Files
6f7e42d1a4 paper: Datastore — PGO/ThinLTO/BOLT + ZAP optimization (#5)
* paper: Datastore — PGO/ThinLTO/BOLT + ZAP optimization of a columnar engine

Covers the ClickHouse fork's memory/binary optimization (49-50MB RSS vs official
116MB, binary 945->648MB), the XRay root-cause for AArch64 BOLT failure
(composed R_AARCH64_PREL64 in xray_instr_map), gRPC->ZAP transport with promise
pipelining (63x on dependent chains), flat memory to 10k connections, and the
multi-tenant/Apache-2.0 resale posture. Pattern-A layout, builds via repo CI.

* paper: add blockchain-native section (S-Chain storage, Raft→Quasar PQ, D-Chain VM, TEE)

Storage/compute separation PoC (parts on SeaweedFS, verified), leaderless PQ
consensus (Quasar/ML-DSA, base-ha precedent), data-system-as-a-chain pattern
(graphvm+cevm), and confidential-compute permissionless model.

* paper: two-engine decentralized platform + reframe (extends S-Chain, not a new chain)

- 08-two-engine: Datastore OLAP + Decentralized SQL (SQLite/K-Chain KEM E2E,
  Z-Chain FHE, CRDTs) over S-Chain; OLAP/OLTP split along the trust axis.
- 07: proven elastic scale-out + zero-copy (2 nodes, 1 copy); ZAP-native
  transport scorecard (gRPC dead, interserver-HTTP->ZAP, ZK->Quasar); reframed
  datastore as a co-located service EXTENDING S-Chain (D-Chain is the DEX), not
  its own public chain.

* paper: S-Chain storage economics (metered + Arweave-style endowment + DEX-routed multi-currency public-goods market)

- 09-economics: two demand curves (metered ops + perpetual endowment w/ solvency
  math), bonded provider market (stake/proof/payout/slash), multi-currency fees
  routed through the DEX (D-Chain) -> swapped to LUX, bootstrap inflation tapering
  to fees. Permissionless public good, no central leader.
- 07: reframed datastore as inheriting S-Chain's permissionless public posture
  (not operator-run/centralized).

* paper: F-Chain FHE (luxfi/fhe, real) + Z-Chain ZK rollups + E2E post-quantum (P3Q/ML-DSA/KEM)

