCause(err)
}
logger.ContextKV(ctx, xlog.ERROR,
"reason", "UseAPIKey",
"org_id", orgID.String(),
"key_id", keyID.String(),
"err", err.Error())
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.PermissionDenied, "invalid key").WithCause(err)
}
if m == nil || m.OrgID.UInt64() != orgID.UInt64() {
logger.ContextKV(ctx, xlog.WARNING,
"reason", "org_id_mismatch",
"org_id", orgID.String(),
"key_id", keyID.String(),
)
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.PermissionDenied, "invalid key")
}
if !m.ExpiresAt.IsZero() && m.ExpiresAt.UTC().Before(time.Now()) {
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.PermissionDenied, "key expired")
}
res := m.Pb()
// return the secret
err = dataprotection.UnprotectObject(ctx, s.dataprotection, m.Secret, &res.Secret)
if err != nil {
logger.ContextKV(ctx, xlog.ERROR, "reason", "UnprotectOrgObject", "err", err.Error())
return nil, httperror.NewGrpcFromCtx(ctx, codes.Internal, "unexpected error").WithCause(err)
}
return res, nil
}
// signature = HMAC-SHA256(secret, method + url + timestamp + body_hash)
func generateHMACSignature(method, timestamp, secret string) string {
h := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret))
h.Write([]byte(method))
h.Write([]byte(timestamp))
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil))
}