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83 lines
4.1 KiB
TeX
83 lines
4.1 KiB
TeX
\section{Deployment and Activation}
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\label{sec:deploy}
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This document is a working protocol and implementation report. Historical
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calendar dates and benchmark targets are not activation evidence. PoAI mining,
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the two-trillion AI monetary policy, and omnichain payout remain fail-closed
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until governance fixes their parameters and the gates below pass.
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\subsection{Phase 0: arithmetic and wire freeze}
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.2em]
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\item Freeze field, serialization, domain tags, accumulator and overflow rules,
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graph operation set, and challenge derivation.
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\item Publish byte-identical CPU/GPU vectors for every activated operation.
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\item Demonstrate a production Zen model emitting the complete integer graph
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and transcript on its normal execution path.
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\item Freeze the A-Chain job, commitment, nullifier, receipt, and root formats,
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plus the A-to-Z settlement statement.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Phase 1: exact replay and shadow proofs}
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Small jobs may use canonical exact replay. Larger jobs produce optimistic or
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succinct shadow evidence without authorizing subsidy. The network measures
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proof-capture overhead, CPU validation cost, transcript size, data availability,
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challenge latency, and cross-backend divergence under production load.
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Shadow evidence has no mint authority. This stage is deployment safety and
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measurement, not a weaker proof class accepted by consensus.
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\subsection{Phase 2: optimistic PoAI activation}
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Optimistic proof authority may activate only after:
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.2em]
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\item honest CPU/GPU commitments agree byte-for-byte;
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\item fabricated operations are objectively caught and honest work is never
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falsely rejected;
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\item independent watchers can reconstruct and challenge all committed data;
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\item no receipt authorizes irreversible issuance before challenge finality;
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\item metering and anti-self-dealing rules withstand adversarial tests;
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\item one global nullifier and one halving allowance remain correct across
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reorganization and failure;
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\item an authenticated A-Chain receipt is checkpointed through the fail-closed
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Z-Chain settlement path and consumed exactly once by at least two
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destination environments.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Phase 3: cloud-provider pilot}
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At least one existing cloud scheduler and one independent provider integrate the
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same job adapter. The pilot must show that proof capture adds acceptable cost to
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ordinary paid inference or training, that CPU validators do not repeat the full
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GPU workload, that confidential jobs fail closed when TEE collateral is stale,
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and that customer privacy/authorization is preserved.
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\subsection{Phase 4: succinct-proof authority}
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P3Q may replace the optimistic challenge path and activate as the Z-Chain
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settlement rollup only after the exact PoAI AIR, parameters, recursive batch
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policy, A-to-Z state-transition binding, verifier, node integration, resource
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bounds, and audits are complete. P3Q is Plonky3-derived and pairing-free; that
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design label is not deployment evidence. Shadow parity with the already active
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policy is required before authority changes. Here ``parity'' means that the
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candidate P3Q statement accepts exactly the same finalized A-Chain receipt
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transitions; it is an activation test, not part of the public mining story.
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\subsection{Monetary activation}
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Governance must fix the genesis DAO address and controls, A-Chain activation
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height $h_0$, halving interval $H$, miner/validator split, job-class reward
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normalization, per-epoch caps, fee-burn fraction, and emergency back-off policy.
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The canonical ledger must enforce the one-trillion DAO allocation, one-trillion
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proof-earned pool, and two-trillion hard cap. Every legacy one-billion or
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per-chain mint contract must be disabled or upgraded first.
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\subsection{Back-off}
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If a proof, availability, metering, PQ authentication, bridge, or economic
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invariant fails, governance disables new job admission and mining issuance while
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preserving already finalized receipts and canonical balances. A destination
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adapter may be paused independently, but it may never fall back to raw proof
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acceptance.
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