Files
forge/modules/setting/security.go
zeekayandHanzo Dev 27cde39e36 Name every remaining identifier, path and default for this product
Storage buckets, indexer names, the bleve analyzer, the lock prefix, SSH host
keys, the markdown front-matter key, the container data paths, the RPM repo id
and the API security scheme all read as this product now, and app.example.ini
matches the code again. The upstream maintainer list and the changelog
generator config went with the release history they belonged to, and the
citation comments state the fact rather than link the issue.

Three inert rules turn out to have been inert because they named a module path
this tree does not use: gci grouped no first-party imports under prefix(), and
depguard let models/migrations import models and modules/structs. They now name
github.com/hanzoai/git. The config example also documented .gitea/workflows
while the code has read .hanzo/workflows for some time.

The authorized_keys marker follows the delegate-hook precedent: the new name is
written and the old one is still recognised, because a marker we do not know is
copied through as a hand-added key and leaves a revoked key authorized. The
stored user_setting key keeps its value; only a migration may change that.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-09-10 19:14:35 -07:00

203 lines
7.4 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package setting
import (
"net/url"
"os"
"strings"
"github.com/hanzoai/git/modules/auth/password/hash"
"github.com/hanzoai/git/modules/generate"
"github.com/hanzoai/git/modules/log"
)
// Security settings
var Security = struct {
// TODO: move more settings to this struct in future
XFrameOptions string
XContentTypeOptions string
ContentSecurityPolicyGeneral string // it only supports empty (default policy) or "unset", maybe it can support more in the future
AllowedHostList string
}{
XFrameOptions: "SAMEORIGIN",
XContentTypeOptions: "nosniff",
AllowedHostList: "external",
}
var (
InstallLock bool
SecretKey string
InternalToken string // internal access token
LogInRememberDays int
CookieRememberName string
ReverseProxyAuthUser string
ReverseProxyAuthEmail string
ReverseProxyAuthFullName string
ReverseProxyLimit int
ReverseProxyLogoutRedirect string
ReverseProxyTrustedProxies []string
MinPasswordLength int
ImportLocalPaths bool
DisableGitHooks = true
DisableWebhooks bool
OnlyAllowPushIfEnvironmentSet bool
PasswordComplexity []string
PasswordHashAlgo string
PasswordCheckPwn bool
SuccessfulTokensCacheSize int
DisableQueryAuthToken bool
RecordUserSignupMetadata = false
TwoFactorAuthEnforced = false
)
// loadSecret load the secret from ini by uriKey or verbatimKey, only one of them could be set
// If the secret is loaded from uriKey (file), the file should be non-empty, to guarantee the behavior stable and clear.
func loadSecret(sec ConfigSection, uriKey, verbatimKey string) string {
// don't allow setting both URI and verbatim string
uri := sec.Key(uriKey).String()
verbatim := sec.Key(verbatimKey).String()
if uri != "" && verbatim != "" {
log.Fatal("Cannot specify both %s and %s", uriKey, verbatimKey)
}
// if we have no URI, use verbatim
if uri == "" {
return verbatim
}
tempURI, err := url.Parse(uri)
if err != nil {
log.Fatal("Failed to parse %s (%s): %v", uriKey, uri, err)
}
switch tempURI.Scheme {
case "file":
buf, err := os.ReadFile(tempURI.RequestURI())
if err != nil {
log.Fatal("Failed to read %s (%s): %v", uriKey, tempURI.RequestURI(), err)
}
val := strings.TrimSpace(string(buf))
if val == "" {
// The file shouldn't be empty, otherwise we can not know whether the user has ever set the KEY or KEY_URI
// For example: if INTERNAL_TOKEN_URI=file:///empty-file,
// Then if the token is re-generated during installation and saved to INTERNAL_TOKEN
// Then INTERNAL_TOKEN and INTERNAL_TOKEN_URI both exist, that's a fatal error (they shouldn't)
log.Fatal("Failed to read %s (%s): the file is empty", uriKey, tempURI.RequestURI())
}
return val
// only file URIs are allowed
default:
log.Fatal("Unsupported URI-Scheme %q (%q = %q)", tempURI.Scheme, uriKey, uri)
return ""
}
}
// generateSaveInternalToken generates and saves the internal token to app.ini
func generateSaveInternalToken(rootCfg ConfigProvider) {
token, err := generate.NewInternalToken()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal("Error generate internal token: %v", err)
