Files
deploy/util/sourceintegrity/source_integrity_test.go
41536738c8 refactor(cd): hard-fork - rename CRD API group argoproj.io -> deploy.hanzo.ai (#1)
* feat(api): hard-fork CRD API group argoproj.io -> deploy.hanzo.ai

Hanzo CD hard-fork, phase 1.1. Single source of truth is
pkg/apis/application/register.go's Group constant (Application/AppProject/
ApplicationSet all derive their FullName from it); every other Go call-site
that hardcoded the literal group string is updated to match: the 3 generated
informer GVRs, the app-of-apps nested-Application detector in types.go, the
resource-tree Application-kind cache populator, the 3 NotFound error
constructors in server/application, and the applicationset-controller's
leader-election Lease name/ID (kept in lockstep across Go source + RBAC
resourceNames, or leader election would get RBAC-denied on startup).

CRD YAMLs (application/appproject/applicationset) and every RBAC apiGroups
rule that actually governs our 3 CRDs are repointed to deploy.hanzo.ai, across
both manifests/base/* (namespaced Roles) and manifests/cluster-rbac/* (cluster
scope). Two adjacent things that share the "argoproj.io" string but are NOT
ours are deliberately left untouched: gitops-engine's health-check dispatch
for Argo Workflows' `Workflow` kind, and argocd-server-clusterrole's second
apiGroups block granting read on Argo Workflows' `workflows` resource — both
belong to a separate, unrelated Argoproj-family project we are not forking.

Also untouched, per explicit scope: annotation/label keys (argocd.argoproj.io/*)
and finalizers (*.argoproj.io) that track already-applied live resources, and
argocd-cm.yaml's resource.customizations.ignoreResourceUpdates keys (a narrow
app-of-apps diffing nicety, not build- or RBAC-relevant).

CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./... verified green.

* ci: wire canonical hanzo.yml + cicd.yml (Hanzo CD image build)

Phase 1.3. Follows the same one-way pattern every hanzo/lux/zoo repo uses:
hanzo.yml declares the image (root Dockerfile -> ghcr.io/hanzoai/deploy) and a
fast go-build sanity test (the multi-stage Dockerfile build is the slow, real
gate); cicd.yml is the ~10-line trigger shim importing hanzoai/ci's reusable
build workflow on the arc pool, secrets from KMS only.

No `deploy:` block yet, matching the hanzoai/cms build-only-first-cutover
pattern: this repo's own live hanzo-cd namespace runs the whole Hanzo fleet's
GitOps, so the prod image/CRD swap is a deliberate separate action (see the
[HELD] universe PR), never an automatic rollout on merge. Every PR/push still
builds and pushes an immutable ghcr.io/hanzoai/deploy:sha-<7>-amd64 image.

* feat(ui): rebrand Argo CD -> Hanzo CD (title, favicon, logo, sidebar)

Phase 1.2. User-facing "Argo CD"/"ArgoCD" text replaced with "Hanzo CD"
across the login page, help modal, settings screens, version-info panel,
sync-options warning, fullscreen-logs title, app.tsx page titles, and
index.html's <title>/noscript text (dropped the now-wrong upstream CLI
doc link rather than invent a hanzo.ai URL that doesn't exist).

Logo/favicon assets replaced with the canonical Hanzo mark (never
hand-drawn, copied from ~/work/hanzo/logo/dist): the two real usages of
Argo's logo collapse onto one Hanzo glyph (mono + white variants) at the
same 5 call sites (login icon + footer, login.scss $logoPath/
$logoNegativePath, sidebar text-logo), preserving the existing CSS
invert() filters so both the light login panel and dark sidebar still
render correctly. Old argologo.svg/argo_o.svg/argo.png deleted (no
longer referenced). favicon-{16x16,32x32}.png added at
ui/src/assets/favicon/ (index.html's links to that path were previously
dead - the directory didn't exist in this checkout). package.json name
argo-cd-ui -> hanzo-cd-ui.

Left alone, deliberately: the two Kubernetes resource-kind icon sets
under ui/src/assets/images/resources/ (unrelated to branding), and
upstream doc/project links (argoproj.io, argo-cd.readthedocs.io) since
we have no equivalent hanzo.ai docs to point to yet - except the login
footer logo's outbound link, which now points to hanzo.ai instead of
argoproj.io (a Hanzo-branded mark linking to the upstream project it
was forked from read as an obvious leftover).

