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POST /v1/iam/users and PUT /v1/iam/users/{owner}/{name} answered 200 and
dropped user.isAdmin: the field was read from the calling code only, so a
SuperAdmin could not make hanzo/denis an admin and nothing said so.
One rule, users.Admin, now decides every change to an org-admin role: the
user create and update, SCIM, an admin membership, and an invitation that
carries the role. A SuperAdmin moves it anywhere; an org's admin moves it on
the others of a customer org; only a SuperAdmin makes an admin of a brand
(policy.IsPlatformOrg) or touches the admin org; nobody raises their own; the
last admin stays (409) unless a SuperAdmin takes them; applications, machines
and members are refused (403). The request is read for presence, so leaving
isAdmin out keeps it and a full-row write cannot demote by omission.
A revoke, a removed membership, an upsert lowering and a deleted account call
store.Void: User.Epoch moves to now, the account's token rows and sessions
are deleted, and verifyBearer refuses a token with iat <= epoch.
Invitations carry a role (member or admin), written only by who may grant it
and applied on signup and accept. GET /v1/iam/users takes isAdmin=true. Every
grant, revoke, role invitation, removal and void is an audit row under the
org, with actor, target, from, to, reason and request id.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016DKtyuzxU43Gsc6Pm9vKTF
165 lines
8.5 KiB
Go
165 lines
8.5 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
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package schema
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import "github.com/hanzoai/orm"
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// AuditLog is an append-only action record (v1 the legacy surface `record`, v2 kind
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// "audit_logs"). One row captures a single request against the IAM surface:
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// who acted (Organization, User, ClientIp), what they invoked (Method,
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// RequestUri, Action), the request payload and the server's answer (Object,
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// Response, StatusCode), and whether the row fired its registered webhooks
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// (IsTriggered). It is written once at request time and is not mutated in
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// normal operation; the CRUD update path exists only for administrative
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// correction.
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//
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// Identity is the (Owner, Name) pair — Name is a generated unique id and Owner
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// is the acting organization — so the orm string key is "owner/name". v1's
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// integer autoincrement primary key (`id`) is a per-store surrogate with no
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// cross-store meaning; it is superseded by the orm string key rather than
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// carried as a colliding `id` field, since orm.Model already persists its own
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// `id`. Every semantically meaningful v1 column is carried so no actor,
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// endpoint, payload, or status is lost on migration.
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//
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// Object and Response are unbounded text in v1 (mediumtext): Object holds the
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// password-masked request body and Response a compact status/message envelope.
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// Both carry no orm index. The audit query dimensions — Organization, User, and
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// Action — are indexed alongside the (Owner, Name) key and the CreatedTime sort
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// column.
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// The actions the PLATFORM writes about itself. A row carrying one of these is
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// not a customer's own telemetry: it is the evidence that the platform did
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// something accountable — recorded a consent answer, issued or revoked a
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// credential. The generic audit-log CRUD refuses to create, alter or delete one,
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// so the trail cannot be forged with an invented grant or quietly trimmed of a
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// real one by the same org admin whose actions it records.
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//
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// They live here, beside the entity, because the WRITERS (internal/oidc) and the
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// GATE (internal/auditlogs) are different packages and must name the same set. A
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// writer that invents its own string writes a row anybody can then rewrite.
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const (
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ActionConsentTraining = "consent-training"
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ActionIssueUserToken = "issue-user-token"
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ActionMintUserKeys = "mint-user-keys"
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ActionRevokeUserKeys = "revoke-user-keys"
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ActionTokenExchange = "token-exchange"
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// A server key acting FOR a user in its own org — the credential behind as().
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// It is a privileged mint (one principal obtains a token bound to another), so
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// every one is recorded: who acted (the org key), for whom (the target
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// subject), in which org, and when.
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ActionAs = "as"
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// A platform operator stepping into an organization and back out, and reaching
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// past their own memberships to enumerate the registry. All three are
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// privileged cross-tenant acts, so all three are recorded — and so is a
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// refusal, which is the row an auditor most wants to find.
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ActionAssumeOrg = "assume-organization"
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ActionReleaseOrg = "release-organization"
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ActionListOrgs = "list-organizations"
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// A request a SuperAdmin made with platform authority — every one the Guard
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// admits for them, read or write, whatever its route and answer — and the
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// platform acts IAM performs for one outside the Guard: unlinking another
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// person's sign-in method, approving a device sign-in for another
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// organization's application. Filed under the actor's own org, the admin org,
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// so the whole trail of platform authority is one query; Organization names
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// the org acted on when there is one.
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ActionSuperAdmin = "superadmin"
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// A workload in a Kubernetes namespace obtaining its application's token by
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// presenting the ServiceAccount token its cluster minted for it (RFC 7523).
