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schema.User.SuperAdmin is the one predicate: a person whose row's owner is the admin org. The Guard sets Principal.Sudo from it when it loads the caller, and assume/release, device approval, unlink, the bootstrap credential freeze and the registry push gate ask the row directly. store.IsSuperAdmin, which also admitted a membership of the admin org, is gone. A brand org's user added to the admin org is an ordinary member of their own org, and a service account or program in the admin org is never SuperAdmin. hanzoai/authz v1.10.42 reads the same rule off a token (Claims.Sudo on orgs[0]) and lets a membership of the admin org open nothing, so such a member no longer reads or edits the admin org's registry row either. The token IAM mints is unchanged: orgs still opens with the row's owner. Two protective gates keep the whole admin org, machines and unheld names included: no secret key names an account there (store.SuperAdminKey), and only a SuperAdmin writes one (users.Authorize). Both read the owner as written, so neither reads the store. Every request the Guard admits for a SuperAdmin is recorded as a superadmin audit row, PlatformWritten, with its method, address, answer and client address; so is a SuperAdmin's unlink of someone else's sign-in method and a device approval into another org. TestEverySuperAdminGateAdmitsTheAdminOrgsPeopleOnly drives ten SuperAdmin-only requests through the router as two SuperAdmins, a brand admin holding an admin-org membership and two admin-org machines, and reads the trail row each one leaves. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HuMDfgFssPUptYUzgZ6Cp8
103 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
103 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
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package routes_test
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"testing"
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"github.com/hanzoai/orm"
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"github.com/hanzoai/iam/pkg/schema"
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"github.com/hanzoai/iam/pkg/store"
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)
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const scimPassword = `{"schemas":["urn:ietf:params:scim:api:messages:2.0:PatchOp"],"Operations":[{"op":"replace","path":"password","value":"a whole new password"}]}`
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// SCIM is a second write surface for the same row. The branch covers it for an
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// application; an org admin reaches SCIM through the same tenant rule.
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func TestRed_SuperAdmin_OrgAdminCannotWriteThroughSCIM(t *testing.T) {
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h := newHarness(t)
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operatorFixtures(t, h)
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boss := h.person(t, "hanzo/boss")
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if status, body := h.send(t, boss, "PATCH", "/v1/iam/scim/v2/Users/admin/z", scimPassword); status != 403 {
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t.Errorf("SCIM PATCH of the operator's password as hanzo's admin answered %d: %s", status, body)
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}
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if got := digest(t, h, "admin", "z"); got != secretUserHash {
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t.Errorf("the operator's password changed through SCIM")
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}
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replace := `{"schemas":["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"],"userName":"z","emails":[{"value":"[email protected]","primary":true}]}`
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if status, body := h.send(t, boss, "PUT", "/v1/iam/scim/v2/Users/admin/z", replace); status != 403 {
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t.Errorf("SCIM PUT of the operator as hanzo's admin answered %d: %s", status, body)
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}
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if status, body := h.send(t, boss, "DELETE", "/v1/iam/scim/v2/Users/admin/z", ""); status != 403 {
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t.Errorf("SCIM DELETE of the operator as hanzo's admin answered %d: %s", status, body)
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}
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if digest(t, h, "admin", "z") == "" {
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t.Errorf("the operator's account was deleted through SCIM")
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}
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}
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// Filing a passkey for the operator is refused; removing one is not asked.
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func TestRed_SuperAdmin_OrgAdminCannotRemoveTheirPasskeyOrToken(t *testing.T) {
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h := newHarness(t)
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operatorFixtures(t, h)
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boss := h.person(t, "hanzo/boss")
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ctx := context.Background()
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pk := orm.New[schema.WebauthnCredential](h.db)
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pk.Owner, pk.Name, pk.User = "hanzo", "operator-key", "admin/z"
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pk.SetId("hanzo/operator-key")
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if err := pk.CreateCtx(ctx); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if status, body := h.send(t, boss, "DELETE", "/v1/iam/webauthn-credentials/hanzo/operator-key", ""); status == 200 {
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if _, err := orm.Get[schema.WebauthnCredential](h.db, "hanzo/operator-key"); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("hanzo's admin removed the operator's passkey: %d %s", status, body)
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}
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}
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tok := orm.New[schema.Token](h.db)
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tok.Owner, tok.Name, tok.User = "hanzo", "operator-session", "admin/z"
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tok.SetId("hanzo/operator-session")
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if err := tok.CreateCtx(ctx); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if status, body := h.send(t, boss, "DELETE", "/v1/iam/tokens/hanzo/operator-session", ""); status == 200 {
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if _, err := orm.Get[schema.Token](h.db, "hanzo/operator-session"); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("hanzo's admin revoked the operator's token: %d %s", status, body)
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}
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}
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}
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// An org admin mints an API key in their own org naming the operator, who works
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// there by a membership. No such key resolves to the operator's row.
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func TestRed_SuperAdmin_OrgAdminCannotMintAKeyForThem(t *testing.T) {
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h := newHarness(t)
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operatorFixtures(t, h)
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boss := h.person(t, "hanzo/boss")
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status, body := h.send(t, boss, "POST", "/v1/iam/keys", `{"owner":"hanzo","name":"planted","user":"admin/z"}`)
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if status != 200 {
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return // refused
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}
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var e struct {
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Data struct {
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AccessSecret string `json:"accessSecret"`
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} `json:"data"`
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AccessSecret string `json:"accessSecret"`
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}
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_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(body), &e)
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secret := e.Data.AccessSecret
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if secret == "" {
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secret = e.AccessSecret
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}
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u, err := store.UserByAccessKey(context.Background(), h.db, secret)
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if err == nil && u != nil {
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t.Errorf("hanzo's admin minted a key that resolves to %s/%s (SuperAdmin=%v)", u.Owner, u.Name, u.SuperAdmin())
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}
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}
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