Files
iam/internal/oidc/federation_provision_test.go
zeekayandGitHub 12fdb51464 oidc: link a verified address to the account that holds it (#28)
* oidc: link a verified address to the account that holds it

A social sign-in whose provider verified the address now links onto the
one account holding that address, however that account was made, and
signs the person in to it.  The link sets the provider subject and
EmailVerified; the password, sessions, other sign-in methods, org and
roles are unchanged.  An address the provider did not verify, or one
that names two accounts, is still refused.

Each link writes a federation-link audit row in the same transaction,
naming the provider, the subject, the client and whether the address
was verified before.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016DKtyuzxU43Gsc6Pm9vKTF

* oidc: write a federated link only for a vouched, completed sign-in

linkOrProvision opens an existing account, by subject or by address,
only when the provider vouches for it: a provider filed under a
reserved org may open any account outside one; any other provider only
accounts of the org that owns it, never a held org's.

The link by address is resolved, not written.  It rides the resume
parameters and federationMint writes it after the account-state and
second-factor gates, re-reading the row under its lock: the row must
still hold the verified address, still be vouched for, and hold no
other subject of that provider.  The audit row is appended before the
account is written.

An account that already holds a different subject of the provider is
refused, as /v1/iam/link refuses it.  Both address reaches are read,
and two different accounts between them are ErrEmailAmbiguous.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016DKtyuzxU43Gsc6Pm9vKTF
2026-11-01 23:51:19 -08:00

92 lines
3.7 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
package oidc
import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/hanzoai/iam/pkg/store"
)
// What a federated sign-in may CREATE.
// An application with registration switched off does not get new accounts created
// by a social provider either. The switch is the tenant's, and it used to mean one
// thing at the password and wallet endpoints and nothing at all at this one.
func TestFederation_ProvisioningHonoursTheSignupSwitch(t *testing.T) {
app, db := newServer(t)
seedApp(t, db, appOpts{clientID: "webapp", redirectURIs: []string{testRedirect}}) // signup OFF
m := newMockOIDC(t, fedGoogleCID)
seedOIDCProvider(t, db, "webapp", m)
before := countUsers(t, db)
q, cookie := beginAuthorize(t, app, "webapp", fedProvGoogle)
m.mu.Lock()
m.nonce = q.Get("nonce")
m.mu.Unlock()
loc := requireRedirect(t, callback(t, app, q.Get("state"), "idp-code-1", cookie), testRedirect)
cb := mustQuery(t, loc)
if cb.Get("code") != "" {
t.Fatalf("registration is off, yet federation minted a code: %q", loc)
}
if cb.Get("error") != "access_denied" {
t.Fatalf("want access_denied, got %q (%q)", cb.Get("error"), cb.Get("error_description"))
}
if countUsers(t, db) != before {
t.Fatal("a social sign-in created an account on an application that is closed to registration")
}
}
// An existing account still signs in through that same closed application: the
// switch governs REGISTRATION, not sign-in, so turning it off must not lock out the
// people who already have accounts.
func TestFederation_SignupSwitchDoesNotBlockAnExistingAccount(t *testing.T) {
app, db := newServer(t)
seedApp(t, db, appOpts{clientID: "webapp", redirectURIs: []string{testRedirect}}) // signup OFF
m := newMockOIDC(t, fedGoogleCID)
seedUser(t, db, "alice", m.email, "pw")
seedOIDCProvider(t, db, "webapp", m)
runOIDCLogin(t, app, db, m, "webapp", nil)
u, err := store.GetUserByConnector(tctx(), db, "hanzo", "google", m.sub)
if err != nil || u == nil || u.Name != "alice" {
t.Fatalf("the existing account must still sign in and be linked: %v %v", u, err)
}
}
// A provider that hands over no address at all is REFUSED, not turned into an
// account. This is the live GitHub App shape: the App ignores the requested scope,
// /user/emails answers 403, and what used to happen was a second account named
// after the PROVIDER ("github") with an empty email — unreachable, unrecoverable,
// and never matched to the person's real account.
func TestFederation_NoAddressIsRefusedRatherThanNamedAfterTheProvider(t *testing.T) {
app, db := newServer(t)
seedApp(t, db, appOpts{clientID: "webapp", signup: true, redirectURIs: []string{testRedirect}})
m := newMockGitHub(t)
m.emailsForbidden = true // the App has no "Email addresses" permission
m.profileEmail = "" // and the profile hides it
seedGitHubProvider(t, db, "webapp", m)
before := countUsers(t, db)
q, cookie := beginAuthorize(t, app, "webapp", fedProvGitHub)
loc := requireRedirect(t, callback(t, app, q.Get("state"), "gh-code-1", cookie), testRedirect)
cb := mustQuery(t, loc)
if cb.Get("code") != "" {
t.Fatalf("a sign-in with no address minted a code: %q", loc)
}
if cb.Get("error") != "access_denied" || !strings.Contains(cb.Get("error_description"), "email") {
t.Fatalf("the refusal must say what is missing, got %q / %q", cb.Get("error"), cb.Get("error_description"))
}
if countUsers(t, db) != before {
t.Fatalf("an email-less account was provisioned anyway (%d -> %d)", before, countUsers(t, db))
}
for _, name := range []string{"github", "github2", "user"} {
if u, _ := store.GetUserByName(tctx(), db, "hanzo", name); u != nil {
t.Fatalf("an account named %q was created from the provider type", name)
}
}
}