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// The row names the service account that asked, so the trail reads the same
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// whether a credential came from a stored secret or from the cluster.
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ActionWorkloadToken = "workload-token"
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// Invitations: an email sent about one, an account joining an org through one,
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// and the refused attempts to use one — by a signed-in account, and at signup.
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// They are the ledger the send quotas and the attempt limits count, which is
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// why no request may create, alter or remove them.
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ActionInviteSend = "invitation-send"
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ActionInviteAccept = "invitation-accept"
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ActionInviteRefused = "invitation-refused"
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ActionInviteSignupRefused = "invitation-signup-refused"
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// A code IAM sent a signed-in account to prove its address for joining.
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ActionInviteCodeSent = "invitation-code-sent"
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// A membership granted or revoked through /v1/iam/memberships, filed under the
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// org it changes: an org's roster is its authority over who acts and spends in
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// it, so every change to it is accountable to that org.
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ActionMembershipGrant = "membership-grant"
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ActionMembershipRevoke = "membership-revoke"
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// A SuperAdmin signing in AS another person (/v1/iam/impersonate): the hint
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// issued, the code minted for it, and the token that code became. One action
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// for all three steps, each row's requestUri naming its step; refusals too.
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ActionImpersonate = "impersonate"
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// A confidential client obtaining a delegated token for a person
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// (iam LLM.md "Delegation"): the person, the org it bills, the client that
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// acts, the run it is for and its lifetime. Refusals too, filed under the org
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// asked for, so a tenant reads every attempt to act in it.
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ActionDelegate = "delegate"
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// A person adding a sign-in address — an email or a phone, proved by a code
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// sent to it — to their own account (PUT /v1/iam/address). Object names the
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// field and the application, never the address or the code.
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ActionAddress = "address"
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// A wallet sign-up that created an account, filed under the application's
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// org with the client address (ClientIp) and its network (Object). It is the
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// ledger the wallet creation cap counts.
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ActionWalletSignup = "wallet-signup"
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// A social sign-in linking its provider subject onto the existing account that
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// holds the address the provider verified, filed under that account's org.
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// Object names the provider, the subject, the client and whether the account's
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// address was verified before the link; never a credential.
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ActionFederationLink = "federation-link"
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// The admin lifecycle (iam LLM.md "Org admins"). Each is filed under the org
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// acted in, so that org's admins read it at GET /v1/iam/audit-logs, and its
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// Object is store.Act's: the target, the value before and after, the reason
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// and the request id. ActionOrgAdmin is an account's org-admin flag moving
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// (a grant or a revoke, told apart by from/to); ActionInviteRole an
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// invitation written to carry a role; ActionUserRemove an account deleted;
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// ActionVoid an account's tokens and sessions ended because it lost authority.
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ActionOrgAdmin = "org-admin"
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ActionInviteRole = "invitation-role"
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ActionUserRemove = "user-remove"
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ActionVoid = "void"
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)
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// PlatformWritten reports whether action names a record the platform writes
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// about itself, and which therefore no request may create, alter, or remove.
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//
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// Read this; never compare the strings. A caller with its own comparison is a
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// second copy of the reserved set, and the two will drift the moment one grows.
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func PlatformWritten(action string) bool {
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switch action {
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case ActionConsentTraining, ActionIssueUserToken, ActionMintUserKeys,
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ActionRevokeUserKeys, ActionTokenExchange, ActionAs,
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ActionAssumeOrg, ActionReleaseOrg, ActionListOrgs, ActionSuperAdmin, ActionWorkloadToken,
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ActionInviteSend, ActionInviteAccept, ActionInviteRefused, ActionInviteSignupRefused,
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ActionInviteCodeSent, ActionMembershipGrant, ActionMembershipRevoke, ActionImpersonate,
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ActionDelegate, ActionAddress, ActionWalletSignup, ActionFederationLink,
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ActionOrgAdmin, ActionInviteRole, ActionUserRemove, ActionVoid:
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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type AuditLog struct {
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orm.Model[AuditLog]
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Owner string `json:"owner" orm:"index"`
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Name string `json:"name" orm:"index"`
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CreatedTime string `json:"createdTime" orm:"index"`
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Organization string `json:"organization" orm:"index"`
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ClientIp string `json:"clientIp"`
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User string `json:"user" orm:"index"`
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Method string `json:"method"`
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RequestUri string `json:"requestUri"`
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Action string `json:"action" orm:"index"`
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Language string `json:"language"`
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Object string `json:"object"`
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Response string `json:"response"`
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StatusCode int `json:"statusCode"`
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IsTriggered bool `json:"isTriggered"`
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}
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