Files
engine/hanzo-server-core/src/util.rs
zeekayandHanzo Dev be2f152a42 fix(ci): install libclang for the rocm check, and unsplice two doc comments
ci.yml had two independent failures.

Check (rocm):

    panicked … Unable to find libclang: "couldn't find any valid shared libraries
    matching: ['libclang.so', …], set the `LIBCLANG_PATH`"

bindgen runs over include/hip.h for the rocm feature and needs libclang; the job
installed curl, build-essential, libssl-dev, protobuf-compiler and pkg-config but
not that. Added. Same family as the other tool gaps on this runner image — the
error names a build script, not the missing package.

Clippy:

    error: doc list item without indentation
      --> hanzo-server-core/src/util.rs:28:5
      = note: `-D clippy::doc-lazy-continuation` implied by `-D warnings`

Not a formatting nit. Two doc comments had been SPLICED: 721abb89a2 added
local_media_allowed() and its documentation landed INSIDE the existing
fetch_remote_media doc, so one merged block sat above local_media_allowed and
`fetch_remote_media` — the function that refuses SSRF — was left with no
documentation at all. Clippy was reporting the seam.

Each doc is back on the function it describes. Indenting line 28 would have
silenced the lint and left the docs on the wrong functions.

    cargo clippy -p hanzo-server-core --lib -- -D warnings   exit 0 (was 1)

ci.yml was already failing on the four commits before this one, so neither is a
regression from the deploy rewrite.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-08-02 08:48:07 -07:00

