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schema.User.SuperAdmin is the one predicate: a person whose row's owner is the admin org. The Guard sets Principal.Sudo from it when it loads the caller, and assume/release, device approval, unlink, the bootstrap credential freeze and the registry push gate ask the row directly. store.IsSuperAdmin, which also admitted a membership of the admin org, is gone. A brand org's user added to the admin org is an ordinary member of their own org, and a service account or program in the admin org is never SuperAdmin. hanzoai/authz v1.10.42 reads the same rule off a token (Claims.Sudo on orgs[0]) and lets a membership of the admin org open nothing, so such a member no longer reads or edits the admin org's registry row either. The token IAM mints is unchanged: orgs still opens with the row's owner. Two protective gates keep the whole admin org, machines and unheld names included: no secret key names an account there (store.SuperAdminKey), and only a SuperAdmin writes one (users.Authorize). Both read the owner as written, so neither reads the store. Every request the Guard admits for a SuperAdmin is recorded as a superadmin audit row, PlatformWritten, with its method, address, answer and client address; so is a SuperAdmin's unlink of someone else's sign-in method and a device approval into another org. TestEverySuperAdminGateAdmitsTheAdminOrgsPeopleOnly drives ten SuperAdmin-only requests through the router as two SuperAdmins, a brand admin holding an admin-org membership and two admin-org machines, and reads the trail row each one leaves. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HuMDfgFssPUptYUzgZ6Cp8
414 lines
20 KiB
Go
414 lines
20 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
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package schema
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"strings"
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policy "github.com/hanzoai/authz"
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"github.com/hanzoai/orm"
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)
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// User is an identity principal — the v2 form of the v1 the legacy surface `user` row,
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// re-expressed on hanzoai/orm. It is the authentication entity: the only
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// credential material it persists is PasswordHash (a one-way bcrypt digest,
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// json:"-" so it never leaves the process) and the legacy hash metadata used
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// to migrate rows minted before the bcrypt cutover. The plaintext password is
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// never a field on this struct — it arrives on the create/update request,
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// is hashed immediately, and is discarded.
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//
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// The natural/query key is (Owner, Name): Owner is the tenant/organization slug,
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// Name is unique within it. The embedded orm.Model[User] supplies the storage
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// key, the created/updated timestamps, and the CRUD lifecycle.
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type User struct {
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orm.Model[User]
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// Id is the user's STABLE OPAQUE identifier — the value the OIDC `sub` claim
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// carries. It is the v1 the legacy surface per-row UUID (e.g.
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// "e7d7fda0-4c53-4508-9d35-7ec892b7e5d7"), migrated verbatim so a user's `sub`
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// is byte-identical across the cutover: every live session, external reference,
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// and the downstream money-path principal keyed on `sub` survive unchanged. A
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// user minted natively in v2 is assigned a fresh UUID here on create, so the
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// `sub` is ALWAYS a stable opaque id going forward — never the (Owner, Name)
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// pair, which is mutable (a rename would otherwise silently reissue identity).
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//
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// It is distinct from the embedded orm.Model STORAGE KEY — the value the datastore
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// locks and looks a row up by — which is NOT (Owner, Name) for every row: a MIGRATED
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// legacy row is stamped "owner/name" (SetId in the migrator), but a v2-native
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// users.Create'd row is NOT — Create allocates rather than pinning a key, so its
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// storage key is a store-assigned surrogate id (a decimal string like
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// "17847909129933610000001"). (Owner, Name) is therefore the natural/QUERY key
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// (unique, indexed), not necessarily the storage key: resolve a row for a locked
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// write by its REAL key (store.GetUserByName(...).Key().Encode(), which stamps both
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// shapes — see internal/oidc updateUser), never by assuming "owner/name". This Id is
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// a first-class, indexed DOMAIN field; its json tag "id" dominates the promoted
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// orm.Model `Id_` (also "id") by shallower depth, so the persisted record's "id" is
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// this UUID — exactly the v1 shape. A row that carries no Id (a not-yet-assigned
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// pre-cutover user) falls back to the (Owner, Name) subject at mint; every other
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// path resolves `sub`→user by Id.
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Id string `json:"id,omitempty" orm:"index"`
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// Identity / tenancy. (Owner, Name) is the natural key.
