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\section{Security Analysis}
\subsection{Threat Model}
Hanzo addresses three threat categories:
\subsubsection{Quantum Threats}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Harvest now, decrypt later}: Adversary records encrypted traffic for future quantum decryption
\item \textbf{Key compromise}: Quantum computer breaks classical ECDH/RSA keys
\item \textbf{Signature forgery}: Quantum attacks on ECDSA signatures
\end{itemize}
Mitigations:
\begin{itemize}
\item ML-KEM-768/1024 for key establishment
\item ML-DSA-65/87 for digital signatures
\item Hybrid mode for defense-in-depth
\end{itemize}
\subsubsection{Confidential Computing}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{TEE side channels}: Cache timing, speculative execution
\item \textbf{Memory snooping}: DMA attacks on unencrypted GPU memory
\item \textbf{Attestation bypass}: Forged measurements
\end{itemize}
Mitigations:
\begin{itemize}
\item Privacy tier 4: GPU TEE-I/O with encrypted NVLink
\item KBS attestation verification
\item DEK wrapping with ML-KEM
\end{itemize}
\subsubsection{Network Attacks}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Eclipse attacks}: Isolate node from honest peers
\item \textbf{Sybil attacks}: Create multiple fake identities
\item \textbf{DDoS}: Overwhelm node resources
\end{itemize}
Mitigations:
\begin{itemize}
\item LibP2P peer discovery with reputation
\item Wave consensus quorum requirements
\item Rate limiting on API endpoints
\end{itemize}
\subsection{Formal Verification}
Future work includes:
\begin{itemize}
\item TLA+ specification of consensus protocol
\item Coq proofs for PQC key derivation
\item CAVP validation for FIPS algorithms
\end{itemize}