566 lines
24 KiB
Rust

//! ## General utilities.
use hanzo_engine::AudioInput;
use hanzo_engine::Hanzo;
use image::DynamicImage;
use std::error::Error;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::{
fs::{self, File},
io::AsyncReadExt,
};
/// Largest media body accepted from a remote URL. A request body is attacker-chosen; without a cap a
/// single `image_url` can stream until the process is OOM-killed.
const MAX_REMOTE_MEDIA_BYTES: u64 = 64 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Whether this process may read media from its own filesystem.
///
/// `parse_image_url`/`parse_audio_url` are reachable from `/v1/chat/completions`
/// and `/v1/embeddings`, where the string comes from the request body. A
/// `file://` URL — or a bare path, which is promoted to one below — therefore
/// lets a caller name any file the server process can open and receive its
/// bytes back decoded as media. The remote path already refuses to be steered
/// (no redirects, no private addresses); the local path had no equivalent gate.
///
/// Local media is genuinely useful when the engine runs as a local tool against
/// files the operator already owns, so this is a gate rather than a removal —
/// and it is closed unless the operator opens it, because a server serving
/// other people is the case that must be safe by default.
fn local_media_allowed() -> bool {
matches!(
std::env::var("HANZO_ALLOW_LOCAL_MEDIA").as_deref(),
Ok("1") | Ok("true") | Ok("TRUE")
)
}
/// Fetch `url` over http(s) for media, refusing what a server must not fetch on a caller's behalf.
///
/// `parse_image_url`/`parse_audio_url` run on `/v1/chat/completions` and `/v1/embeddings`, so the URL
/// arrives from an untrusted request body. A bare GET there is an SSRF primitive: the server will
/// happily fetch `http://169.254.169.254/...` (cloud metadata, i.e. credentials), reach hosts inside
/// the deployment's network that the caller cannot, follow a redirect from a public host into either,
/// and stream an unbounded body. This refuses all four:
/// - only http/https (the caller's scheme choice is not ours to trust),
/// - no redirects, so a public URL cannot hop to a private one after the check,
/// - resolved address must be globally routable -- no loopback/private/link-local/unspecified,
/// - body capped at MAX_REMOTE_MEDIA_BYTES, enforced on the stream, not on a claimed header.
async fn fetch_remote_media(url: &url::Url) -> Result<Vec<u8>, anyhow::Error> {
if url.scheme() != "http" && url.scheme() != "https" {
anyhow::bail!("Unsupported URL scheme for remote media: {}", url.scheme());
}
// Match on the parsed host, not `host_str()`: that returns an IPv6 literal still wrapped in
// brackets ("[::1]"), which no resolver accepts -- the address would fail DNS instead of reaching
// the check below, refusing for the wrong reason and never testing the IP at all.
let host = url
.host()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Remote media URL has no host: {url}"))?;
let ips: Vec<std::net::IpAddr> = match host {
// A literal address needs no resolver; check what was actually named.
url::Host::Ipv4(v4) => vec![std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4)],
url::Host::Ipv6(v6) => vec![std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6)],
// A name is only as safe as its worst address: check every one it maps to, since a name can
// resolve to a private address (and to several).
url::Host::Domain(name) => {
let port = url.port_or_known_default().unwrap_or(80);
tokio::net::lookup_host((name, port))
.await
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Could not resolve remote media host '{name}': {e}"))?
.map(|a| a.ip())
.collect()
}
};
if ips.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("Remote media host '{host}' resolved to no addresses");
}
for ip in ips {
let blocked = match ip {
std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
v4.is_loopback()
|| v4.is_private()
|| v4.is_link_local()
|| v4.is_broadcast()
|| v4.is_unspecified()
|| v4.is_documentation()
}
std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
v6.is_loopback()
|| v6.is_unspecified()
|| v6.is_unique_local()
|| v6.is_unicast_link_local()
}
};
if blocked {
anyhow::bail!(
"Refusing to fetch remote media from non-public address {ip} (host '{host}')"
);
}
}
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
.build()?;
let resp = client.get(url.clone()).send().await?.error_for_status()?;
// Cap on the stream: Content-Length is the sender's claim, not a limit.
use futures::StreamExt;
let mut out: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
let mut stream = resp.bytes_stream();
while let Some(chunk) = stream.next().await {
let chunk = chunk?;
if out.len() as u64 + chunk.len() as u64 > MAX_REMOTE_MEDIA_BYTES {
anyhow::bail!("Remote media at {url} exceeds the {MAX_REMOTE_MEDIA_BYTES} byte limit");
}
out.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
}
Ok(out)
}
/// Parses and loads an image from a URL, file path, or data URL.
///
/// This function accepts various input formats and attempts to parse them in order:
/// 1. First tries to parse as a complete URL (http/https/file/data schemes)
/// 2. If that fails, checks if it's a local file path and converts to file URL
/// 3. Finally falls back to treating it as a malformed URL and returns an error
///
/// ### Arguments
///
/// * `url_unparsed` - A string that can be:
/// - An HTTP/HTTPS URL (e.g., "<https://example.com/image.png>")
/// - A file path (e.g., "/path/to/image.jpg" or "image.png")
/// - A data URL with base64 encoded image (e.g., "data:image/png;base64,...")
/// - A file URL (e.g., "file:///path/to/image.jpg")
///
/// ### Examples
///
/// ```ignore
/// use hanzo_server_core::util::parse_image_url;
///
/// // Load from HTTP URL
/// let image = parse_image_url("https://example.com/photo.jpg").await?;
///
/// // Load from local file path
/// let image = parse_image_url("./assets/logo.png").await?;
///
/// // Load from data URL
/// let image = parse_image_url("...").await?;
///
/// // Load from file URL
/// let image = parse_image_url("file:///home/user/picture.jpg").await?;
/// ```
pub async fn parse_image_url(url_unparsed: &str) -> Result<DynamicImage, anyhow::Error> {
