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* hanzo-evm: aiquorum + aimarket precompiles, evmllm (geth AI precompile + e2e), operator/canonical (commit/reveal, int8-quant), aiffi bench. Thinking-chain substrate. * hanzo-evm/evm: wire AI precompiles (inference 0x0300..03 + modelregistry) Registers deterministic int8 inference (Tier-1 in-consensus AI) + ModelSpec registry into the Hanzo EVM. threshold dep aligned to v1.9.4 (go.mod match). Builds green (55M binary). aivmbridge follows luxfi/precompile release.
45 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
45 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2026, Hanzo AI Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package canonical
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import (
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"github.com/luxfi/crypto"
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"github.com/luxfi/geth/common"
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)
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// Commit implements the SHARED WIRE SPEC exactly, byte-identical to
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// aiquorum.ComputeCommit:
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//
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// keccak256(
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// job_id(32) || model_spec_hash(32) || prompt_hash(32) ||
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// output_hash(32) || embedding_hash(32) || operator(20) || nonce(32) )
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//
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// All fields are fixed width and the order is exact. The operator's 20-byte
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// address is bound INTO the commit. That binding is the anti-copy / anti-front-
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// run control: a peer who observes operator A's commit hash on the wire cannot
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// replay it as their own, because recomputing with their own address yields a
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// different digest and the precompile's RevealResponse rejects the mismatch.
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//
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// # Commit hiding depends on the nonce (critical in GOVERNANCE mode)
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//
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// In RAW mode output_hash has full entropy, so the commit hides the output even
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// with a weak nonce. In GOVERNANCE mode output_hash is one of only a few dozen
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// possible values ({vote} x {confidence buckets}). An observer who knows the
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// (public) job_id, model_spec_hash, prompt_hash and operator address could
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// brute-force (output_hash, nonce) if the nonce were low-entropy, breaking
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// hiding before the reveal window. The nonce MUST therefore be a fresh 256-bit
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// cryptographically-random value (see operator.NewNonce); with 256 bits of
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// entropy the brute force is infeasible and hiding holds in both modes.
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func Commit(jobID, modelSpecHash, promptHash, outputHash, embeddingHash common.Hash, operator common.Address, nonce common.Hash) common.Hash {
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buf := make([]byte, 0, 32*5+20+32)
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buf = append(buf, jobID.Bytes()...)
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buf = append(buf, modelSpecHash.Bytes()...)
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buf = append(buf, promptHash.Bytes()...)
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buf = append(buf, outputHash.Bytes()...)
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buf = append(buf, embeddingHash.Bytes()...)
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buf = append(buf, operator.Bytes()...)
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buf = append(buf, nonce.Bytes()...)
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return common.BytesToHash(crypto.Keccak256(buf))
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}
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