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Owner string `json:"owner" orm:"index"`
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Name string `json:"name" orm:"index"`
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CreatedTime string `json:"createdTime"`
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UpdatedTime string `json:"updatedTime"`
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DeletedTime string `json:"deletedTime,omitempty"`
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ExternalId string `json:"externalId,omitempty" orm:"index"`
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Type string `json:"type,omitempty"`
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// Credential material. PasswordHash is a one-way bcrypt digest and is
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// verify-only. It MUST be persisted (orm serializes the entity to its JSON
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// data column, so a json:"-" field would never be stored — that silently
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// broke login), so it carries a real json tag; the users API redact() strips
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// it (and every other secret) from every response. PasswordType and
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// PasswordSalt describe the digest scheme so rows hashed under the legacy
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// argon2id scheme can still be verified and lazily re-hashed to bcrypt.
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PasswordHash string `json:"passwordHash,omitempty"`
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PasswordType string `json:"passwordType,omitempty"`
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PasswordSalt string `json:"passwordSalt,omitempty"`
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// Profile.
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DisplayName string `json:"displayName,omitempty"`
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FirstName string `json:"firstName,omitempty"`
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LastName string `json:"lastName,omitempty"`
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Avatar string `json:"avatar,omitempty"`
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AvatarType string `json:"avatarType,omitempty"`
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PermanentAvatar string `json:"permanentAvatar,omitempty"`
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Email string `json:"email,omitempty" orm:"index"`
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EmailVerified bool `json:"emailVerified,omitempty"`
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Phone string `json:"phone,omitempty" orm:"index"`
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CountryCode string `json:"countryCode,omitempty"`
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Region string `json:"region,omitempty"`
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Location string `json:"location,omitempty"`
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Address []string `json:"address,omitempty"`
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Addresses []*Address `json:"addresses,omitempty"`
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Affiliation string `json:"affiliation,omitempty"`
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Title string `json:"title,omitempty"`
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IdCardType string `json:"idCardType,omitempty"`
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IdCard string `json:"idCard,omitempty" orm:"index"`
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RealName string `json:"realName,omitempty"`
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IsVerified bool `json:"isVerified,omitempty"`
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Homepage string `json:"homepage,omitempty"`
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Bio string `json:"bio,omitempty"`
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Tag string `json:"tag,omitempty"`
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Language string `json:"language,omitempty"`
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Gender string `json:"gender,omitempty"`
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Birthday string `json:"birthday,omitempty"`
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Education string `json:"education,omitempty"`
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Score int `json:"score,omitempty"`
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Karma int `json:"karma,omitempty"`
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Ranking int `json:"ranking,omitempty"`
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// Balance mirrors v1 for lossless migration but is authoritative in
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// Commerce (billing.hanzo.ai), not here — do not write it from IAM.
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Balance float64 `json:"balance,omitempty"`
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BalanceCredit float64 `json:"balanceCredit,omitempty"`
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Currency string `json:"currency,omitempty"`
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BalanceCurrency string `json:"balanceCurrency,omitempty"`
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// State flags.
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IsDefaultAvatar bool `json:"isDefaultAvatar,omitempty" orm:"default:false"`
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IsOnline bool `json:"isOnline,omitempty" orm:"default:false"`
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IsAdmin bool `json:"isAdmin,omitempty" orm:"default:false"`
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IsForbidden bool `json:"isForbidden,omitempty" orm:"default:false"`
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IsDeleted bool `json:"isDeleted,omitempty" orm:"default:false"`
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SignupApplication string `json:"signupApplication,omitempty"`
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Hash string `json:"hash,omitempty"`
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PreHash string `json:"preHash,omitempty"`
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RegisterType string `json:"registerType,omitempty"`
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RegisterSource string `json:"registerSource,omitempty"`
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// API credentials. AccessSecret / AccessSecretHash / the OAuth tokens are
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// bearer material, so Mask blanks them and the handler's redact() strips them
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// before responding. They carry real json tags because a field orm never saves
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// is a field that silently vanishes.
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//
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// A presented secret is resolved through Key.AccessSecretDigest and nowhere
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// else, so no credential is ISSUED into these columns: they hold what older
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// rows left behind, and every writer that touches them clears them.
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AccessKey string `json:"accessKey,omitempty"`
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AccessSecret string `json:"accessSecret,omitempty"`
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AccessSecretHash string `json:"accessSecretHash,omitempty"`
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AccessToken string `json:"accessToken,omitempty"`
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OriginalToken string `json:"originalToken,omitempty"`
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OriginalRefreshToken string `json:"originalRefreshToken,omitempty"`
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// Sign-in provenance.