let url = if let Ok(url) = url::Url::parse(url_unparsed) {
url
} else if local_media_allowed() && File::open(url_unparsed).await.is_ok() {
url::Url::from_file_path(std::path::absolute(url_unparsed)?)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Could not parse file path: {}", url_unparsed))?
} else {
anyhow::bail!(
"Invalid source '{}': not a valid URL (http/https/data) and file not found on server. \
Use a full URL, a data URL, or an absolute file path that exists on the server.",
url_unparsed
)
};
let bytes = if url.scheme() == "http" || url.scheme() == "https" {
fetch_remote_media(&url).await?
} else if url.scheme() == "file" {
if !local_media_allowed() {
anyhow::bail!(
"Refusing to read local media: set HANZO_ALLOW_LOCAL_MEDIA=1 to allow \
file:// and local paths on this server"
);
}
let path = url
.to_file_path()
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Could not parse file path: {}", url))?;
if let Ok(mut f) = File::open(&path).await {
// Read from local file
let metadata = fs::metadata(&path).await?;
let mut buffer = vec![0; metadata.len() as usize];
f.read_exact(&mut buffer).await?;
buffer
} else {
anyhow::bail!("Could not open file at path: {}", url);
}
} else if url.scheme() == "data" {
// Decode with base64
let data_url = data_url::DataUrl::process(url.as_str())?;
data_url.decode_to_vec()?.0
} else {
anyhow::bail!("Unsupported URL scheme: {}", url.scheme());
};
Ok(image::load_from_memory(&bytes)?)
}
/// Parses and loads an audio file from a URL, file path, or data URL.
pub async fn parse_audio_url(url_unparsed: &str) -> Result<AudioInput, anyhow::Error> {
let url = if let Ok(url) = url::Url::parse(url_unparsed) {
url
} else if local_media_allowed() && File::open(url_unparsed).await.is_ok() {
url::Url::from_file_path(std::path::absolute(url_unparsed)?)
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Could not parse file path: {}", url_unparsed))?
} else {
anyhow::bail!(
"Invalid source '{}': not a valid URL (http/https/data) and file not found on server. \
Use a full URL, a data URL, or an absolute file path that exists on the server.",
url_unparsed
)
};
let bytes = if url.scheme() == "http" || url.scheme() == "https" {
fetch_remote_media(&url).await?
} else if url.scheme() == "file" {
if !local_media_allowed() {
anyhow::bail!(
"Refusing to read local media: set HANZO_ALLOW_LOCAL_MEDIA=1 to allow \
file:// and local paths on this server"
);
}
let path = url
.to_file_path()
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Could not parse file path: {}", url))?;
if let Ok(mut f) = File::open(&path).await {
let metadata = fs::metadata(&path).await?;
let mut buffer = vec![0; metadata.len() as usize];
f.read_exact(&mut buffer).await?;
buffer
} else {
anyhow::bail!("Could not open file at path: {}", url);
}
} else if url.scheme() == "data" {
let data_url = data_url::DataUrl::process(url.as_str())?;
data_url.decode_to_vec()?.0
} else {
anyhow::bail!("Unsupported URL scheme: {}", url.scheme());
};
AudioInput::from_bytes(&bytes)
}
/// Validates that the requested model matches one of the loaded models.
///
/// This function checks if the model parameter from an OpenAI API request
/// matches one of the models that are currently loaded by the server.
///
/// The special model name "default" can be used to bypass this validation,
/// which is useful for clients that require a model parameter but want
/// to use the default model.
///
/// ### Arguments
///
/// * `requested_model` - The model name from the API request
/// * `state` - The Hanzo state containing the loaded models info
///
/// ### Returns
///
/// Returns `Ok(())` if the model is available or if "default" is specified, otherwise returns an error.
pub fn validate_model_name(requested_model: &str, state: Arc<Hanzo>) -> Result<(), anyhow::Error> {
// Allow "default" as a special case to bypass validation
if requested_model == "default" {
return Ok(());
}
if state
.model_exists(requested_model)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to resolve model: {}", e))?
{
return Ok(());
}
let available_models = state
.list_models()
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to get available models: {}", e))?;
if available_models.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("No models are currently loaded.");
}
anyhow::bail!(
"Requested model '{}' is not available. Available models: {}. Use 'default' to use the default model.",
requested_model,
available_models.join(", ")
)
}
/// Sanitize error messages to remove internal implementation details like stack traces.
/// This ensures that sensitive internal information is not exposed to API clients.
///
/// The function traverses the error chain to find the deepest (root) error and returns its message.
/// This is useful for API responses where we want to provide meaningful error information
/// without exposing internal stack traces or implementation details.
///
/// ### Arguments
///
/// * `error` - The error to sanitize
///
/// ### Returns
///
/// The message from the root cause error in the error chain
///
/// ### Examples
///
/// ```ignore
/// use hanzo_server_core::util::sanitize_error_message;
///
/// // For a simple error without chain
/// let error = std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound, "File not found");
/// assert_eq!(sanitize_error_message(&error), "File not found");
///
/// // For chained errors, returns the root cause
/// let root = std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied, "Access denied");
/// let wrapped = anyhow::Error::new(root).context("Failed to read file");
/// // This would return "Access denied" instead of "Failed to read file"
/// ```
pub fn sanitize_error_message(error: &(dyn Error + 'static)) -> String {
// Traverse the error chain to find the deepest (root) error and return its message.
let mut current: &dyn Error = error;
// Keep traversing until we find an error with no source
while let Some(source) = current.source() {
current = source;
}
// Return the message of the root cause error
current.to_string()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use image::GenericImageView;
use super::*;
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_parse_image_url() {
// from URL