* feat(module): rename Go module github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 -> github.com/hanzoai/deploy

Phase 2. No version suffix on the new path (org policy: never publish our
own Go modules above v1.x.x / with a v2+ suffix) — this fork starts a fresh
v0/v1 module identity rather than carrying the v3 the upstream fork point
had reached.

Mechanical, symmetric rewrite: 704 .go files (import statements only; two
disjoint substitutions applied specific-first so the nested gitops-engine
module path never double-matches), plus go.mod (module line, the
gitops-engine require+replace pair, version reset to v0.0.0-... since a
suffix-less path can't carry a v3 semver), gitops-engine/go.mod, Makefile
(ldflags PACKAGE + 2 TEST_MODULE filters), .golangci.yaml, .goreleaser.yaml,
.mockery.yaml (+ gitops-engine's), Procfile, the codegen/proto generation
scripts (hack/generate-proto.sh, update-codegen.sh, update-openapi.sh), and
20 .proto files' go_package options. Also one OpenTelemetry tracer name
string in gitops-engine/pkg/sync/sync_context.go (a cosmestic label, not an
import, but worth keeping consistent).

CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./... verified green for both the root module and
the nested gitops-engine module; go vet clean on both; go mod tidy run
(network available) to reconcile go.sum, dependency set unchanged.

Left alone, deliberately: doc-only mentions (docs/snyk/*.html scan reports,
gitops-engine/README.md), a comment-only reference in
.github/workflows/release.yaml, and one Renovate bot config line — none are
build- or codegen-load-bearing. Also left alone: comments citing upstream
GitHub issue URLs (github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues/NNNNN) and a handful
of test fixtures using "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd.git" as a
representative example repo URL — both are accurate historical/test-data
references, not stale self-references.

