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2026-06-28 20:33:35 -07:00

2.3 KiB

drive

Hanzo Drive

End-to-end post-quantum, Google-Drive-class storage on the Hanzo object substrate. Content never reaches the server in plaintext; sharing is a key re-wrap, not a re-encrypt.

How it's built (one substrate, no new services)

        storage-console (web)        FUSE mount (desktop sync)
                    \                /
                  hanzoai/drive  (this repo)
        per-tenant metadata + ACLs  |  content blobs
                    |               |
        hanzoai/sqlite3 + hanzovfs  |  hanzoai/vfs ⇒ hanzoai/s3
        (encrypted SQLite, PQ)      |  (content-addressed, PQ blocks)
                    \_______________/
                    lux.id (auth/share) · luxfi/hsm+kms (key custody)
  • Content — each file is sealed with a fresh per-node DEK (ChaCha20-Poly1305), stored as a content-addressed blob on a hanzoai/vfs backend (s3:// in prod).
  • Metadata + ACLs — folder tree, versions, and shares live in a per-tenant encrypted SQLite (hanzoai/sqlite3 + hanzovfs), so metadata is PQ at rest too.
  • Sharing — the node DEK is sealed to each recipient's ML-KEM-768 + X25519 identity (luxfi/age). Sharing re-wraps the DEK; the content bytes never re-encrypt and the server never sees plaintext. Revocation rotates the DEK forward.
  • Versioning / dedup — blobs are content-addressed, so an edit stores only new blobs and file history is an immutable blob set.

Surfaces

  • Web: hanzoai/storage-console over the /v1/drive/* API (mounts into hanzoai/cloud).
  • Desktop sync: the hanzoai/vfs FUSE mount — a normal folder, encrypted-at-rest.

Status

Core library + /v1/drive HTTP surface (cloud subsystem Mount, registers into cloud.Registry order 120) both green — health, upload (PQ-sealed), list, download, share. storage-console can hit /v1/drive/* once the cloud binary enables drive. Tamper-evident audit trail (hash-chained, VerifyAudit) + /v1/drive/audit — SOC 2 CC7.2. See SOC2-READINESS.md. Next: HSM-rooted DEK custody (luxfi/hsm), SIEM log export, chunked large files, storage-console wiring.

See [HIP]: realizes HIP-0302 (encrypted SQLite) + HIP-0107 (VFS replication). MIT (depends on AGPL hanzoai/s3 at the storage floor).