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CreatedIp string `json:"createdIp,omitempty"`
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LastSigninTime string `json:"lastSigninTime,omitempty"`
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LastSigninIp string `json:"lastSigninIp,omitempty"`
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// Linked federated-identity subjects, one column per connector (v1 parity).
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GitHub string `json:"github,omitempty"`
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Google string `json:"google,omitempty"`
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QQ string `json:"qq,omitempty"`
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WeChat string `json:"wechat,omitempty"`
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Facebook string `json:"facebook,omitempty"`
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DingTalk string `json:"dingtalk,omitempty"`
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Weibo string `json:"weibo,omitempty"`
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Gitee string `json:"gitee,omitempty"`
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LinkedIn string `json:"linkedin,omitempty"`
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Wecom string `json:"wecom,omitempty"`
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Lark string `json:"lark,omitempty"`
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Gitlab string `json:"gitlab,omitempty"`
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Adfs string `json:"adfs,omitempty"`
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Baidu string `json:"baidu,omitempty"`
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Alipay string `json:"alipay,omitempty"`
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Iam string `json:"iam,omitempty"`
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Infoflow string `json:"infoflow,omitempty"`
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Apple string `json:"apple,omitempty"`
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AzureAD string `json:"azuread,omitempty"`
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AzureADB2c string `json:"azureadb2c,omitempty"`
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Slack string `json:"slack,omitempty"`
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Steam string `json:"steam,omitempty"`
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Bilibili string `json:"bilibili,omitempty"`
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Okta string `json:"okta,omitempty"`
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Douyin string `json:"douyin,omitempty"`
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Kwai string `json:"kwai,omitempty"`
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Line string `json:"line,omitempty"`
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Amazon string `json:"amazon,omitempty"`
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Auth0 string `json:"auth0,omitempty"`
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BattleNet string `json:"battlenet,omitempty"`
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Bitbucket string `json:"bitbucket,omitempty"`
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Box string `json:"box,omitempty"`
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CloudFoundry string `json:"cloudfoundry,omitempty"`
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Dailymotion string `json:"dailymotion,omitempty"`
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Deezer string `json:"deezer,omitempty"`
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DigitalOcean string `json:"digitalocean,omitempty"`
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Discord string `json:"discord,omitempty"`
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Dropbox string `json:"dropbox,omitempty"`
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EveOnline string `json:"eveonline,omitempty"`
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Fitbit string `json:"fitbit,omitempty"`
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Gitea string `json:"gitea,omitempty"`
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Heroku string `json:"heroku,omitempty"`
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InfluxCloud string `json:"influxcloud,omitempty"`
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Instagram string `json:"instagram,omitempty"`
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Intercom string `json:"intercom,omitempty"`
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Kakao string `json:"kakao,omitempty"`
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Lastfm string `json:"lastfm,omitempty"`
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Mailru string `json:"mailru,omitempty"`
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Meetup string `json:"meetup,omitempty"`
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MicrosoftOnline string `json:"microsoftonline,omitempty"`
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Naver string `json:"naver,omitempty"`
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Nextcloud string `json:"nextcloud,omitempty"`
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OneDrive string `json:"onedrive,omitempty"`
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Oura string `json:"oura,omitempty"`
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Patreon string `json:"patreon,omitempty"`
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Paypal string `json:"paypal,omitempty"`
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SalesForce string `json:"salesforce,omitempty"`
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Shopify string `json:"shopify,omitempty"`
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Soundcloud string `json:"soundcloud,omitempty"`
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Spotify string `json:"spotify,omitempty"`
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Strava string `json:"strava,omitempty"`
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Stripe string `json:"stripe,omitempty"`
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Telegram string `json:"telegram,omitempty"`
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TikTok string `json:"tiktok,omitempty"`
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Tumblr string `json:"tumblr,omitempty"`
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Twitch string `json:"twitch,omitempty"`
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Twitter string `json:"twitter,omitempty"`
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Typetalk string `json:"typetalk,omitempty"`
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Uber string `json:"uber,omitempty"`
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VK string `json:"vk,omitempty"`
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Wepay string `json:"wepay,omitempty"`
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Xero string `json:"xero,omitempty"`
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Yahoo string `json:"yahoo,omitempty"`
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Yammer string `json:"yammer,omitempty"`
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Yandex string `json:"yandex,omitempty"`
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Zoom string `json:"zoom,omitempty"`
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Custom string `json:"custom,omitempty"`
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Custom2 string `json:"custom2,omitempty"`
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Custom3 string `json:"custom3,omitempty"`
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Custom4 string `json:"custom4,omitempty"`
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Custom5 string `json:"custom5,omitempty"`
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Custom6 string `json:"custom6,omitempty"`
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Custom7 string `json:"custom7,omitempty"`
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Custom8 string `json:"custom8,omitempty"`
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Custom9 string `json:"custom9,omitempty"`
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Custom10 string `json:"custom10,omitempty"`
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// Multi-factor authentication. TotpSecret and RecoveryCodes are secret
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// verify-only material — the handler strips them from every response.
