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zeekay
f4b78d6371
One word stood for several: the MCP server, one address that accepts requests, the single way in, and the boundary a credential is validated at. Doc comments here are lifted into OpenAPI descriptions and republished on docs.hanzo.ai, so the ambiguity was reaching customers. Each site now names its own sense — endpoint, entry point, the MCP server, the edge, address — or takes the word the surrounding code already uses. Comments and prose strings only. Identifiers keep their names, including the doc comments that must open with the identifier they document. go build ./... passes.
64 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
64 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
package implsentry
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import (
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/hanzoai/o11y/pkg/modules/errortracking/implerrortracking"
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"github.com/hanzoai/o11y/pkg/valuer"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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// extractKey pulls the "<v>:<hmac>" credential out of a minted DSN.
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func extractKey(t *testing.T, dsn string) string {
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t.Helper()
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at := strings.Index(dsn, "@")
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require.Greater(t, at, len("https://"))
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return dsn[len("https://"):at]
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}
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func TestMintDSN_ShapeAndVerify(t *testing.T) {
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secret := []byte("platform-ingest-secret")
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proj := valuer.GenerateUUID()
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dsn := mintDSN(secret, "api.hanzo.ai", proj, 1)
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// CLEAN path — no /api/ segment.
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assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(dsn, "https://"))
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// THE INGEST ADDRESS, not the product face. A DSN addresses /v1/event — the one
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// address every beacon lands on — while /v1/o11y/sentinel is where a signed-in person
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// reads issues back. A DSN minted on the face would send the error plane to a
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// second public spelling of one wire, which is the whole reason they converged.
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assert.Contains(t, dsn, "@api.hanzo.ai/v1/event/"+proj.String())
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assert.NotContains(t, dsn, "/v1/o11y/sentinel/")
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assert.NotContains(t, dsn, "/api/")
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// The embedded key verifies for THIS project at v1.
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key := extractKey(t, dsn)
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assert.True(t, implerrortracking.VerifyKey(secret, proj.String(), key, 1))
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}
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func TestMintDSN_ProjectDomainSeparation(t *testing.T) {
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secret := []byte("platform-ingest-secret")
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a, b := valuer.GenerateUUID(), valuer.GenerateUUID()
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keyA := extractKey(t, mintDSN(secret, "h", a, 1))
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// A's key must NOT verify for B — the project id is part of the HMAC domain.
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assert.False(t, implerrortracking.VerifyKey(secret, b.String(), keyA, 1))
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assert.True(t, implerrortracking.VerifyKey(secret, a.String(), keyA, 1))
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}
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func TestMintDSN_RotationWatermark(t *testing.T) {
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secret := []byte("s")
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proj := valuer.GenerateUUID()
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v1 := extractKey(t, mintDSN(secret, "h", proj, 1))
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v2 := extractKey(t, mintDSN(secret, "h", proj, 2))
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// After rotation to v2, a v1 key no longer verifies (minVersion=2); v2 does.
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assert.False(t, implerrortracking.VerifyKey(secret, proj.String(), v1, 2))
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assert.True(t, implerrortracking.VerifyKey(secret, proj.String(), v2, 2))
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// A wrong secret never verifies.
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assert.False(t, implerrortracking.VerifyKey([]byte("other"), proj.String(), v2, 1))
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}
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