---------

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-06-26 11:35:28 -07:00

104 lines
6.0 KiB
TeX

\section{The S-Chain Storage Market}
\label{sec:economics}
A decentralized storage substrate needs an economic model, both to price the
service to customers and to compensate the operators who physically store and
serve bytes. S-Chain needs two pricing models, because it serves two kinds of
data with opposite lifetimes, and a provider market underneath both.
\subsection{Two demand curves: metered and perpetual}
\paragraph{Metered (operational).} Hot, mutable, operational data --- a
Datastore tenant's active parts, a project's live SQLite file --- is priced
pay-as-you-go. This model exists today: the platform meters storage at a
per-gigabyte-month rate (with finer per-second and per-hour granularity) plus
egress, billed against a prepaid organization wallet, comparable to commodity
object-store pricing. It suits data whose value tracks its recency and whose
owner expects a recurring bill.
\paragraph{Perpetual (archival).} A second class of data should be stored
\emph{once} and kept \emph{forever} --- audit logs, published datasets, the
verifiable analytics commitments of Section~\ref{sec:chain}, content a user
wants to outlive their subscription. Recurring billing is the wrong instrument
here: it makes permanence contingent on an unbroken payment stream. The
Arweave-style alternative is an \emph{endowment}: the writer pays a single
upfront fee, a conservative fraction is reserved to cover immediate storage, and
the remainder capitalizes an endowment whose yield funds storage in perpetuity.
The model is solvent under one empirical assumption --- that the real cost of
storing a byte declines over time (the historical $\sim\!30\%$/year decline in
\$/GB) faster than the endowment is drawn down. Concretely, for a one-time fee
$F$, an annual real storage cost $c_0$ per byte declining at rate $r$, and an
endowment real return $\rho$, perpetual storage is funded when
\[
F \;\ge\; c_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{(1-r)^t}{(1+\rho)^t}
\;=\; c_0\,\frac{1+\rho}{\rho + r},
\]
a finite sum precisely because $r>0$. Pricing $F$ at a deliberately pessimistic
$r$ (and re-pricing new writes as hardware costs fall) is what makes
``pay once, stored for two centuries'' actuarially sound rather than a promise.
This endowment does not exist yet and is the concrete economic build for S-Chain.
\subsection{The provider market underneath}
Both demand curves pay into a supply side: independent operators who run S-Chain
storage nodes (the Hanzo S3 / SeaweedFS volume servers) and earn for storing and
serving content-addressed objects. The accountability surface is already modeled
--- the network's service-node registry carries provider registrations, service
endpoints, and SLA/uptime records --- so the missing piece is the incentive
layer that turns those records into payments and penalties:
\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.4em]
\item \textbf{Bonded providers.} An operator stakes a bond to join a storage
pool, consistent with the network's bonded-signer model elsewhere; this gates
a permissioned-but-open supply set rather than fully anonymous storage.
\item \textbf{Proof of storage / availability.} Providers periodically prove
they still hold the objects they are paid for (a challenge--response over
content-addressed chunks), recorded as the registry's uptime/SLA proofs.
\item \textbf{Payout and slashing.} The metered revenue and the endowment
yield flow to providers in proportion to proven, served storage; failed
availability proofs slash the bond. This is the same accounting that the
platform's existing usage-metering and wallet rails perform for compute,
extended to storage providers.
\end{itemize}
\subsection{A permissionless public good, paid in any currency}
The market above is deliberately \emph{not} operator-run or
us-in-control: S-Chain is intended as permissionless public-goods
infrastructure that web3 applications build on with no central leader, the way
one builds on a base layer rather than on a vendor. Two mechanisms make that
economically coherent.
\paragraph{Multi-currency fees routed through the DEX.} Applications should not
be forced to hold the network's base asset to pay for storage and compute. The
network's native DEX (the D-Chain) is the exchange layer: any L2/L3 lists its
coin into the DEX, and its applications pay infrastructure fees in \emph{their
own} currency, which is swapped natively --- through the relevant liquidity pool
(e.g.\ a ZOO/LUX pool) --- back into LUX to settle operator payouts. A storage
or compute provider is thus paid in the base asset while a tenant spends the
token it already holds; the DEX absorbs the currency conversion as a routine
swap. The fee economy is multi-currency at the edge and single-currency at
settlement.
\paragraph{Bootstrap inflation, then fees.} A storage market has a cold-start
problem: providers must be paid before fee volume exists. The resolution is a
\emph{temporary} inflation subsidy to seed provider rewards, tapering to zero as
fee revenue grows --- explicitly temporary because the base asset is
deflationary and cannot subsidize forever. Steady state is fee-funded: metered
leases and endowment yield, denominated in any listed currency and settled in
LUX, pay the bonded providers. Inflation is the on-ramp, not the engine.
\subsection{Why this closes the platform}
The economics complete the architecture rather than decorate it. The two query
engines of Section~\ref{sec:twoengine} both reduce, at the storage layer, to
content-addressed objects on S-Chain --- Datastore parts and encrypted SQLite
pages alike --- so a single market prices and endows \emph{all} platform data
uniformly: meter the hot working set, endow the permanent record, pay the
bonded providers who hold it, and let the same Quasar consensus that orders the
data's commitments also order the market's payments. A customer buys ``storage''
once; the platform decides per-object whether that is a recurring lease or a
perpetual endowment; and neither Datastore nor the decentralized SQL engine
needs its own billing system, because both are tenants of the one S-Chain
market.