let url = "https://www.rust-lang.org/logos/rust-logo-32x32.png";
let image = parse_image_url(url).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(image.dimensions(), (32, 32));
let url = "http://www.rust-lang.org/logos/rust-logo-32x32.png";
let image = parse_image_url(url).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(image.dimensions(), (32, 32));
// from file path
let url = "resources/rust-logo-32x32.png";
let image = parse_image_url(url).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(image.dimensions(), (32, 32));
// URL must be an absolute path
let absolute_path = std::path::absolute(url).unwrap();
let url = format!("file://{}", absolute_path.as_os_str().to_str().unwrap());
let image = parse_image_url(&url).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(image.dimensions(), (32, 32));
// from base64 encoded image (rust-logo-32x32.png)
let url = "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";
let url = format!("data:image/png;base64,{url}");
let image = parse_image_url(&url).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(image.dimensions(), (32, 32));
// audio from base64
let audio_b64 = "UklGRiYAAABXQVZFZm10IBAAAAABAAEAQB8AAIA+AAACABAAZGF0YQIAAAAAAA==";
let url = format!("data:audio/wav;base64,{audio_b64}");
let audio = parse_audio_url(&url).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(audio.sample_rate, 8000);
assert_eq!(audio.samples.len(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn test_sanitize_error_message_with_backtrace() {
// Test error with backtrace
let error_with_backtrace = "Failed to parse Forge Provider response: A weight is negative, too large or not a valid number
0: hanzo_ml::error::Error::bt
1: hanzo_engine::sampler::Sampler::sample_multinomial
2: hanzo_engine::sampler::Sampler::sample_top_kp_min_p
3: hanzo_engine::sampler::Sampler::sample
4: hanzo_engine::pipeline::sampling::sample_sequence::{{closure}}";
struct TestError(String);
impl std::fmt::Display for TestError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "{}", self.0)
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for TestError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "{}", self.0)
}
}
impl std::error::Error for TestError {}
let error = TestError(error_with_backtrace.to_string());
let sanitized = sanitize_error_message(&error);
// Since TestError has no source(), it should return the full message including backtrace
assert_eq!(sanitized, error_with_backtrace);
// The improved solution returns the root error as-is when there's no error chain
}
#[test]
fn test_sanitize_error_message_without_backtrace() {
// Test error without backtrace
let simple_error = "Simple error message without backtrace";
struct TestError(String);
impl std::fmt::Display for TestError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "{}", self.0)
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for TestError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(f, "{}", self.0)
}
}
impl std::error::Error for TestError {}
let error = TestError(simple_error.to_string());
let sanitized = sanitize_error_message(&error);
assert_eq!(sanitized, simple_error);
}
#[test]
fn test_sanitize_error_message_with_chain() {
// Test error chain - the root cause should be extracted
use std::fmt;
#[derive(Debug)]
struct RootError;
impl fmt::Display for RootError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "Root cause: Database connection failed")
}
}
impl std::error::Error for RootError {}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct MiddleError(Box<dyn std::error::Error>);
impl fmt::Display for MiddleError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(f, "Middle error: Service unavailable")
}
}
impl std::error::Error for MiddleError {
fn source(&self) -> Option<&(dyn std::error::Error + 'static)> {
Some(&*self.0)
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct TopError(Box<dyn std::error::Error>);
impl fmt::Display for TopError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
write!(
f,
"Top error: Request failed with backtrace\n 0: some::module::function"
)
}
}
impl std::error::Error for TopError {
fn source(&self) -> Option<&(dyn std::error::Error + 'static)> {
Some(&*self.0)
}
}
let root = RootError;
let middle = MiddleError(Box::new(root));
let top = TopError(Box::new(middle));
let sanitized = sanitize_error_message(&top);
// Should return the root cause, not the top-level error with backtrace
assert_eq!(sanitized, "Root cause: Database connection failed");
assert!(!sanitized.contains("backtrace"));
assert!(!sanitized.contains("Request failed"));
}
/// A URL naming a non-public address must be refused before any request is made.
///
/// `parse_image_url`/`parse_audio_url` are reachable from the request body on
/// `/v1/chat/completions` and `/v1/embeddings`, so an unguarded GET here lets a caller aim the
/// server at `169.254.169.254` (cloud metadata: credentials) or at hosts inside the deployment
/// that the caller cannot reach. Each case below is refused at resolution, so nothing is sent.
#[tokio::test]
async fn remote_media_refuses_non_public_addresses() {
for url in [
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", // cloud metadata
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin", // loopback
"http://10.0.0.5/internal", // private
"http://[::1]/", // v6 loopback
] {
let parsed = url::Url::parse(url).unwrap();
let err = fetch_remote_media(&parsed)
.await
.expect_err("must refuse a non-public address");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("non-public address") || msg.contains("resolved to no addresses"),
"{url} was refused, but for the wrong reason: {msg}"
);
}
}
/// Only http/https reach the network path. `file:` is served by the local branch in
/// `parse_image_url`, never by a fetch, so a caller cannot smuggle a local read through it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn remote_media_refuses_non_http_schemes() {
for url in [
"file:///etc/passwd",
"ftp://example.com/x",
"gopher://example.com/",
] {
let parsed = url::Url::parse(url).unwrap();
let err = fetch_remote_media(&parsed)
.await
.expect_err("must refuse scheme");
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("Unsupported URL scheme"),
"{url}: {err}"
);
}
}
}