mirror of
https://github.com/hanzoai/iam.git
synced 2026-11-19 18:37:16 +00:00
40 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
40 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc.
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
|
|
|
|
package schema
|
|
|
|
import "github.com/hanzoai/orm"
|
|
|
|
// Challenge is a single-use, expiring wallet login challenge (v1 the legacy surface
|
|
// `web3_nonce`, v2 kind "challenges") — the anti-replay half of CAIP-122 wallet
|
|
// sign-in (HIP-0111). GET /v1/iam/web3/nonce mints one; POST /v1/iam/web3/verify
|
|
// burns it before any crypto runs, so a captured proof can never be redeemed
|
|
// twice even when its signature is valid.
|
|
//
|
|
// Owner is always "built-in": a challenge is minted before any application or
|
|
// tenant is known, so the challenge store is global, not org-scoped. Name IS the
|
|
// nonce string, so (Owner, Name) is the natural key the burn locks.
|
|
//
|
|
// Domain is the request-derived brand host the wallet signed against, re-checked
|
|
// against this row at verify. The whole phishing defense rides on that binding,
|
|
// which is why the host is stored at mint rather than re-derived from the client
|
|
// at verify.
|
|
type Challenge struct {
|
|
orm.Model[Challenge]
|
|
|
|
Owner string `json:"owner" orm:"index"` // "built-in" — the challenge store is global
|
|
Name string `json:"name" orm:"index"` // the nonce string itself (the lookup key)
|
|
|
|
// Chain and Address are the advisory scoping hints the mint was asked for.
|
|
// Chain is re-checked at verify so a nonce minted for one chain cannot be
|
|
// redeemed with a valid proof on another; Address is a hint only — identity
|
|
// comes from the VERIFIED address, never from this row.
|
|
Chain string `json:"chain"`
|
|
Address string `json:"address"`
|
|
|
|
Domain string `json:"domain"`
|
|
CreatedTime string `json:"createdTime"`
|
|
ExpireTime string `json:"expireTime"` // RFC3339
|
|
Used bool `json:"used"`
|
|
}
|