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* paper: Datastore — PGO/ThinLTO/BOLT + ZAP optimization of a columnar engine Covers the ClickHouse fork's memory/binary optimization (49-50MB RSS vs official 116MB, binary 945->648MB), the XRay root-cause for AArch64 BOLT failure (composed R_AARCH64_PREL64 in xray_instr_map), gRPC->ZAP transport with promise pipelining (63x on dependent chains), flat memory to 10k connections, and the multi-tenant/Apache-2.0 resale posture. Pattern-A layout, builds via repo CI. * paper: add blockchain-native section (S-Chain storage, Raft→Quasar PQ, D-Chain VM, TEE) Storage/compute separation PoC (parts on SeaweedFS, verified), leaderless PQ consensus (Quasar/ML-DSA, base-ha precedent), data-system-as-a-chain pattern (graphvm+cevm), and confidential-compute permissionless model. * paper: two-engine decentralized platform + reframe (extends S-Chain, not a new chain) - 08-two-engine: Datastore OLAP + Decentralized SQL (SQLite/K-Chain KEM E2E, Z-Chain FHE, CRDTs) over S-Chain; OLAP/OLTP split along the trust axis. - 07: proven elastic scale-out + zero-copy (2 nodes, 1 copy); ZAP-native transport scorecard (gRPC dead, interserver-HTTP->ZAP, ZK->Quasar); reframed datastore as a co-located service EXTENDING S-Chain (D-Chain is the DEX), not its own public chain. * paper: S-Chain storage economics (metered + Arweave-style endowment + DEX-routed multi-currency public-goods market) - 09-economics: two demand curves (metered ops + perpetual endowment w/ solvency math), bonded provider market (stake/proof/payout/slash), multi-currency fees routed through the DEX (D-Chain) -> swapped to LUX, bootstrap inflation tapering to fees. Permissionless public good, no central leader. - 07: reframed datastore as inheriting S-Chain's permissionless public posture (not operator-run/centralized). * paper: F-Chain FHE (luxfi/fhe, real) + Z-Chain ZK rollups + E2E post-quantum (P3Q/ML-DSA/KEM) --------- Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
104 lines
6.0 KiB
TeX
104 lines
6.0 KiB
TeX
\section{The S-Chain Storage Market}
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\label{sec:economics}
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A decentralized storage substrate needs an economic model, both to price the
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service to customers and to compensate the operators who physically store and
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serve bytes. S-Chain needs two pricing models, because it serves two kinds of
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data with opposite lifetimes, and a provider market underneath both.
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\subsection{Two demand curves: metered and perpetual}
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\paragraph{Metered (operational).} Hot, mutable, operational data --- a
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Datastore tenant's active parts, a project's live SQLite file --- is priced
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pay-as-you-go. This model exists today: the platform meters storage at a
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per-gigabyte-month rate (with finer per-second and per-hour granularity) plus
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egress, billed against a prepaid organization wallet, comparable to commodity
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object-store pricing. It suits data whose value tracks its recency and whose
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owner expects a recurring bill.
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\paragraph{Perpetual (archival).} A second class of data should be stored
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\emph{once} and kept \emph{forever} --- audit logs, published datasets, the
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verifiable analytics commitments of Section~\ref{sec:chain}, content a user
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wants to outlive their subscription. Recurring billing is the wrong instrument
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here: it makes permanence contingent on an unbroken payment stream. The
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Arweave-style alternative is an \emph{endowment}: the writer pays a single
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upfront fee, a conservative fraction is reserved to cover immediate storage, and
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the remainder capitalizes an endowment whose yield funds storage in perpetuity.
