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Forks the internal @librechat/api workspace package (packages/api) to @hanzochat/api, matching the app package @hanzochat/chat. De-LibreChats the package name and puts its build under our control. Fixes the live prod bug where the deployed chat image shipped a stale @librechat/api/dist missing the exported handleError(), breaking every error path with "handleError is not a function" and killing the SSE stream. A clean build of @hanzochat/api produces dist/index.js that exports handleError (verified: exports.handleError = handleError). - packages/api/package.json: name @librechat/api -> @hanzochat/api - 254 source/config/doc/lockfile sites: @librechat/api -> @hanzochat/api (api/, packages/, config/, turbo.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lock, package-lock.json, LLM.md) - @librechat/api-client (distinct MCP client id string) left untouched - other @librechat/* packages (client, data-schemas, data-provider) left as-is per scope pnpm install (regenerated lockfile) + build:api green; dist exports handleError. api/data-schemas/client packages build; full build:packages and api test:ci are blocked by a PRE-EXISTING, unrelated upstream break in librechat-data-provider (config.spec.ts / cloudfront-config.spec.ts reference exports that src/config.ts no longer has) -- out of scope here.
44 lines
1.4 KiB
JavaScript
44 lines
1.4 KiB
JavaScript
const { isOboConfigStillTrusted } = require('@hanzochat/api');
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const db = require('~/models');
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/**
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* Checks whether a parsed MCP server config is DB-sourced (user-created) using
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* the same `isUserSourced` heuristics as the rest of the MCP layer: an explicit
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* `source` is authoritative when present; otherwise `dbId` presence is used.
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*/
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function isDbSourced({ source, dbId }) {
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if (source != null) {
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return source === 'user';
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}
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return !!dbId;
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}
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/**
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* Builds the predicate the MCP runtime calls before performing an OBO token exchange.
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*
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* YAML/Config-sourced configs (admin-defined) bypass the check — admins are
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* already trusted at the deployment level. DB-sourced configs (created via the
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* UI) are gated on the original author still holding `MCP_SERVERS.CONFIGURE_OBO`,
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* so retained configs fail closed when an author's role is downgraded.
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*/
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function createOboTrustChecker() {
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return async ({ source, author, dbId }) => {
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if (!isDbSourced({ source, dbId })) {
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return true;
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}
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return isOboConfigStillTrusted({
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authorId: author,
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getUserRoleByAuthorId: async (userId) => {
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const user = await db.findUser({ _id: userId }, 'role');
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return user?.role;
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},
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getRolePermissions: async (roleName) => {
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const role = await db.getRoleByName(roleName);
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return role?.permissions;
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},
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});
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};
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}
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module.exports = { createOboTrustChecker };
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