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// WebauthnCredentials is carried as raw JSON here for lossless migration;
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// the typed passkey model is the sibling WebauthnCredential entity.
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WebauthnCredentials []json.RawMessage `json:"webauthnCredentials,omitempty"`
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PreferredMfaType string `json:"preferredMfaType,omitempty"`
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RecoveryCodes []string `json:"recoveryCodes,omitempty"`
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TotpSecret string `json:"totpSecret,omitempty"`
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VerificationCode string `json:"verificationCode,omitempty"`
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MfaPhoneEnabled bool `json:"mfaPhoneEnabled,omitempty"`
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MfaEmailEnabled bool `json:"mfaEmailEnabled,omitempty"`
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MfaRadiusEnabled bool `json:"mfaRadiusEnabled,omitempty"`
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MfaRadiusUsername string `json:"mfaRadiusUsername,omitempty"`
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MfaRadiusProvider string `json:"mfaRadiusProvider,omitempty"`
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MfaPushEnabled bool `json:"mfaPushEnabled,omitempty"`
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MfaPushReceiver string `json:"mfaPushReceiver,omitempty"`
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MfaPushProvider string `json:"mfaPushProvider,omitempty"`
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MultiFactorAuths []*MfaProps `json:"multiFactorAuths,omitempty"`
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Invitation string `json:"invitation,omitempty" orm:"index"`
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InvitationCode string `json:"invitationCode,omitempty" orm:"index"`
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FaceIds []*FaceId `json:"faceIds,omitempty"`
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Cart []CartItem `json:"cart,omitempty"`
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Ldap string `json:"ldap,omitempty"`
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Properties map[string]string `json:"properties,omitempty"`
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LastChangePasswordTime string `json:"lastChangePasswordTime,omitempty"`
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LastSigninWrongTime string `json:"lastSigninWrongTime,omitempty"`
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SigninWrongTimes int `json:"signinWrongTimes,omitempty"`
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ManagedAccounts []ManagedAccount `json:"managedAccounts,omitempty"`
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MfaAccounts []MfaAccount `json:"mfaAccounts,omitempty"`
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MfaItems []*MfaItem `json:"mfaItems,omitempty"`
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MfaRememberDeadline string `json:"mfaRememberDeadline,omitempty"`
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// MfaRememberDigest is the digest of the token held by the ONE browser the
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// deadline above applies to. Without it the deadline is account-wide and "don't
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// ask again on this browser" switches the second factor off everywhere. It is a
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// digest, never the token, so a database dump yields nothing presentable — and it
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// carries a REAL json tag because orm persists via json.Marshal, so `json:"-"`
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// would never be stored (the trap PasswordHash documents above); Mask() strips it
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// from every response instead.
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MfaRememberDigest string `json:"mfaRememberDigest,omitempty"`
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NeedUpdatePassword bool `json:"needUpdatePassword,omitempty"`
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IpWhitelist string `json:"ipWhitelist,omitempty"`
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ApplicationScopes []ConsentRecord `json:"applicationScopes,omitempty"`
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}
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// Address is a structured postal address held on a user.
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type Address struct {
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Tag string `json:"tag,omitempty"`
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Line1 string `json:"line1,omitempty"`
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Line2 string `json:"line2,omitempty"`
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City string `json:"city,omitempty"`
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State string `json:"state,omitempty"`
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ZipCode string `json:"zipCode,omitempty"`
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Region string `json:"region,omitempty"`
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}
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// ManagedAccount is a credential a user delegates for a downstream application.
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// Password is secret verify-only material; the handler strips it on read.
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type ManagedAccount struct {
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Application string `json:"application,omitempty"`
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Username string `json:"username,omitempty"`
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Password string `json:"-"`
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SigninUrl string `json:"signinUrl,omitempty"`
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}
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// MfaAccount is a stored TOTP authenticator entry. SecretKey never serializes.
