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zeekayandHanzo Dev 695cf85aa7 the signing key is mounted by the deployment, and a row cannot hold one
A Cert ROW is the key's IDENTITY — owner, name (the JWKS `kid`), algorithm,
expiry — and identity is public: the JWKS publishes it. The private half is
`json:"-"`, and since every orm backend persists an entity as
json.Marshal(entity), that tag IS the storage contract: no write path reaches a
column with it, and the API neither serves nor accepts it.

internal/keyring holds the material for the life of the process and fills it on
load. ONE source, and only one: a directory of PEM files, one per Cert name, at
$IAM_SIGNING_KEYS — the shape both of the estate's KMS readers already deliver,
so something else performs the KMS read and iam holds no KMS credential. A cert
under a reserved signing owner is the only kind ever given a key, because
material is addressed by name and the name is the `kid`.

Resolution is fail-closed. With nothing mounted a Cert resolves to no key and
the token endpoint refuses. A dev box mounts a PEM like every other deployment
does; nothing mints one in process, so two replicas of one image either hold the
same key or hold none, never different keys under one `kid`.

The seed therefore files cert METADATA and stops there. Everything downstream —
the signer, the verifier, the JWKS, the session-cookie key — reads
cert.PrivateKey off the value the store hands it, exactly as before.

A deployment MUST mount $IAM_SIGNING_KEYS with one PEM per signing cert name
before this rolls; a process that resolves no key refuses to serve.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-08-21 06:56:46 -07:00
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