---------

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-07-29 18:27:58 -07:00

580 lines
21 KiB
Go

package sourceintegrity
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/mock"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/hanzoai/deploy/pkg/apis/application/v1alpha1"
"github.com/hanzoai/deploy/util/git"
gitmocks "github.com/hanzoai/deploy/util/git/mocks"
utilTest "github.com/hanzoai/deploy/util/test"
)
func Test_IsGPGEnabled(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("true", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ARGOCD_GPG_ENABLED", "true")
assert.True(t, IsGPGEnabled())
})
t.Run("false", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ARGOCD_GPG_ENABLED", "false")
assert.False(t, IsGPGEnabled())
})
t.Run("empty", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ARGOCD_GPG_ENABLED", "")
assert.True(t, IsGPGEnabled())
})
}
func Test_GPGDisabledLogging(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("ARGOCD_GPG_ENABLED", "false")
si := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrity{Git: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGit{Policies: []*v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy{{
Repos: []v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyRepo{{URL: "*"}},
GPG: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{
Mode: v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPGModeStrict,
Keys: []string{"SOME_KEY_ID"},
},
}}}}
logger := utilTest.LogHook{}
logrus.AddHook(&logger)
t.Cleanup(logger.CleanupHook)
fun := lookupGit(si, "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd.git")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"SourceIntegrity criteria for git+gpg declared, but it is turned off by ARGOCD_GPG_ENABLED"}, logger.GetEntries())
assert.Nil(t, fun)
// No logs on the second call
logger.Entries = []logrus.Entry{}
lookupGit(si, "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd-ext.git")
assert.Equal(t, []string{}, logger.GetEntries())
assert.Nil(t, fun)
}
func TestGPGUnknownMode(t *testing.T) {
gitClient := &gitmocks.Client{}
gitClient.EXPECT().IsAnnotatedTag(mock.Anything, mock.Anything).Return(false)
gitClient.EXPECT().CommitSHA(mock.Anything).Return("DEADBEEF", nil)
s := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{Mode: "foobar", Keys: []string{}}
result, _, err := verify(t.Context(), s, gitClient, "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd.git")
require.ErrorContains(t, err, `unknown GPG mode "foobar" configured for GIT source integrity`)
assert.Nil(t, result)
}
func TestNullOrEmptyDoesNothing(t *testing.T) {
repoURL := "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd"
applicationSource := v1alpha1.ApplicationSource{RepoURL: repoURL}
gitClient := &gitmocks.Client{}
gitClient.EXPECT().RepoURL().Return(repoURL)
tests := []struct {
name string
si *v1alpha1.SourceIntegrity
logged []string
}{
{
name: "nil",
si: nil,
logged: []string{},
},
{
name: "No GIT",
si: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrity{}, // No Git or alternative specified
logged: []string{},
},
{
name: "No matching policy",
si: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrity{Git: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGit{}}, // No policies configured here
logged: []string{},
},
{
name: "Matching policy does nothing",
si: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrity{Git: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGit{Policies: []*v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy{{
Repos: []v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyRepo{{URL: "*"}},
// No GPG or alternative specified
}}}},
logged: []string{"No verification configured for SourceIntegrity policy for [{URL:*}]"},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
logger := utilTest.LogHook{}
logrus.AddHook(&logger)
t.Cleanup(logger.CleanupHook)
assert.False(t, HasCriteria(tt.si, applicationSource))
assert.Equal(t, tt.logged, logger.GetEntries())
})
}
}
func TestPolicyMatching(t *testing.T) {
group := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy{
Repos: []v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyRepo{
{URL: "https://github.com/group/*"},
{URL: "!https://github.com/group/*-legacy.git"},
{URL: "!https://github.com/group/*-critical.git"},
},
GPG: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{
Mode: v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPGModeHead,
},
}
legacy := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy{
Repos: []v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyRepo{
{URL: "https://github.com/group/*-legacy.git"},
},
GPG: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{
Mode: v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPGModeNone,
},
}
critical := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy{
Repos: []v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyRepo{
{URL: "https://github.com/group/*-critical.git"},
},
GPG: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{
Mode: v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPGModeStrict,
},
}
// collides with group
duplicated := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy{
Repos: []v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyRepo{
{URL: "https://github.com/group/duplicated.git"},
},
GPG: &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{