}
InternalToken = token
saveCfg, err := rootCfg.PrepareSaving()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal("Error saving internal token: %v", err)
}
rootCfg.Section("security").Key("INTERNAL_TOKEN").SetValue(token)
saveCfg.Section("security").Key("INTERNAL_TOKEN").SetValue(token)
if err = saveCfg.Save(); err != nil {
log.Fatal("Error saving internal token: %v", err)
}
}
func loadSecurityFrom(rootCfg ConfigProvider) {
sec := rootCfg.Section("security")
LogInRememberDays = sec.Key("LOGIN_REMEMBER_DAYS").MustInt(31)
SecretKey = loadSecret(sec, "SECRET_KEY_URI", "SECRET_KEY")
if SecretKey == "" {
// Until it supports rotating an existing secret key, we shouldn't move users off of the widely used default value
SecretKey = "!#@FDEWREWR&*("
}
CookieRememberName = sec.Key("COOKIE_REMEMBER_NAME").MustString("hanzo_git_remember")
ReverseProxyAuthUser = sec.Key("REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION_USER").MustString("X-WEBAUTH-USER")
ReverseProxyAuthEmail = sec.Key("REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION_EMAIL").MustString("X-WEBAUTH-EMAIL")
ReverseProxyAuthFullName = sec.Key("REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION_FULL_NAME").MustString("X-WEBAUTH-FULLNAME")
ReverseProxyLimit = sec.Key("REVERSE_PROXY_LIMIT").MustInt(1)
ReverseProxyLogoutRedirect = sec.Key("REVERSE_PROXY_LOGOUT_REDIRECT").String()
ReverseProxyTrustedProxies = sec.Key("REVERSE_PROXY_TRUSTED_PROXIES").Strings(",")
if len(ReverseProxyTrustedProxies) == 0 {
ReverseProxyTrustedProxies = []string{"127.0.0.0/8", "::1/128"}
}
MinPasswordLength = sec.Key("MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH").MustInt(8)
ImportLocalPaths = sec.Key("IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS").MustBool(false)
DisableGitHooks = sec.Key("DISABLE_GIT_HOOKS").MustBool(true)
DisableWebhooks = sec.Key("DISABLE_WEBHOOKS").MustBool(false)
OnlyAllowPushIfEnvironmentSet = sec.Key("ONLY_ALLOW_PUSH_IF_ENVIRONMENT_SET").MustBool(true)
// Ensure that the provided default hash algorithm is a valid hash algorithm
var algorithm *hash.PasswordHashAlgorithm
PasswordHashAlgo, algorithm = hash.SetDefaultPasswordHashAlgorithm(sec.Key("PASSWORD_HASH_ALGO").MustString(""))
if algorithm == nil {
log.Fatal("The provided password hash algorithm was invalid: %s", sec.Key("PASSWORD_HASH_ALGO").MustString(""))
}
PasswordCheckPwn = sec.Key("PASSWORD_CHECK_PWN").MustBool(false)
SuccessfulTokensCacheSize = sec.Key("SUCCESSFUL_TOKENS_CACHE_SIZE").MustInt(20)
deprecatedSetting(rootCfg, "cors", "X_FRAME_OPTIONS", "security", "X_FRAME_OPTIONS", "v1.26.0")
if !sec.HasKey("X_FRAME_OPTIONS") {
Security.XFrameOptions = rootCfg.Section("cors").Key("X_FRAME_OPTIONS").MustString(Security.XFrameOptions)
}
if err := sec.MapTo(&Security); err != nil {
log.Fatal("Failed to map security settings: %v", err)
}
twoFactorAuth := sec.Key("TWO_FACTOR_AUTH").String()
switch twoFactorAuth {
case "":
case "enforced":
TwoFactorAuthEnforced = true
default:
log.Fatal("Invalid two-factor auth option: %s", twoFactorAuth)
}
InternalToken = loadSecret(sec, "INTERNAL_TOKEN_URI", "INTERNAL_TOKEN")
if InstallLock && InternalToken == "" {
// if the forge has been installed but the InternalToken hasn't been generated (upgrade from an old release), we should generate
// some users do cluster deployment, they still depend on this auto-generating behavior.
generateSaveInternalToken(rootCfg)
}
cfgdata := sec.Key("PASSWORD_COMPLEXITY").Strings(",")
if len(cfgdata) == 0 {
cfgdata = []string{"off"}
}
PasswordComplexity = make([]string, 0, len(cfgdata))
for _, name := range cfgdata {
name := strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(name, `"`))
if name != "" {
PasswordComplexity = append(PasswordComplexity, name)
}
}
sectionHasDisableQueryAuthToken := sec.HasKey("DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN")
// TODO: default value should be true in future releases
DisableQueryAuthToken = sec.Key("DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN").MustBool(false)
RecordUserSignupMetadata = sec.Key("RECORD_USER_SIGNUP_METADATA").MustBool(false)
// warn if the setting is set to false explicitly
if sectionHasDisableQueryAuthToken && !DisableQueryAuthToken {
log.Warn("Enabling Query API Auth tokens is not recommended. DISABLE_QUERY_AUTH_TOKEN will default to true in 1.23 and will be removed in 1.24.")
}
}