6.3 KiB
Roadmap
Active planned work. Order is suggested, not a delivery commitment. Current runtime navigation
is in Documentation/codemap.md; defects are in
the local, gitignored FINDINGS.md, whose IDs are not cited here.
Implemented baseline
PLAN.md phase 1: login, orgs, projects, memberships,
invites, API keys and the authorization layer; phase 2 and 2a: the CA
tables, the CA core library (internal/ca: tenant-scoped issuer registry,
keys, platform bootstrap) and the issuer, profile, root and signing methods
of the CA service; phase 3: the certificate, revocation and current CRL
methods of the CA service, the trustyca-ra and trustyca-aia roles of
the backend listener and the CA client; phase 4: CRL publishing
(internal/ca.CrlPublisher, PublishCrls, the crl_renewal task) and the
cert_status task (expiry and retention); phase 5: the CIS service
(server/service/cis: the JSON and gRPC API for authenticated callers);
phase 6: the operator tooling (trustycactl ca ... and ca org bootstrap,
the privpb.Admin support lists across orgs, the CIS commands of
trustyca); phase 7: the hardening; phase 8: the AIA service
(server/service/aia: the public AIA, CRL and OCSP routes and the OCSP
response cache on a plain HTTP listener).
Active work
| ID | Work | Ownership / contract |
|---|---|---|
| RM-001 | Public precondition error contract | server/service/orgs answers HTTP 409 conflict / gRPC FailedPrecondition (preconditionFailed); map FailedPrecondition to 409 in porto so Go gRPC clients agree (they see 400 bad_request; only the CA service of the wfe restores 409 for what a remote backend returns, ca.forwardedError), then pin it |
| RM-002 | Issuer renewal under one label | UNIQUE NULLS NOT DISTINCT (org_id, project_id, label) on issuer holds in every status, so a renewed issuer cannot take the label of the archived one and internal/ca.Bootstrap refuses a rotated key; replace it with a unique index on Active (and Pending) issuers, or rename archived issuers, with a migration and a bootstrap that archives in place (DESIGN.md §5.4) |
| RM-003 | OCSP issuer lookup by IKID | pb.OCSPRequest carries the DER request only; the CA finds an issuer that is not in memory by a SHA-1 key hash through the skid index, so a SHA-256 CertID, an imported issuer whose SKID is not the SHA-1 of its key, and a lookup by name hash miss a cold issuer. Add an optional IKID that the AIA routes /v1/ocspi/{ikid} pass on, so every hash algorithm resolves without a scan (DESIGN.md §8) |
| RM-005 | Deny by default on the wfe listener | The index page of the UI is served at /, so / stays under authz.allow_any of the wfe and every path without a rule is open to every identity at the authz layer; the services rely on the access check of each method. Serve the UI pages under a listed prefix, or add an exact-match rule to porto's authz, then remove / from allow_any as the backend listener does |
| RM-006 | Signing plane split (PLAN.md phase 9) | pb.CA on the wfe for the tenants (the org of the token, no OrgID in the requests), forwarding every call to privpb.Backend on the backend listener, the API of the service identities with an explicit OrgID; named service clients per pod role (DESIGN.md §2.1, §2.2). Done: the backend service with the whole CA, the proxy CA service, the re-authorization of forwarded callers, the clients, the token-scoped public requests. Open: a two-app integration test through the wfe with a tenant token, and a JSON route of pb.CA on the wfe for the Web UI |
| RM-007 | Profile invalidation across instances | The issuer registry of a backend instance learns of a profile changed elsewhere after ca.issuer_cache_ttl; broadcast the invalidation to every backend instance (Redis pub/sub or PostgreSQL NOTIFY) (DESIGN.md §2.1, §5.1) |
| RM-008 | Least privilege of the signing plane | A data protection key for issuer keys that the web pods do not hold (today one provider wraps the token signing key and the software issuer keys), DB roles per pod role, name constraints on tenant issuing CAs, and a method allowlist per trustyca-* role in authctx instead of the prefix that trusts every service role for every reachable method (DESIGN.md §2.1) |
| RM-004 | Project-scoped issuer and profile mutations | UpdateIssuerRequest, ActivateIssuerRequest and DeleteProfileRequest carry no ProjectID, so the interceptor authorizes them at org scope and a project Admin cannot archive, activate or delete the rows of its own project. Add ProjectID to the three requests, as UpdateCertificateLabelRequest and RevokeCertificateRequest have it (the row must belong to the named project); the service already authorizes the resolved row against its project (rowAccess, DESIGN.md §6) |
Completion policy
Move completed features into their owning docs and update the codemap in the same change. Contract changes include proto/SQL generation and compatibility notes; shared-state changes require race and multi-process checks. Never infer completion from a historical milestone's recorded test or benchmark result.
Security
- DPoP replay protection is missing. porto's server-side DPoP check passes
an empty config: no replay cache, no proof-to-token hash (
ath), no trusted URL; this is an upstream porto item. The trustyca login endpoint has no replay cache either: the only one xpki ships is in-memory and rejects every proof once full, and login needs no authentication, so anyone could fill it and block DPoP logins. A Redis-backed cache is the right shape. - gRPC DPoP proofs are checked against the incoming
:authority; forwarded host headers are not used. Before prod, run one--dpop-keylogin plus a gRPC command against dev (wfe.dev.trustyca.io) to confirm the ingress passes:authoritythrough unchanged.
Lint
- Tighten the golangci-lint configuration.
- Report uses of deprecated APIs (staticcheck SA1019) in lint and CI.