Mode: v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPGModeHead,
},
}
sig := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGit{
Policies: []*v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy{group, legacy, critical, duplicated},
}
p := func(ps ...*v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy) []*v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy { return ps }
testCases := []struct {
repo string
expectedPolicies []*v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicy
expectedLogs []string
expectedNoFunc bool
}{
{
repo: "https://github.com/group/head.git",
expectedPolicies: p(group),
expectedLogs: []string{},
},
{
repo: "https://github.com/group/foo-legacy.git",
expectedPolicies: p(legacy),
expectedLogs: []string{},
expectedNoFunc: true, // The mode is "none"
},
{
repo: "https://github.com/group/bar-critical.git",
expectedPolicies: p(critical),
expectedLogs: []string{},
},
{
repo: "https://github.com/group/duplicated.git",
expectedPolicies: p(group, duplicated),
expectedLogs: []string{"multiple (2) git source integrity policies found for repo URL: https://github.com/group/duplicated.git"},
},
{
repo: "https://gitlab.com/foo/bar.git",
expectedPolicies: p(),
expectedLogs: []string{"No git source integrity policies found for repo URL: https://gitlab.com/foo/bar.git"},
expectedNoFunc: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range testCases {
t.Run(tt.repo, func(t *testing.T) {
actual := findMatchingGitPolicies(sig, tt.repo)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expectedPolicies, actual)
hook := utilTest.NewLogHook(logrus.InfoLevel)
logrus.AddHook(hook)
defer hook.CleanupHook()
si := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrity{Git: sig}
forGitFunc := lookupGit(si, tt.repo)
if tt.expectedNoFunc {
assert.Nil(t, forGitFunc)
} else {
assert.NotNil(t, forGitFunc)
}
assert.Equal(t, tt.expectedLogs, hook.GetEntries())
})
}
}
// Verify that when a user has configured the full fingerprint, it is still accepted
func TestComparingWithGPGFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
const shortKey = "D56C4FCA57A46444"
const fingerprint = "01234567890123456789abcd" + shortKey
require.True(t, IsShortKeyID(shortKey))
require.True(t, IsLongKeyID(fingerprint))
gitClient := &gitmocks.Client{}
gitClient.EXPECT().LsSignatures(mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything).Return(
[]git.RevisionSignatureInfo{{
Revision: "1.0", VerificationResult: git.GPGVerificationResultGood, SignatureKeyID: shortKey, Date: "ignored", AuthorIdentity: "ignored",
}},
fmt.Sprintf(`gpg: Signature made Wed Feb 26 23:22:34 2020 CET
gpg: using RSA key %s
gpg: Good signature from "test user <[email protected]>" [ultimate]`, fingerprint),
nil,
)
gpgWithTag := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{Mode: v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPGModeHead, Keys: []string{fingerprint}}
// And verifying a given revision
result, legacy, err := verify(t.Context(), gpgWithTag, gitClient, "1.0")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, result.IsValid())
require.NoError(t, result.AsError())
assert.Equal(t, "Good signature from ignored key D56C4FCA57A46444", legacy)
}
func TestGPGHeadValid(t *testing.T) {
const sha = "0c7a9c3f939c1f19b518bcdd11e2fce9703c4901"
const tag = "tag"
const keyId = "4cfe068f80b1681b"
testCases := []struct {
revision string
check func(gitClient *gitmocks.Client, logger utilTest.LogHook)
}{
{
revision: sha,
check: func(gitClient *gitmocks.Client, logger utilTest.LogHook) {
gitClient.AssertCalled(t, "LsSignatures", mock.Anything, sha, false)
assert.Empty(t, logger.GetEntries())
},
},
{
revision: tag,
check: func(gitClient *gitmocks.Client, logger utilTest.LogHook) {
gitClient.AssertCalled(t, "LsSignatures", mock.Anything, tag, false)
assert.Empty(t, logger.GetEntries())
},
},
}
for _, test := range testCases {
t.Run("verify "+test.revision, func(t *testing.T) {
// Given repo with a tagged commit
gitClient := &gitmocks.Client{}
gitClient.EXPECT().LsSignatures(mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything).RunAndReturn(func(_ context.Context, revision string, _ bool) ([]git.RevisionSignatureInfo, string, error) {
signatureInfos := []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{{
Revision: revision, VerificationResult: git.GPGVerificationResultGood, SignatureKeyID: keyId, Date: "ignored", AuthorIdentity: "ignored",
}}
legacy := fmt.Sprintf(`gpg: Signature made Wed Feb 26 23:22:34 2020 CET
gpg: using RSA key %s
gpg: Good signature from "test user <[email protected]>" [ultimate]`, keyId)
return signatureInfos, legacy, nil
})
logger := utilTest.LogHook{}
logrus.AddHook(&logger)
t.Cleanup(logger.CleanupHook)
// When using head mode
gpgWithTag := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{
Mode: v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPGModeHead,
Keys: []string{keyId, "0000000000000000"},
}
// And verifying a given revision
result, legacy, err := verify(t.Context(), gpgWithTag, gitClient, test.revision)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Then it is checked and valid
assert.True(t, result.IsValid())
assert.Equal(t, []string{"GIT/GPG"}, result.PassedChecks())
test.check(gitClient, logger)
require.NoError(t, result.AsError())
assert.Equal(t, "Good signature from ignored key 4cfe068f80b1681b", legacy)
})
}
}
func TestDescribeProblems(t *testing.T) {