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type MfaAccount struct {
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AccountName string `json:"accountName,omitempty"`
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Issuer string `json:"issuer,omitempty"`
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SecretKey string `json:"-"`
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Origin string `json:"origin,omitempty"`
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}
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// MfaProps is one configured MFA method surfaced to clients. Secret and
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// RecoveryCodes are verify-only and stripped from responses.
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type MfaProps struct {
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Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty"`
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IsPreferred bool `json:"isPreferred,omitempty"`
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MfaType string `json:"mfaType,omitempty"`
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Secret string `json:"-"`
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CountryCode string `json:"countryCode,omitempty"`
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URL string `json:"url,omitempty"`
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RecoveryCodes []string `json:"-"`
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MfaRememberInHours int `json:"mfaRememberInHours,omitempty"`
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}
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// MfaItem is an organization-defined MFA requirement pinned to the user. It is
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// shared with Organization (which declares the org-level requirement set).
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type MfaItem struct {
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Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
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Rule string `json:"rule,omitempty"`
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}
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// FaceId is a stored face-recognition template for passwordless sign-in.
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type FaceId struct {
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Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
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FaceIdData []float64 `json:"faceIdData,omitempty"`
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ImageUrl string `json:"imageUrl,omitempty"`
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}
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// CartItem is a line item retained from v1 (billing lives in Commerce).
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type CartItem struct {
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Owner string `json:"owner,omitempty"`
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Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
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DisplayName string `json:"displayName,omitempty"`
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Price float64 `json:"price,omitempty"`
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Quantity int `json:"quantity,omitempty"`
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}
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// ConsentRecord records the scopes a user granted a given application.
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type ConsentRecord struct {
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Application string `json:"application,omitempty"`
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GrantedScopes []string `json:"grantedScopes,omitempty"`
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}
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// ServiceAccount is the User.Type IAM writes for a MACHINE identity — a
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// credential with no person behind it. IAM is the authority on what its own rows
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// are, so the predicate reading this field lives beside the field rather than in
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// a downstream library's opinion of the string. Program below is the sibling
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// shape other Hanzo services stamp for the same idea, and Machine accepts both.
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const ServiceAccount = "service-account"
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// Program is the other word, and it is the one a TOKEN carries: the class of a
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// machine with no user row, where the registration itself IS the principal.
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//
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// Its wire spelling is the older of the two, and that is deliberate. A row is read
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// by IAM, which knows both words; a token is read by every service that validates
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// one, each pinned to its own copy of the predicate — and an earlier account
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// library matches ONLY this spelling. Stating the newer word in a token would read
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// as a person wherever the reader had not caught up, which is precisely the
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// failure the claim exists to end. The wire takes the word everyone knows.
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const Program = "application"
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// Machine reports whether this row is a machine identity rather than a person.
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//
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// It decides WHICH LEDGER the principal spends from (store.BillingAccount): a
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// machine has no person, so a personal wallet keyed on its name is one no funding
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// path can name and it reads $0 forever.
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func (u *User) Machine() bool {
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if u == nil {
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return false
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}
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switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(u.Type)) {
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case ServiceAccount, Program:
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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// SuperAdmin reports platform authority: this row is a PERSON whose own org — the
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// owner of the row — is the reserved admin org. It is THE SuperAdmin predicate;
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// every gate in IAM asks it, directly or through the Principal the Guard builds
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// from this row (principal.Principal.Sudo), and nothing else answers the question.
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//
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// A membership of the admin org is not it. A brand org's user added to the admin
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// org is an ordinary member of it; platform authority goes to named people
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// provisioned IN the admin org. A per-org IsAdmin is a different, org-scoped fact
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// and never answers this one.
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//
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// A machine is never one, whatever org it lives in: its authority is what it was
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// minted for, not the platform's. The same rule reads off a token as
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// authz.Claims.Sudo, whose home org is the first entry of `orgs` — the owner of
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// this row (store.MemberOrgRefs) — so the row and every token minted from it agree.
|
|
//
|
|
// Liveness is not part of it: a forbidden or deleted account is refused by every
|
|
// path that authenticates one, and a gate that protects a SuperAdmin's account
|
|
// must keep protecting it while it is suspended.
|
|
func (u *User) SuperAdmin() bool {
|
|
return u != nil && u.Owner == policy.AdminOrg && !u.Machine()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Picture is how this person is drawn: the image they set, or else their
|
|
// Gravatar. It is published only where the caller already holds the address.
|
|
func (u *User) Picture() string {
|
|
if u.Avatar != "" {
|
|
return u.Avatar
|
|
}
|
|
return Gravatar(u.Email)
|
|
}
|