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WorkOS auth.md agent registration, the service_auth shape only. An agent names its person's email at POST /v1/iam/oauth/agent/identity (no credential) and gets a claim_token, stored only as its SHA-256, and a user code. The person approves on the device page they already use, under a stricter rule than a device sign-in: only the account whose verified email is the login_hint, and only an admin of a tenant home org, checked at approval and again at the claim. The agent polls the token endpoint with the claim grant and is answered as a device is. On approval, once, a service account is filed in the person's org (no sk- key, its tag the registration) with an agent-claim audit row, and the answer is its access token and a 7-day identity_assertion, never a refresh token. jwt-bearer exchanges that assertion for a fresh token for as long as the account exists; deleting it revokes the agent. Any other jwt-bearer assertion is the workload grant's, unchanged. A registration is a device row named ag-<reg>: the device poll never redeems one, the claim poll never redeems a device row, and neither is an authorization code. Discovery carries agent_auth only where IAM_AGENT_SKILL_MAP names the issuer, and only what is implemented: no anonymous, no identity_assertion, no claim or events endpoint. IAM_AGENT_CLIENT names the app registrations belong to; the boot refuses half a configuration. Refs hanzo-inc/app#85
123 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
123 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
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package e2e_test
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/url"
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"testing"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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"github.com/hanzoai/orm"
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"github.com/hanzoai/iam/pkg/schema"
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)
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// TestJourney_AgentRegistration is WorkOS auth.md's service_auth flow through the
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// whole router, Guard included: discover, register, a person approves on the
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// device page, the agent claims and exchanges, and the person revokes it by
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// deleting its service account on the service-account surface.
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func TestJourney_AgentRegistration(t *testing.T) {
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e := boot(t)
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t.Setenv("IAM_AGENT_SKILL_MAP", `{"hanzo.id":"https://hanzo.ai/auth.md"}`)
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t.Setenv("IAM_AGENT_CLIENT", "hanzo-agents")
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ctx := context.Background()
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// The application agents register through, as provision declares it.
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a := orm.New[schema.Application](e.db)
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a.Owner, a.Name, a.ClientId, a.Organization, a.Cert = "admin", "hanzo-agents", "hanzo-agents", "hanzo", kid
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a.GrantTypes = []string{"urn:workos:agent-auth:grant-type:claim"}
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a.ExpireInHours = 1
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a.SetId("admin/hanzo-agents")
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if err := a.CreateCtx(ctx); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("seed agent app: %v", err)
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}
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// The person: the admin of acme, whose address is proven.
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seedOrg(t, e.db, "acme")
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ada := orm.New[schema.User](e.db)
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ada.Owner, ada.Name, ada.Email, ada.EmailVerified, ada.IsAdmin = "acme", "ada", "[email protected]", true, true
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hash, _ := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("pw"), bcrypt.MinCost)
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ada.PasswordHash, ada.PasswordType = string(hash), "bcrypt"
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ada.SetId("acme/ada")
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if err := ada.CreateCtx(ctx); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("seed ada: %v", err)
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}
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// 1. Discover.
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meta := e.getJSON(t, "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", "")
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block, _ := meta["agent_auth"].(map[string]any)
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if block["identity_endpoint"] != "https://hanzo.id/v1/iam/oauth/agent/identity" || block["skill"] != "https://hanzo.ai/auth.md" {
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t.Fatalf("agent_auth = %v", meta["agent_auth"])
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}
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// 2. Register, with no credential.
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st, body := e.req(t, "POST", "/v1/iam/oauth/agent/identity", "", `{"type":"service_auth","login_hint":"[email protected]"}`, "application/json")
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if st != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("register: %d %s", st, body)
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}
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var reg struct {
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RegistrationId string `json:"registration_id"`
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ClaimToken string `json:"claim_token"`
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Claim struct {
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UserCode string `json:"user_code"`
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} `json:"claim"`
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(body), ®); err != nil || reg.ClaimToken == "" || reg.Claim.UserCode == "" {
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t.Fatalf("registration = %s (%v)", body, err)
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}
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claim := url.Values{"grant_type": {"urn:workos:agent-auth:grant-type:claim"}, "claim_token": {reg.ClaimToken}}
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if m := e.token(t, claim); m["error"] != "authorization_pending" {
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t.Fatalf("before approval: %v", m)
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}
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// 3. The person approves on the device page.
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approve, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{
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"type": "device", "organization": "acme", "username": "ada", "password": "pw", "userCode": reg.Claim.UserCode,
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})
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if st, body := e.req(t, "POST", "/v1/iam/login", "", string(approve), "application/json"); st != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("approve: %d %s", st, body)
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}
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// 4. The agent claims: one service account in acme, its token, and the assertion.
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tok := e.token(t, claim)
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access, _ := tok["access_token"].(string)
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assertion, _ := tok["identity_assertion"].(string)
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if access == "" || assertion == "" || tok["refresh_token"] != nil {
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t.Fatalf("claim = %v", tok)
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}
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adaBearer := e.mint(t, "acme/ada")
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list := e.getJSON(t, "/v1/iam/service-accounts?organization=acme", adaBearer)
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rows, _ := list["data"].([]any)
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if len(rows) != 1 {
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t.Fatalf("acme's service accounts = %v", list)
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}
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sa, _ := rows[0].(map[string]any)
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name, _ := sa["name"].(string)
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if sa["tag"] != reg.RegistrationId {
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t.Fatalf("service account = %v, want tag %s", sa, reg.RegistrationId)
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}
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// The agent's token is a bearer the Guard admits as that account.
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if acct := e.getJSON(t, "/v1/iam/account", access); acct["status"] != "ok" {
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t.Fatalf("the agent's token is refused: %v", acct)
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}
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// 5. The assertion exchanges for a fresh token.
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exchange := url.Values{"grant_type": {"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer"}, "assertion": {assertion}}
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if m := e.token(t, exchange); m["access_token"] == nil {
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t.Fatalf("exchange: %v", m)
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}
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// 6. The person revokes the agent by deleting its account; the assertion is dead.
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st, body = e.req(t, "DELETE", "/v1/iam/service-accounts/"+name+"?organization=acme", adaBearer, "", "")
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if st != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("delete %s: %d %s", name, st, body)
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}
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if m := e.token(t, exchange); m["error"] != "invalid_grant" || m["access_token"] != nil {
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t.Fatalf("exchange after revocation: %v", m)
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}
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}
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