const r = "aafc9e88599f24802b113b6278e42eaadda32cd6"
const a = "Commit Author <[email protected]>"
const kGood = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
const kOk = "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
policy := v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{Keys: []string{kGood, kOk}}
sig := func(key string, result git.GPGVerificationResult) git.RevisionSignatureInfo {
return git.RevisionSignatureInfo{
Revision: r,
VerificationResult: result,
SignatureKeyID: key,
AuthorIdentity: a,
}
}
tests := []struct {
name string
gpg *v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG
sigs []git.RevisionSignatureInfo
expected []string
legacy string
}{
{
name: "report only problems",
gpg: &policy,
sigs: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{
sig("bad", git.GPGVerificationResultRevokedKey),
sig(kGood, git.GPGVerificationResultGood),
sig("also_bad", git.GPGVerificationResultUntrusted),
},
expected: []string{
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': signed with revoked key (key_id=bad)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': signed with untrusted key (key_id=also_bad)",
},
legacy: "Invalid signature from Commit Author <[email protected]> key bad",
},
{
name: "collapse problems of the same key",
gpg: &policy,
sigs: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{
sig("bad", git.GPGVerificationResultRevokedKey),
sig(kGood, git.GPGVerificationResultGood),
sig("also_bad", git.GPGVerificationResultUntrusted),
sig("bad", git.GPGVerificationResultRevokedKey),
},
expected: []string{
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': signed with revoked key (key_id=bad)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': signed with untrusted key (key_id=also_bad)",
},
legacy: "Invalid signature from Commit Author <[email protected]> key bad",
},
{
name: "do not collapse unsigned commits, as they can differ by author",
gpg: &policy,
sigs: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{
sig("", git.GPGVerificationResultUnsigned),
sig("", git.GPGVerificationResultUnsigned),
sig("", git.GPGVerificationResultUnsigned),
},
expected: []string{
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': unsigned (key_id=)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': unsigned (key_id=)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': unsigned (key_id=)",
},
legacy: "Revision is not signed.",
},
{
name: "Report first ten problems only",
gpg: &policy,
sigs: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{
sig("revoked", git.GPGVerificationResultRevokedKey),
sig(kGood, git.GPGVerificationResultGood),
sig("", git.GPGVerificationResultUnsigned),
sig("untrusted", git.GPGVerificationResultUntrusted),
sig("missing", git.GPGVerificationResultMissingKey),
sig("expired_key", git.GPGVerificationResultExpiredKey),
sig("expired_sig", git.GPGVerificationResultExpiredSignature),
sig("bad", git.GPGVerificationResultBad),
sig("also_bad", git.GPGVerificationResultBad),
sig("more_bad", git.GPGVerificationResultBad),
sig("outright_terrible", git.GPGVerificationResultBad),
// the rest is cut off
sig("OMG", git.GPGVerificationResultBad),
sig("nope", git.GPGVerificationResultBad),
sig("you_gotta_be_kidding_me", git.GPGVerificationResultBad),
},
expected: []string{
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': signed with revoked key (key_id=revoked)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': unsigned (key_id=)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': signed with untrusted key (key_id=untrusted)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': signed with key not in keyring (key_id=missing)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': signed with expired key (key_id=expired_key)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': expired signature (key_id=expired_sig)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': bad signature (key_id=bad)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': bad signature (key_id=also_bad)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': bad signature (key_id=more_bad)",
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': bad signature (key_id=outright_terrible)",
},
legacy: "Invalid signature from " + a + " key revoked",
},
{
name: "legacy verification is possitive even when older commits are untrusted, legacy is always shallow",
gpg: &policy,
sigs: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{
sig(kGood, git.GPGVerificationResultGood),
sig("bad", git.GPGVerificationResultBad),
},
expected: []string{
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': bad signature (key_id=bad)",
},
legacy: "Good signature from " + a + " key AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
},
{
name: "do not collapse commits by key when they differ by the result",
gpg: &policy,
sigs: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{
sig(kGood, git.GPGVerificationResultGood),
sig(kGood, git.GPGVerificationResultBad),
},
expected: []string{
"Failed verifying revision " + r + " by '" + a + "': bad signature (key_id=" + kGood + ")",
},
legacy: "Good signature from " + a + " key AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
problems, legacy := describeProblems(tt.gpg, tt.sigs)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, problems)
assert.Equal(t, tt.legacy, legacy)
})
}
}
func TestGPGStrictValid(t *testing.T) {