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The model is solvent under one empirical assumption --- that the real cost of
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storing a byte declines over time (the historical $\sim\!30\%$/year decline in
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\$/GB) faster than the endowment is drawn down. Concretely, for a one-time fee
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$F$, an annual real storage cost $c_0$ per byte declining at rate $r$, and an
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endowment real return $\rho$, perpetual storage is funded when
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\[
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F \;\ge\; c_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{(1-r)^t}{(1+\rho)^t}
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\;=\; c_0\,\frac{1+\rho}{\rho + r},
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\]
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a finite sum precisely because $r>0$. Pricing $F$ at a deliberately pessimistic
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$r$ (and re-pricing new writes as hardware costs fall) is what makes
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``pay once, stored for two centuries'' actuarially sound rather than a promise.
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This endowment does not exist yet and is the concrete economic build for S-Chain.
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\subsection{The provider market underneath}
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Both demand curves pay into a supply side: independent operators who run S-Chain
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storage nodes (the Hanzo S3 / SeaweedFS volume servers) and earn for storing and
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serving content-addressed objects. The accountability surface is already modeled
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--- the network's service-node registry carries provider registrations, service
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endpoints, and SLA/uptime records --- so the missing piece is the incentive
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layer that turns those records into payments and penalties:
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.4em]
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\item \textbf{Bonded providers.} An operator stakes a bond to join a storage
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pool, consistent with the network's bonded-signer model elsewhere; this gates
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a permissioned-but-open supply set rather than fully anonymous storage.
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\item \textbf{Proof of storage / availability.} Providers periodically prove
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they still hold the objects they are paid for (a challenge--response over
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content-addressed chunks), recorded as the registry's uptime/SLA proofs.
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\item \textbf{Payout and slashing.} The metered revenue and the endowment
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yield flow to providers in proportion to proven, served storage; failed
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availability proofs slash the bond. This is the same accounting that the
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platform's existing usage-metering and wallet rails perform for compute,
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extended to storage providers.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{A permissionless public good, paid in any currency}
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The market above is deliberately \emph{not} operator-run or
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us-in-control: S-Chain is intended as permissionless public-goods
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infrastructure that web3 applications build on with no central leader, the way
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one builds on a base layer rather than on a vendor. Two mechanisms make that
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economically coherent.
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\paragraph{Multi-currency fees routed through the DEX.} Applications should not
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be forced to hold the network's base asset to pay for storage and compute. The
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network's native DEX (the D-Chain) is the exchange layer: any L2/L3 lists its
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coin into the DEX, and its applications pay infrastructure fees in \emph{their
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own} currency, which is swapped natively --- through the relevant liquidity pool
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(e.g.\ a ZOO/LUX pool) --- back into LUX to settle operator payouts. A storage
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or compute provider is thus paid in the base asset while a tenant spends the
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token it already holds; the DEX absorbs the currency conversion as a routine
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swap. The fee economy is multi-currency at the edge and single-currency at
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settlement.
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\paragraph{Bootstrap inflation, then fees.} A storage market has a cold-start
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problem: providers must be paid before fee volume exists. The resolution is a
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\emph{temporary} inflation subsidy to seed provider rewards, tapering to zero as
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fee revenue grows --- explicitly temporary because the base asset is
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deflationary and cannot subsidize forever. Steady state is fee-funded: metered
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leases and endowment yield, denominated in any listed currency and settled in
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LUX, pay the bonded providers. Inflation is the on-ramp, not the engine.
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\subsection{Why this closes the platform}
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The economics complete the architecture rather than decorate it. The two query
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engines of Section~\ref{sec:twoengine} both reduce, at the storage layer, to
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content-addressed objects on S-Chain --- Datastore parts and encrypted SQLite
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pages alike --- so a single market prices and endows \emph{all} platform data
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uniformly: meter the hot working set, endow the permanent record, pay the
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bonded providers who hold it, and let the same Quasar consensus that orders the
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data's commitments also order the market's payments. A customer buys ``storage''
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once; the platform decides per-object whether that is a recurring lease or a
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perpetual endowment; and neither Datastore nor the decentralized SQL engine
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needs its own billing system, because both are tenants of the one S-Chain
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market.
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