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An admin of an org whose name the platform holds (authz.IsHeldOrg) could set a member's password, address, phone or second factor, or file a passkey or a token for them, and then sign in as them with nothing in the token or the trail to say so: staff could take over any customer living in hanzo. users.Credentials is the rule now, read by users.Update (and SCIM and the legacy verb through it), the MFA target and authz.AuthorizeUser: there only the person, a SuperAdmin or a platform application holding the user-administration capability changes how another account signs in, and each such change is audited. Profile edits are the admin's as before, and a customer org's admin still runs its own members. A confidential client on IAM_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_APPS minted a token for any user in any tenant over /v1/iam/tokens/issue, bearing that user's identity and no trace of the client. The client proves itself and not the person, so the token now names it in act, lives at most an hour, is audited, and is minted only for the people the client's org signs in. An acted-for token writes no account and founds no org.