# Hanzo Flow Security Policy & Responsible Disclosure

## Security Policy

This security policy applies to the Hanzo Flow project on GitHub. We prioritize security and continuously work to safeguard our systems. However, vulnerabilities can still exist. If you identify a security issue, please report it to us so we can address it promptly.

### Security/Bugfix Versions

- Fixes are released either as part of the next minor version (e.g., 1.3.0 → 1.4.0) or as an on-demand patch version (e.g., 1.3.0 → 1.3.1).
- Security fixes are given priority and might be enough to cause a new version to be released.

## Reporting a Vulnerability

We encourage responsible disclosure of security vulnerabilities. If you find something suspicious, we encourage and appreciate your report!

### How to Report

Use the "Report a vulnerability" button under the "Security" tab of the [Hanzo Flow GitHub repository](https://github.com/hanzoai/flow/security). This creates a private communication channel between you and the maintainers.

### Reporting Guidelines

- Provide clear details to help us reproduce and fix the issue quickly
- Include steps to reproduce, potential impact, and any suggested fixes
- Your report will be kept confidential, and your details will not be shared without your consent

### Response Timeline

- We will acknowledge your report within 5 business days
- We will provide an estimated resolution timeline
- We will keep you updated on our progress

### Disclosure Guidelines

- Do not publicly disclose vulnerabilities until we have assessed, resolved, and notified affected users
- If you plan to present your research (e.g., at a conference or in a blog), share a draft with us at least 30 days in advance for review
- Avoid including:
  - Data from any Hanzo Flow customer projects
  - Hanzo Flow user/customer information
  - Details about Hanzo Flow employees, contractors, or partners

We appreciate your efforts in helping us maintain a secure platform and look forward to working together to resolve any issues responsibly.

## Known Vulnerabilities

> **Note**: Hanzo Flow is based on the upstream Hanzo Flow project. The CVEs and GitHub Advisories below link to the original upstream disclosures for reference.

### Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in API Request Component (Fixed in 1.7.1)

The API Request component allows arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. In versions < 1.7.1, this component did not block private IP ranges (`127.0.0.1`, `10/172/192` ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`), enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks.

**Potential security impact:**
- Attackers with API key access can access internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services
- Foothold for attacking internal services by abusing inter-service trust
- Non-blind SSRF: Response bodies are returned to the client, enabling immediate data exfiltration

**CVE**: [CVE-2025-68477](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68477)
**GitHub Advisory**: [GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5](https://github.com/hanzoai/flow/security/advisories/GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5)
**Fixed in**: >= 1.7.1

### External Control of File Name or Path (Fixed in 1.7.1)

When creating a flow through the `/v1/flows/` endpoint, if an arbitrary path is specified in the request body's `fs_path`, the server serializes the flow object into JSON and creates/overwrites a file at that path. In versions < 1.7.1, there is no path restriction, normalization, or allowed directory enforcement, so absolute paths (e.g., `/etc/poc.txt`) are interpreted as-is.

**Potential security impact:**
- Authenticated arbitrary file write (within server permission scope): Risk of corrupting configuration/log/task files, disrupting application behavior, and tampering with files read by other components
- Both absolute and relative paths are allowed, enabling base directory traversal
- Risk of overwriting system files increases in environments with root privileges or weak mount/permission settings
- File content is limited to Flow JSON, but impact is severe if the target file is parsed by a JSON parser or subject to subsequent processing

**CVE**: [CVE-2025-68478](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68478)
**GitHub Advisory**: [GHSA-f43r-cc68-gpx4](https://github.com/hanzoai/flow/security/advisories/GHSA-f43r-cc68-gpx4)
**Fixed in**: >= 1.7.1

### Environment Variable Loading Bug (Fixed in 1.6.4)

Versions `1.6.0` through `1.6.3` have a critical bug where environment variables from `.env` files are not being read. This affects all deployments using environment variables for configuration, including security settings.

**Potential security impact:**
- Environment variables from `.env` files are not read.
- Security configurations like `AUTO_LOGIN=false` may not be applied, potentially allowing users to log in as the default superuser.
- Database credentials, API keys, and other sensitive configuration may not be loaded.

**DO NOT** upgrade to versions `1.6.0` through `1.6.3` if you use `.env` files for configuration. Instead, upgrade to version `1.6.4`, which includes a fix for this bug.

**Fixed in**: >= 1.6.4

### Code Execution Vulnerability (Fixed in 1.3.0)

Hanzo Flow allows users to define and run **custom code components** through endpoints like `/v1/validate/code`. In versions < 1.3.0, this endpoint did not enforce authentication or proper sandboxing, allowing **unauthenticated arbitrary code execution**.

This means an attacker could send malicious code to the endpoint and have it executed on the server—leading to full system compromise, including data theft, remote shell access, or lateral movement within the network.

**CVE**: [CVE-2025-3248](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3248)
**Fixed in**: >= 1.3.0

### Privilege Escalation via CLI Superuser Creation (Fixed in 1.5.1)

A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in containers where an authenticated user with RCE access can invoke the internal CLI command `flow superuser` to create a new administrative user. This results in full superuser access, even if the user initially registered through the UI as a regular (non-admin) account.

**CVE**: [CVE-2025-57760](https://github.com/hanzoai/flow/security/advisories/GHSA-4gv9-mp8m-592r)
**Fixed in**: >= 1.5.1

### No API key required when running with `FLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true` and `FLOW_SKIP_AUTH_AUTO_LOGIN=true`

In versions earlier than 1.5, if `FLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true`, then Hanzo Flow automatically logs users in as a superuser without requiring authentication. In this case, API requests don't require an API key.

In version 1.5, an API key is required to authenticate requests.
Setting `FLOW_SKIP_AUTH_AUTO_LOGIN=true` and `FLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=true` skips authentication for API requests. However, the `FLOW_SKIP_AUTH_AUTO_LOGIN` option will be removed in v1.6.

`FLOW_SKIP_AUTH_AUTO_LOGIN=true` is the default behavior, so users do not need to change existing workflows in 1.5. To update your workflows to require authentication, set `FLOW_SKIP_AUTH_AUTO_LOGIN=false`.

For more information, see the API keys and authentication documentation.

## Security Configuration Guidelines

### Superuser Creation Security

The `flow superuser` CLI command can present a privilege escalation risk if not properly secured.

#### Security Measures

1. **Authentication Required in Production**
   - When `FLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=false`, superuser creation requires authentication
   - Use `--auth-token` parameter with a valid superuser API key or JWT token

2. **Disable CLI Superuser Creation**
   - Set `FLOW_ENABLE_SUPERUSER_CLI=false` to disable the command entirely
   - Strongly recommended for production environments

3. **Secure AUTO_LOGIN Setting**
   - Default is `true` for <=1.5. This may change in a future release.
   - When `true`, creates default superuser `flow/flow` - **ONLY USE IN DEVELOPMENT**

#### Production Security Configuration

```bash
# Recommended production settings
export FLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=false
export FLOW_ENABLE_SUPERUSER_CLI=false
export FLOW_SUPERUSER="<your-superuser-username>"
export FLOW_SUPERUSER_PASSWORD="<your-superuser-password>"
export FLOW_DATABASE_URL="<your-production-database-url>" # e.g. "postgresql+psycopg://flow:secure_pass@db.internal:5432/flow"
export FLOW_SECRET_KEY="your-strong-random-secret-key"
```