Abhishek Krishna df5d0ffdb3 fix(security): use CSPRNG for OAuth state parameter ...

The OAuth 2.0 "state" parameter is the canonical defence against CSRF
on the authorization endpoint (RFC 6749 §10.12). It must be
unguessable to an attacker.

Previously `getOrSaveState` used `Math.random().toString(36).slice(2)`,
which:
  - is not cryptographically secure (predictable PRNG)
  - produces ~10 chars of base36 (~52 bits of effective entropy at best,
    far less in practice because Math.random is not uniform)

This switches state generation to a Web Crypto `getRandomValues`-based
helper with a Node `crypto.randomFillSync` fallback for SSR/test
environments where `window.crypto` is not polyfilled (older jsdom).
The output is 32 random bytes encoded as URL-safe base64 (RFC 4648 §5)
without padding — 43 chars, 256 bits of entropy.

Adds two tests covering:
  - state has the expected length and only URL-safe base64 chars
  - states are unique across many instances (collision probability ~2^-244)

No public API change. `getOrSaveState` keeps the same signature.

2026-06-01 11:29:35 +00:00

..

sdk.test.ts

fix(security): use CSPRNG for OAuth state parameter

2026-06-01 11:29:35 +00:00