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Nothing let a signed-in person change their own display name or picture. Every writer of a user row is admin-scoped, because internal/authz gates the self clause to GET precisely so a regular user cannot carry isAdmin on a full-row write — and widening that clause is the escalation it exists to prevent. So the self path belongs on its own endpoint, with the fields named one by one. PUT /v1/iam/account: displayName, avatar, bio, homepage. The subject is ALWAYS the caller, resolved from their session cookie or their bearer; the body names no target, so there is no shape of this request that writes somebody else's record. Each field is a POINTER, so an omitted one PRESERVES and an explicit empty one CLEARS — a screen that saves one control cannot blank the three it did not render, and two screens saving at once do not undo each other. What is absent is the design. owner and name, because renaming moves a real identity. isAdmin and permissions. passwordHash and accessKey. email and phone, because they are login identifiers AND second-factor destinations: changing where a delivered code arrives is a credential act, and it is only safe once the NEW address has proved it can receive one, which is the verification flow's job and not a profile save's. And properties, because the consent record nests inside it — a profile write reaching there would let anyone answer the data-sharing questions on their own behalf. avatar is schema.AvatarRef, the same value an organization's mark takes: one rule for how a subject appears, whether the subject is a person or an organization, validated before the write so a picture this service will not store is a refusal rather than a half-saved profile. The answer is an explicit projection rather than the masked row, so a field added to the user later joins it when somebody decides it should.
229 lines
7.7 KiB
Go
229 lines
7.7 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
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package oidc_test
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// PUT /v1/iam/account is the one self-service write on a user row, so the cases
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// that matter are the ones about what it will NOT do: reach another account, and
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// carry a privileged field in beside the four it is for.
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"io"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/hanzoai/orm"
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"github.com/hanzoai/iam/internal/testhttp"
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"github.com/hanzoai/iam/pkg/schema"
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"github.com/hanzoai/iam/pkg/store"
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)
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const (
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account = "/v1/iam/account"
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inlinePNG = ""
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)
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// save drives one profile write and returns the status and body VERBATIM.
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func (r *rig) save(t *testing.T, sub, body string) (int, string) {
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t.Helper()
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req := httptest.NewRequest("PUT", account, strings.NewReader(body))
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req.Host = "hanzo.id"
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+r.bearer(t, sub))
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resp, err := testhttp.Do(r.app, req)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PUT %s: %v", account, err)
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}
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b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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_ = resp.Body.Close()
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return resp.StatusCode, string(b)
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}
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// row reads a user back out of the store, past the answer.
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func (r *rig) row(t *testing.T, owner, name string) *schema.User {
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t.Helper()
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u, err := store.GetUserByName(context.Background(), r.db, owner, name)
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if err != nil || u == nil {
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t.Fatalf("read %s/%s back: %v", owner, name, err)
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}
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return u
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}
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// The four fields it is for.
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func TestAccount_savesTheProfile(t *testing.T) {
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r := newRig(t)
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status, body := r.save(t, "hanzo/boss", `{"displayName":"The Boss","bio":"builds things","homepage":"https://example.com","avatar":"`+inlinePNG+`"}`)
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if status != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("status=%d body=%s, want 200", status, body)
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}
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u := r.row(t, "hanzo", "boss")
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if u.DisplayName != "The Boss" || u.Bio != "builds things" || u.Homepage != "https://example.com" {
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t.Fatalf("stored %q/%q/%q", u.DisplayName, u.Bio, u.Homepage)
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}
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if u.Avatar != inlinePNG {
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t.Fatalf("stored avatar %q", u.Avatar)
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}
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}
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// An omitted field KEEPS its value; an empty one CLEARS it. A screen that saves
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// one control must not blank the three it did not render.
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func TestAccount_omittedKeepsEmptyClears(t *testing.T) {
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r := newRig(t)
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if status, body := r.save(t, "hanzo/boss", `{"displayName":"The Boss","bio":"builds things"}`); status != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("first save: status=%d body=%s", status, body)
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}
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if status, body := r.save(t, "hanzo/boss", `{"displayName":"Boss"}`); status != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("second save: status=%d body=%s", status, body)
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}
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if u := r.row(t, "hanzo", "boss"); u.Bio != "builds things" {
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t.Fatalf("an omitted field was blanked: bio=%q", u.Bio)
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}
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if status, body := r.save(t, "hanzo/boss", `{"bio":""}`); status != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("clear: status=%d body=%s", status, body)
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}
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if u := r.row(t, "hanzo", "boss"); u.Bio != "" {
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t.Fatalf("an explicit empty did not clear: bio=%q", u.Bio)
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}
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}
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// NOTHING PRIVILEGED RIDES IN. Every one of these is a field somebody would try,
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// and the body is the only place they could come from.
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func TestAccount_privilegedFieldsCannotRideIn(t *testing.T) {
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r := newRig(t)
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// A REGULAR account, so "isAdmin":true below would be a real promotion. Run
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// against an admin the assertion proves nothing: the flag was already set.
