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One word stood for several: the MCP server, one address that accepts requests, the single way in, and the boundary a credential is validated at. Doc comments here are lifted into OpenAPI descriptions and republished on docs.hanzo.ai, so the ambiguity was reaching customers. Each site now names its own sense — endpoint, entry point, the MCP server, the edge, address — or takes the word the surrounding code already uses. Comments and prose strings only; identifiers keep their names, including the doc comments that must open with the identifier they document. Measured 177 -> 0. go build ./... and go vet ./... exit 0. The files gofmt reports were already unformatted at HEAD and are untouched by this change.
86 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
86 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
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package store
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import (
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"testing"
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"github.com/hanzoai/account"
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"github.com/hanzoai/iam/pkg/schema"
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)
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// A MACHINE spends its org's POOL, and it has to SAY so.
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//
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// This is the whole of the bug these tests pin, on the API-KEY path. account.Payer
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// falls back to a shape rule when nothing names a payer, and that rule makes the
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// signup org special: anyone in it gets a PERSONAL wallet. A machine has no
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// person, so "hanzo/guest" is a wallet no funding path can name — an admin grant
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// credits the pool, a deposit names a real member — and it reads $0 forever while
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// the org's balance sits one key away.
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//
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// The token path already states this for client_credentials. The key path did not
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// state it at all, so every first-party service key resolved to the ghost wallet
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// and 402'd against a funded org: "Insufficient balance" on an org holding
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// millions. Minting a fresh key could never fix it — every new key resolved the
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// same way.
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//
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// The assertion runs the REAL downstream rule (account.Payer) over the value, so
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// what is proven is the thread claim → wallet, not a helper agreeing with itself.
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func TestMachineSpendsTheOrgPool(t *testing.T) {
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for _, machine := range []string{"service-account", "application"} {
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t.Run(machine, func(t *testing.T) {
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u := &schema.User{Owner: "hanzo", Name: "guest", Type: machine}
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got := BillingAccount(u, nil)
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if got != "org:hanzo" {
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t.Fatalf("BillingAccount = %q; want %q", got, "org:hanzo")
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}
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// The value must survive account.Parse and land on the ORG, not a
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// person: a bare slug parses to a zero Account and Payer silently
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// falls back to the shape rule that started this.
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payer := account.Payer(account.Credential{Owner: u.Owner, Name: u.Name, Account: got})
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if payer.String() != "org:hanzo" {
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t.Fatalf("Payer = %q; want org:hanzo (the funded pool, not a ghost wallet)", payer.String())
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// A machine outside the signup org names its own org — never another tenant's.
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func TestMachineNamesOnlyItsOwnOrg(t *testing.T) {
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u := &schema.User{Owner: "lux", Name: "bot", Type: "service-account"}
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if got := BillingAccount(u, nil); got != "org:lux" {
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t.Fatalf("BillingAccount = %q; want org:lux", got)
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}
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}
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// A PERSON is unchanged: the free-rider hole stays shut. A plain member of the
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// signup org names nothing and falls through to the personal wallet, which is the
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// rule that stops a brand-new $0 account from spending the platform balance.
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func TestPlainMemberStillNamesNothing(t *testing.T) {
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u := &schema.User{Owner: "hanzo", Name: "stranger"}
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if got := BillingAccount(u, []schema.OrgRef{{Org: "hanzo", Role: "member"}}); got != "" {
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t.Fatalf("BillingAccount = %q; want \"\" (personal wallet via Payer's shape rule)", got)
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}
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if got := BillingAccount(u, nil); got != "" {
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t.Fatalf("BillingAccount = %q; want \"\"", got)
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}
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}
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// A person who OWNS or ADMINISTERS their home org holds that org's credit.
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func TestOrgAdminSpendsThePool(t *testing.T) {
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u := &schema.User{Owner: "hanzo", Name: "boss"}
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for _, role := range []string{RoleOwner, RoleAdmin} {
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if got := BillingAccount(u, []schema.OrgRef{{Org: "hanzo", Role: role}}); got != "org:hanzo" {
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t.Fatalf("role %q: BillingAccount = %q; want org:hanzo", role, got)
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}
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}
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// Privileged elsewhere grants nothing here.
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if got := BillingAccount(u, []schema.OrgRef{{Org: "lux", Role: RoleAdmin}}); got != "" {
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t.Fatalf("BillingAccount = %q; want \"\" (admin of another org names no ledger here)", got)
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}
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}
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