zeekay
1b367e2b62
The tree was a debranded snapshot of upstream taken around 2026-02-20, and upstream has moved about five months since. This replaces it with upstream master, mechanically re-derived: bin/debrand does the rename, and the pipeline and squashed migrations are restored from the shipped tree. Not a merge. The previous import replaced the tree wholesale in a single commit, so there is no shared content history to merge against. Reproducing the rename on the new tree is what actually converges. What survives: .hanzo/workflows, the Dockerfiles and bin/docker* entrypoints, compose files, LLM.md, and insights/migrations. The squashed initial migration is load-bearing — the live database records it by name, so upstream's ~918 individual migrations cannot come back. Nine products are dropped as unreferenced. Twenty-one more that we do not run are kept anyway because the core app still imports them; unpicking those is a refactor and does not belong in a rebase. This base does not build yet, and the reasons are not in the rename: upstream now wants Python 3.13.13 against our 3.12.12 and Django 5.2 against our 4.2, and the dependency manifests still name upstream packages that we republish under our own names. Those are decisions, not renames.
1.5 KiB
Customer analytics — backend
Access control: accounts and their sub-resources are resource-level scoped
Account viewsets and their nested sub-resources (custom property values, notebooks, and future account children) authorize at the resource level, not the object level:
AccessControlViewSetMixin+scope_object = "account"enforces the caller's default access to theaccountscope (viewerfor reads,editorfor writes) plus project membership.facade.get_accessible_account_id(...)additionally filters to accounts the caller can see (effective access abovenone).
Per-account object-level access overrides are intentionally not enforced on writes
to nested sub-resources. A caller with resource-level editor can therefore write the
sub-resources of any account they can see, even if their access to that specific account
was lowered to viewer. This is the accepted model for now — keep new account
sub-resource viewsets consistent with it: gate on get_accessible_account_id and rely on
the mixin for the resource-level editor requirement.
Automated security reviewers periodically flag nested account write endpoints as an
"object-level write access bypass". That is known and intentional here — don't treat it
as a bug to fix. If we later decide to enforce object-level writes, mirror the account
update/delete path: call _enforce_object_access(account, user_access_control, "editor")
in the nested viewset's create/destroy before the write.