const shaFirst = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
const shaSecond = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
const shaThird = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc"
const tagFirst = "tag-first"
const tagSecond = "tag-second"
const tagThird = "tag-third"
const keyOfThird = "9c698b961c1088db"
const keyOfSecond = "f4b9db205449e1d9"
const keyOfFirst = "92bfcec2e8161558"
rsi := func(rev string, key string) git.RevisionSignatureInfo {
return git.RevisionSignatureInfo{
Revision: rev,
VerificationResult: git.GPGVerificationResultGood,
SignatureKeyID: key,
Date: "ignored",
AuthorIdentity: "ignored",
}
}
// To be resolved as lsSignatures[deep][revision]
lsSignatures := map[bool]map[string][]git.RevisionSignatureInfo{
// Return info for all preceding revisions. If revision is a tag, start with a tag.
true: {
shaFirst: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(shaFirst, keyOfFirst)},
tagFirst: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(tagFirst, keyOfFirst), rsi(tagFirst, keyOfFirst)},
shaSecond: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(shaSecond, keyOfSecond), rsi(shaFirst, keyOfFirst)},
tagSecond: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(tagSecond, keyOfSecond), rsi(shaSecond, keyOfSecond), rsi(shaFirst, keyOfFirst)},
shaThird: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(shaThird, keyOfThird), rsi(shaSecond, keyOfSecond), rsi(shaFirst, keyOfFirst)},
tagThird: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(tagThird, keyOfThird), rsi(shaThird, keyOfThird), rsi(shaSecond, keyOfSecond), rsi(shaFirst, keyOfFirst)},
},
// Return info for just the tag or revision
false: {
shaFirst: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(shaFirst, keyOfFirst)},
tagFirst: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(tagFirst, keyOfFirst)},
shaSecond: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(shaSecond, keyOfSecond)},
tagSecond: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(tagSecond, keyOfSecond)},
shaThird: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(shaThird, keyOfThird)},
tagThird: []git.RevisionSignatureInfo{rsi(tagThird, keyOfThird)},
},
}
tests := []struct {
revision string
expectedErr string
expectedPassed []string
expectedLsArgs []any
expectedLegacy string
}{
{
revision: shaFirst,
expectedPassed: []string{"GIT/GPG"},
expectedLsArgs: []any{shaFirst, true},
expectedLegacy: "Good signature from ignored key " + keyOfFirst,
},
{
revision: shaSecond,
expectedPassed: []string{"GIT/GPG"},
expectedLsArgs: []any{shaSecond, true},
expectedLegacy: "Good signature from ignored key " + keyOfSecond,
},
{
revision: shaThird,
expectedPassed: []string{},
expectedErr: fmt.Sprintf("GIT/GPG: Failed verifying revision %s by 'ignored': signed with unallowed key (key_id=%s)", shaThird, keyOfThird),
expectedLsArgs: []any{shaThird, true},
expectedLegacy: "Found good signature made with RSA key " + keyOfThird + ", but this key is not allowed in AppProject",
},
{
revision: tagFirst,
expectedPassed: []string{"GIT/GPG"},
expectedLsArgs: []any{shaFirst, true},
expectedLegacy: "Good signature from ignored key " + keyOfFirst,
},
{
revision: tagSecond,
expectedPassed: []string{"GIT/GPG"},
expectedLsArgs: []any{shaSecond, true},
expectedLegacy: "Good signature from ignored key " + keyOfSecond,
},
{
revision: tagThird,
expectedPassed: []string{},
expectedErr: fmt.Sprintf(`GIT/GPG: Failed verifying revision %s by 'ignored': signed with unallowed key (key_id=%s)
GIT/GPG: Failed verifying revision %s by 'ignored': signed with unallowed key (key_id=%s)`, tagThird, keyOfThird, shaThird, keyOfThird),
expectedLsArgs: []any{shaThird, true},
expectedLegacy: "Found good signature made with RSA key " + keyOfThird + ", but this key is not allowed in AppProject",
},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run("verify "+test.revision, func(t *testing.T) {
// Given repo with a tagged commit
gitClient := &gitmocks.Client{}
gitClient.EXPECT().LsSignatures(mock.Anything, mock.Anything, mock.Anything).RunAndReturn(
func(_ context.Context, revision string, deep bool) (info []git.RevisionSignatureInfo, legacy string, err error) {
if ret, ok := lsSignatures[deep][revision]; ok {
legacy := fmt.Sprintf(`gpg: Signature made %s
gpg: using RSA key D6E87BF6B9AE64079FFEDC02%s
gpg: Good signature from "%s" [ultimate]`, "Wed Feb 26 23:22:34 2020 CET", ret[0].SignatureKeyID, ret[0].AuthorIdentity)
return ret, legacy, nil
}
panic("unknown revision " + revision)
},
)
logger := utilTest.LogHook{}
logrus.AddHook(&logger)
t.Cleanup(logger.CleanupHook)
// When using strict mode
gpgWithTag := &v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPG{
Mode: v1alpha1.SourceIntegrityGitPolicyGPGModeStrict,
Keys: []string{keyOfFirst, keyOfSecond},
}
// And verifying a given revision
result, legacy, err := verify(t.Context(), gpgWithTag, gitClient, test.revision)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Then it is checked and valid
err = result.AsError()
if test.expectedErr == "" {
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, result.IsValid())
} else {
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, test.expectedErr, err.Error())
assert.False(t, result.IsValid())
}
assert.Equal(t, test.expectedLegacy, legacy)
assert.Equal(t, test.expectedPassed, result.PassedChecks())
assert.Empty(t, logger.GetEntries())
})
}
}