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zeekayandHanzo Dev 1e5d61041a feat: Hanzo Drive — e2e post-quantum Drive on the Hanzo object substrate
Per-tenant encrypted SQLite (hanzoai/sqlite3 + hanzovfs) for the folder tree,
versions, and ACLs; content-addressed ChaCha20-Poly1305 blobs on hanzoai/vfs
(⇒ hanzoai/s3); sharing by re-wrapping a node DEK to a recipient's ML-KEM-768 +
X25519 identity (luxfi/age) — no re-encrypt, server never sees plaintext.

Core Store: Mkdir/Upload/List/Download/Share. Test proves upload→list→download→
share→non-shared-denied, all e2e-PQ. Realizes HIP-0302 + HIP-0107.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-06-16 21:20:57 +00:00

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// Package drive — Hanzo Drive. See README.md.
//
// Threat model: the server (and S3 provider) are honest-but-curious. All content
// and metadata are encrypted client/edge-side; the server stores only ciphertext
// and ML-KEM-wrapped DEKs. A quantum adversary recording all objects learns
// nothing without a tenant's ML-KEM identity (custodied by luxfi/hsm in prod).
package drive