Security Audit — June 2026

A hardening pass across the repo, the hanzogui.dev web app, the CI/CD pipeline, and the GitHub project configuration. This document records what was found, what was fixed in-tree, and the action items that can only be done by a maintainer (credential rotation, etc.).

Status legend: ✅ fixed in this repo · ⚠️ needs maintainer action · 📋 recommended follow-up

Credential leak in git history — VERIFIED ALREADY REMEDIATED (2026-06-13)

A 2023 commit (df848c8, takeout/studio-next/.env, removed the same day) is permanently reachable in the public history and contained credentials for Supabase project akrzjiwwabjhzbvvnypu (still referenced in pkgs/bento-get/src/constants.ts):

GitHub PAT (ghp_…0FEvWK) — tested 2026-06-13: GET /user → 401. Already revoked. ✅
Supabase service_role key (JWT, exp 2032, bypasses RLS) — tested 2026-06-13: REST endpoint → 401 "Invalid API key". The project's JWT secret was rotated, so this key (and the old anon key) no longer authenticate. ✅

Both leaked credentials are dead; no rotation needed. The anon key currently in bento-get/constants.ts is a post-rotation key (public by design, RLS-gated).

📋 Optional follow-up: scrub the df848c8 blob from history (BFG / git filter-repo) for cleanliness. (GitHub secret scanning + push protection are now enabled and cover ongoing detection.)

⚠️ A2. Verify / remove the prod `[email protected]` account

The test-user endpoint previously created this account in the production Supabase project with a static, source-committed password and Pro entitlements. The static password is now removed (see H5), but if the account was ever created in prod it still exists. Confirm in Supabase Auth and delete it if present.

What was fixed in this repo

hanzogui.dev web app

ID	Issue	Fix
C1 ✅	`GET /api/bento/code?userGithubId=` served paid Bento source with no auth (legacy v1 CLI path; trusted a client-supplied id as the user identity)	Removed the unauthenticated branch; the shipped CLI already uses the token-authenticated `/api/bento/cli/v2/code-download`. `app/api/bento/code+api.ts`
C2 ✅	`POST /api/github/app-hook` was a forgeable webhook stub (no signature verification, logged all headers)	Deleted the dead endpoint.
H1 ✅	Charge endpoints applied a client-supplied `couponId` without re-validating it applied to the product (free/near-free purchases)	Added `features/stripe/assertValidCoupon.ts` and call it in `create-subscription`, `create-v2-subscription`, `add-team-seats` before any coupon is applied.
H2 ✅	`/api/validate-coupon` was unauthenticated → coupon-enumeration oracle	Added `ensureAuth`.
H3 ✅	Team-seat invite minted unlimited active seats and accepted arbitrary `user_id`	Enforced seat capacity vs `total_seats`, dedup of active members, and invitee-exists check. `app/api/team-seat+api.ts`
H4 ✅	`/api/github/users` returned all users incl. email (`select('*')`) and had a PostgREST `.or()` filter injection via comma	Returns only `id, full_name, avatar_url`; name-only `ilike` (or exact-email match if `@` present, never returned); strips comma. UI no longer renders others' emails. `app/api/github/users+api.ts`, `NewAccountModal.tsx`
H4b ✅	`/api/discord/search-member` let any logged-in user enumerate the whole guild	Gated behind Pro (`ensureAccess`).
H5 ✅	Hardcoded test-user password (`test-user-password-12345`) usable to sign into prod via Supabase password auth	Generates a fresh random password per run and rotates any existing user's password. `app/api/test-user+api.ts`

Confirmed already-safe during the audit: Stripe webhook signature verification, GitHub sponsor webhook constant-time HMAC, subscription cancel/upgrade ownership checks, postMessage origin checks, and no server secret inlined into the client bundle.

CI/CD pipeline

✅ Fork PRs no longer receive secrets. test-ios-native.yml gated the secrets: inherit build (and its dependent test job) to same-repo refs, so a fork PR can no longer exfiltrate KV_STORE_REDIS_REST_*.
✅ Least-privilege permissions: blocks added to every workflow (contents: read default; contents: write only on the release/changelog jobs that create GitHub Releases).
✅ Third-party actions SHA-pinned: oven-sh/setup-bun, android-actions/setup-android, reactivecircus/android-emulator-runner, marvinpinto/action-automatic-releases.
✅ bun install --frozen-lockfile in the install composite action.
✅ .github/dependabot.yml added (github-actions ecosystem) to keep action SHAs current.

Secrets hygiene / scanning

✅ .gitignore: fixed .env.test.localp typo and added key-material globs (*.pem, *.key, *.p12, *.p8, *.keystore, …).
Secret scanning is handled by GitHub native secret scanning + push protection (enabled below). A gitleaks CI job was trialed and removed — the org-licensed Action plus full-tree CLI scans weren't worth the cost over native scanning.

GitHub project configuration (applied live)

✅ Secret scanning + push protection enabled (would have blocked the A1 leak).
✅ Dependabot vulnerability alerts + automated security updates enabled.
✅ Private vulnerability reporting enabled; SECURITY.md added.
✅ "Protect Master" ruleset enabled — blocks force-push and branch deletion on main (org admins retain direct-push via bypass).

npm publish

✅ Confirmed no published package ships an install/postinstall hook, the lockfile is committed, and the interactive release flow supports 2FA/OTP.

📋 Recommended follow-ups (not yet done)

Adopt npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC) for releases and publish with npm publish --provenance. Today a single NPM_TOKEN can publish all ~163 packages; OIDC removes the long-lived token and adds SLSA provenance. The release path is currently isolated to a test-release branch with --skip-publish, so this is hardening, not an active hole.
Triage the bun audit backlog (≈187 advisories, almost all transitive/dev in the site + zero stack). bun update for compatible fixes, then resolve the residual high/critical.
Optionally scrub the A1 blob from history (BFG / git filter-repo). The leaked credentials are already dead, so this is cosmetic.
SHA-pin first-party actions/* too (left on @v4 for now; Dependabot will manage them once pinned).
Add rate limiting to sensitive endpoints (coupon validation, theme generation, auth/email) — there is currently none.
Replace the archived marvinpinto/action-automatic-releases with softprops/action-gh-release or gh release create.

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