mirror of
https://github.com/hanzoai/drive.git
synced 2026-10-30 18:38:28 +00:00
Per-tenant encrypted SQLite (hanzoai/sqlite3 + hanzovfs) for the folder tree, versions, and ACLs; content-addressed ChaCha20-Poly1305 blobs on hanzoai/vfs (⇒ hanzoai/s3); sharing by re-wrapping a node DEK to a recipient's ML-KEM-768 + X25519 identity (luxfi/age) — no re-encrypt, server never sees plaintext. Core Store: Mkdir/Upload/List/Download/Share. Test proves upload→list→download→ share→non-shared-denied, all e2e-PQ. Realizes HIP-0302 + HIP-0107. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
8 lines
387 B
Go
8 lines
387 B
Go
// Package drive — Hanzo Drive. See README.md.
|
|
//
|
|
// Threat model: the server (and S3 provider) are honest-but-curious. All content
|
|
// and metadata are encrypted client/edge-side; the server stores only ciphertext
|
|
// and ML-KEM-wrapped DEKs. A quantum adversary recording all objects learns
|
|
// nothing without a tenant's ML-KEM identity (custodied by luxfi/hsm in prod).
|
|
package drive
|