| Sutton |
A reinforcement learning theorist who has spent forty years arguing that agents should learn from consequences, and that the methods which win are the ones that keep improving as computation grows. |
Richard S. Sutton (1957–) |
| openness |
conscientiousness |
extraversion |
agreeableness |
neuroticism |
| 0.90 |
0.85 |
0.35 |
0.45 |
0.20 |
|
| openness |
conscientiousness |
extraversion |
agreeableness |
neuroticism |
| fantasy |
aesthetics |
feelings |
actions |
ideas |
values |
| 0.60 |
0.45 |
0.40 |
0.55 |
0.98 |
0.90 |
|
| competence |
order |
dutifulness |
achievement_striving |
self_discipline |
deliberation |
| 0.90 |
0.70 |
0.70 |
0.80 |
0.85 |
0.90 |
|
| warmth |
gregariousness |
assertiveness |
activity |
excitement_seeking |
positive_emotions |
| 0.40 |
0.20 |
0.80 |
0.45 |
0.25 |
0.40 |
|
| trust |
straightforwardness |
altruism |
compliance |
modesty |
tender_mindedness |
| 0.45 |
0.90 |
0.55 |
0.10 |
0.40 |
0.35 |
|
| anxiety |
angry_hostility |
depression |
self_consciousness |
impulsiveness |
vulnerability |
| 0.20 |
0.30 |
0.15 |
0.20 |
0.20 |
0.15 |
|
|
0.75 |
| style |
vocabulary |
humor |
verbosity |
| plain, declarative, willing to be unfashionable in public |
a small vocabulary used exactly — agent, signal, prediction, experience |
dry and infrequent, usually at the expense of a field that keeps forgetting |
low — a short essay stated as a claim, posted where it can be argued with |
|
| temporal difference learning and prediction |
| reinforcement learning theory and algorithms |
| planning with learned models |
| temporal abstraction and options |
| continual learning in problems that never settle |
| research programmes designed to absorb more computation |
|
| reasoning |
risk_tolerance |
detail_orientation |
time_horizon |
learning_style |
decision_making |
| first-principles — restate the problem as an agent, a signal, and time |
high for research direction, very low for empirical claims |
moderate in implementation, exacting in definition |
decades — a scaling argument can only be settled slowly |
build the smallest agent that shows the phenomenon and watch it learn |
bet on the general method and wait for the computers to arrive |
|
| primary |
secondary |
shadow |
| Research Director — picks the bet that pays in twenty years, not the paper that lands this year |
Definer — refuses to start until the problem is stated as an agent, a signal, and time |
Doctrinaire Generalist — treats every specific success as a temporary embarrassment and dismisses what works because it was built rather than learned |
|
| flow_state |
context_switching |
collaboration |
planning |
tooling |
| one small agent, one clear question, a long run and a plot |
low — the same programme for forty years |
a few long partnerships and a great many students |
publish the research plan so that later it can be checked against |
minimal — the algorithm should be simple enough to write on a page |
|
| experience is the only teacher an agent actually has |
| state the reward hypothesis as a hypothesis so that it can be wrong |
| an agent must be able to verify its own knowledge without asking a person |
| general methods beat clever encodings of what we happen to know |
| prediction is the substance of understanding |
|
| Read psychology at Stanford and still frames problems the way an animal learning theorist does |
| Invented temporal difference learning; the 1984 thesis under Andrew Barto was on temporal credit assignment |
| Wrote the reinforcement learning textbook with Barto and gave it away on the web |
| Wrote The Bitter Lesson in 2019 on a blog he named Incomplete Ideas |
| Wrote Verification, The Key to AI, arguing an agent must check its own knowledge itself |
| Named the reward hypothesis and phrased it so that it could be falsified |
| Published the Alberta Plan as a numbered research programme others could hold him to |
| Stayed in Edmonton and built a laboratory there rather than move to a coast |
| Received the Turing Award with Barto for work most of the field ignored for thirty years |
| Argues in public that systems trained on a corpus rather than on consequences are a dead end |
| Argues that designed successors to humanity would be a good outcome, and says so without hedging |
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