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77 lines
3.2 KiB
TeX
77 lines
3.2 KiB
TeX
\section{Privacy and Security}
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\label{sec:privacy}
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\subsection{What Is and Is Not Shared}
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\paragraph{Shared (non-sensitive):}
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.5em]
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\item Natural language pattern descriptions ($\leq 32$ words each),
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representing general strategies (e.g., ``validate inputs before
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calling external APIs'').
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\item 1-bit quantized embeddings of these patterns.
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\item Quality scores and domain tags.
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\end{itemize}
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\paragraph{Never shared:}
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\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.5em]
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\item Raw tool call inputs or outputs (may contain user data).
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\item Agent trajectories or session logs.
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\item Model weights or internal representations.
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\item User identifiers, API keys, or credentials.
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\item Task-specific content beyond the extracted pattern.
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\end{itemize}
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The pattern extraction step (GRPO introspection) is designed to produce
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generalizable principles, not task-specific solutions. A pattern like
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``always handle \texttt{None} inputs before processing'' does not reveal
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what specific \texttt{None} value was encountered.
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\subsection{Differential Privacy}
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For deployments requiring formal privacy guarantees, FAI supports optional
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Gaussian noise injection before broadcast:
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\begin{definition}[DP-Noisy Compression]
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\label{def:dp-noise}
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Given privacy budget $\varepsilon_{\text{DP}} > 0$ and sensitivity $\Delta_s$,
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add Gaussian noise to each scale factor before broadcast:
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\begin{equation}
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\tilde{\alpha}_m^{(j)} = \alpha_m^{(j)} + \mathcal{N}\!\left(0, \, \sigma_{\text{DP}}^2\right),
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\quad \sigma_{\text{DP}} = \frac{\Delta_s \sqrt{2 \ln(1.25/\delta)}}{\varepsilon_{\text{DP}}}.
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\end{equation}
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Sign vectors are not perturbed (binary data has a different privacy calculus).
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Each broadcast round consumes privacy budget $\varepsilon_{\text{DP}}$;
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over $R$ rounds, the total budget is $R \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{DP}}$ (basic
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composition) or $O(\varepsilon_{\text{DP}} \sqrt{R \ln(1/\delta)})$ (advanced
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composition~\cite{dwork2014algorithmic}).
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\end{definition}
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\subsection{Integrity and Reputation}
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\paragraph{Batch Integrity.}
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Each broadcast batch is signed by the sender's private key (using Ed25519)
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and includes a SHA-256 hash. Receiving nodes verify both before processing.
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\paragraph{Reputation Tracking.}
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Each node maintains a reputation score for each peer, initialized to $1.0$
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and updated as:
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\begin{align}
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\text{rep}^{(T+1)}_i &= \gamma \cdot \text{rep}^{(T)}_i + (1 - \gamma) \cdot r_i^{(T)},
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\label{eq:reputation}
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\end{align}
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where $\gamma = 0.9$ is the decay factor and $r_i^{(T)} \in \{0, 1\}$
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indicates whether peer $i$'s batch passed validation (hash, freshness, and
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filter). Peers with $\text{rep}_i < \rho_{\min}$ (default $\rho_{\min} = 0.3$)
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are deprioritized for future gossip connections.
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\paragraph{DSO Stake Requirement.}
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Integration with the DSO network requires staking a minimum bond $D_{\min}$
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(default: 10 \$AI) per node registration. Byzantine behavior that is
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provably detected triggers bond slashing, creating an economic deterrent
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against adversarial participation~\cite{hanzo2026dso}.
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% ============================================================================
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% 9. EVALUATION PLAN
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% ============================================================================
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