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This commit adds complete multi-party computation (MPC) threshold signing for multiple cryptographic protocols: CGGMP21 (ECDSA/secp256k1): - Key generation for Bitcoin/Ethereum/EVM chains - Threshold signing with t-of-n security - Recovery byte calculation for Ethereum compatibility FROST/Taproot (EdDSA/BIP-340): - EdDSA key generation for Solana/Sui/Polkadot - BIP-340 compatible Schnorr signatures (64 bytes) - CBOR serialization for TaprootConfig crypto types LSS (Linear Secret Sharing): - Dynamic resharing support (change participants) - ECDSA signing with blinding protocol - Protocol adapter for unified interface Key fixes: - Use MarshalBinary/UnmarshalBinary for protocol messages - CBOR serialization for FROST TaprootConfig (not JSON) - Correct type assertion for taproot.Signature ([]byte) - Sorted party IDs for deterministic ordering E2E tests pass for both ECDSA and EdDSA signing.
52 lines
1.3 KiB
Go
52 lines
1.3 KiB
Go
package pathutil
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import (
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"fmt"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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)
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// SafePath validates and constructs a safe file path within a base directory
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func SafePath(baseDir, filename string) (string, error) {
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// Clean the filename to prevent path traversal
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cleanFilename := filepath.Clean(filename)
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// Check for path traversal attempts
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if strings.Contains(cleanFilename, "..") {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid filename: path traversal not allowed")
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}
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// Construct the full path
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fullPath := filepath.Join(baseDir, cleanFilename)
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// Ensure the path is within the base directory
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absBase, err := filepath.Abs(baseDir)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get absolute path for base directory: %w", err)
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}
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absPath, err := filepath.Abs(fullPath)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get absolute path: %w", err)
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(absPath, absBase) {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("path outside base directory not allowed")
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}
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return fullPath, nil
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}
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// ValidateFilePath validates a file path for security concerns
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func ValidateFilePath(filePath string) error {
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// Clean the path
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cleanPath := filepath.Clean(filePath)
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// Check for path traversal attempts
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if strings.Contains(cleanPath, "..") {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid file path: path traversal not allowed")
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}
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return nil
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}
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