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before := r.row(t, "hanzo", "nobody")
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if before.IsAdmin {
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t.Fatal("this case needs an account that is NOT an admin")
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}
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status, body := r.save(t, "hanzo/nobody", `{
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"displayName":"Nobody",
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"isAdmin":true,
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"owner":"admin",
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"name":"root",
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"passwordHash":"$2a$10$forged",
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"permissions":["*"],
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"email":"[email protected]",
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"phone":"+15550000000",
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"properties":{"preferences":"{\"training\":\"granted\"}"},
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"accessKey":"sk-forged",
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"score":99999
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}`)
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if status != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("status=%d body=%s, want 200 — the extra keys are ignored, not fatal", status, body)
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}
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after := r.row(t, "hanzo", "nobody")
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if after.DisplayName != "Nobody" {
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t.Fatalf("the one real field did not save: %q", after.DisplayName)
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}
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for _, c := range []struct {
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field string
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got, want any
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}{
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{"isAdmin", after.IsAdmin, before.IsAdmin},
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{"owner", after.Owner, before.Owner},
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{"name", after.Name, before.Name},
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{"passwordHash", after.PasswordHash, before.PasswordHash},
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{"email", after.Email, before.Email},
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{"phone", after.Phone, before.Phone},
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{"accessKey", after.AccessKey, before.AccessKey},
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{"score", after.Score, before.Score},
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} {
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if c.got != c.want {
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t.Fatalf("%s rode in: %v, want it untouched at %v", c.field, c.got, c.want)
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}
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}
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if len(after.Properties) != len(before.Properties) {
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t.Fatalf("properties rode in: %v — the consent record nests there", after.Properties)
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}
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// A promoted account is the one that would matter most.
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if after.IsAdmin {
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t.Fatal("the caller promoted themselves")
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}
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}
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// The account written is ALWAYS the caller's. There is no field to name another.
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func TestAccount_writesOnlyTheCaller(t *testing.T) {
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r := newRig(t)
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if status, body := r.save(t, "hanzo/nobody", `{"displayName":"changed","owner":"hanzo","name":"boss"}`); status != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("status=%d body=%s", status, body)
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}
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if u := r.row(t, "hanzo", "boss"); u.DisplayName == "changed" {
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t.Fatal("a caller wrote somebody else's profile by naming them")
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}
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if u := r.row(t, "hanzo", "nobody"); u.DisplayName != "changed" {
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t.Fatalf("the caller's own profile did not save: %q", u.DisplayName)
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}
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}
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// A picture this service will not store is a refusal, never a half-saved profile.
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func TestAccount_refusesAPictureItWillNotStore(t *testing.T) {
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r := newRig(t)
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for _, c := range []struct{ name, avatar string }{
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{"a script url", "javascript:alert(1)"},
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{"an svg", ""},
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{"http on a TLS page", "http://example.com/a.png"},
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{"over the limit", "data:image/png;base64," + strings.Repeat("A", schema.AvatarLimit)},
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} {
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t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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b, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"displayName": "Boss", "avatar": c.avatar})
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status, body := r.save(t, "hanzo/boss", string(b))
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if status == 200 {
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t.Fatalf("accepted %s: %s", c.name, body)
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}
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if u := r.row(t, "hanzo", "boss"); u.Avatar != "" || u.DisplayName == "Boss" {
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t.Fatalf("a refused write saved something: avatar=%q displayName=%q", u.Avatar, u.DisplayName)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// No credential, no write.
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func TestAccount_unauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
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r := newRig(t)
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req := httptest.NewRequest("PUT", account, strings.NewReader(`{"displayName":"nobody"}`))
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req.Host = "hanzo.id"
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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resp, err := testhttp.Do(r.app, req)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("PUT: %v", err)
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}
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b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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_ = resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode == 200 && !strings.Contains(string(b), "sign in") {
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t.Fatalf("an unauthenticated write was accepted: %s", b)
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}
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if u := r.row(t, "hanzo", "boss"); u.DisplayName == "nobody" {
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t.Fatal("an unauthenticated request wrote a profile")
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}
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}
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// The answer is the bounded projection, not the row: a secret cannot appear in
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// it even by accident, because only six fields can.
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func TestAccount_answerIsBounded(t *testing.T) {
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r := newRig(t)
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// Give the account something secret to leak.
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if _, err := orm.TypedQuery[schema.User](r.db).Filter("Owner=", "hanzo").Filter("Name=", "boss").First(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("seed check: %v", err)
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}
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status, body := r.save(t, "hanzo/boss", `{"displayName":"Boss"}`)
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if status != 200 {
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t.Fatalf("status=%d body=%s", status, body)
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}
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for _, leak := range []string{"passwordHash", "accessSecret", "isAdmin", "properties", "permissions"} {
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if strings.Contains(body, leak) {
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t.Fatalf("the answer carried %s: %s", leak, body)
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}
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}
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}
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