mirror of
https://github.com/hanzoai/papers.git
synced 2026-10-29 07:34:31 +00:00
143 lines
5.2 KiB
TeX
143 lines
5.2 KiB
TeX
\section{Utility Mechanisms}
|
|
|
|
\label{sec:utility}
|
|
% ============================================================================
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Compute Payment}
|
|
\label{sec:compute}
|
|
|
|
All AI workloads on Hanzo Network are priced in HANZO. The Hamiltonian Market
|
|
Maker (HMM)~\cite{hanzonetwork} clears resource markets by maintaining the
|
|
invariant:
|
|
\begin{equation}
|
|
\mathcal{H}(\bm{\Psi}, \bm{\Theta}) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} w_i \Psi_i \Theta_i +
|
|
\lambda \sum_{i=1}^{m} \tfrac{1}{2}(\Psi_i^2 + \Theta_i^2) = \kappa,
|
|
\end{equation}
|
|
where $\bm{\Psi}$ denotes compute supply (GPU-seconds, VRAM, bandwidth),
|
|
$\bm{\Theta}$ denotes demand credits, $w_i$ are resource weights, and $\lambda$
|
|
is a curvature parameter. Clients purchase demand credits with HANZO; workers
|
|
redeem credits for HANZO upon verified job completion.
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Pricing.} The marginal price of resource $i$ is:
|
|
\begin{equation}
|
|
p_i = \frac{\partial \mathcal{H}}{\partial \Psi_i} \Big/
|
|
\frac{\partial \mathcal{H}}{\partial \Theta_i} =
|
|
\frac{w_i \Theta_i + \lambda \Psi_i}{w_i \Psi_i + \lambda \Theta_i}.
|
|
\end{equation}
|
|
This endogenous pricing eliminates dependence on external oracles.
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Fee structure.} Each compute transaction incurs:
|
|
\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
|
|
\item Market fee: 30 basis points (configurable by governance).
|
|
\item Risk fee: 5--20 bps proportional to inventory imbalance.
|
|
\item Of total fees collected, 25\% are burned and 75\% distributed to
|
|
stakers and the treasury.
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Node Staking}
|
|
\label{sec:staking}
|
|
|
|
Running an inference node on Hanzo Network requires staking HANZO as collateral.
|
|
Staking serves three purposes: Sybil resistance, quality assurance (via
|
|
slashing), and supply reduction.
|
|
|
|
\begin{table}[H]
|
|
\centering
|
|
\small
|
|
\begin{tabular}{lrl}
|
|
\toprule
|
|
\textbf{Node Type} & \textbf{Min.\ Stake} & \textbf{Slashing} \\
|
|
\midrule
|
|
Validator & 100,000 HANZO & Up to 10\% \\
|
|
Worker (GPU) & Proportional to capacity & Up to 25\% \\
|
|
Verifier & 50,000 HANZO & Up to 5\% \\
|
|
Router & 10,000 HANZO & Up to 5\% \\
|
|
\bottomrule
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
\caption{Staking requirements by node type. Worker stake scales with declared GPU capacity.}
|
|
\label{tab:staking}
|
|
\end{table}
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Staking rewards.} Node operators receive rewards from two sources:
|
|
\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=1.4em]
|
|
\item \textbf{Compute fees}: 50\% of platform fees (after burn) are
|
|
distributed to stakers proportional to verified work.
|
|
\item \textbf{Emission rewards}: From the community allocation, following the
|
|
halving schedule described in \S\ref{sec:distribution}.
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Slashing conditions.} A staker's collateral is partially slashed if:
|
|
\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
|
|
\item PoAI verification detects incorrect inference output.
|
|
\item The node fails to respond within SLA timeout ($>$3 consecutive misses).
|
|
\item The node serves a model version not approved by governance.
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Governance}
|
|
\label{sec:governance}
|
|
|
|
HANZO holders govern the network through an on-chain DAO with the following
|
|
scope:
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}[leftmargin=1.1em]
|
|
\item \textbf{Model selection}: Which Zen models are served on the network
|
|
(addition, deprecation, version upgrades).
|
|
\item \textbf{Parameter tuning}: Fee rates, slashing percentages, staking
|
|
minimums, emission schedule adjustments.
|
|
\item \textbf{Treasury allocation}: Grant proposals, partnership funding,
|
|
buyback programs.
|
|
\item \textbf{Infrastructure upgrades}: Network upgrades, precompile
|
|
activation, chain configuration changes.
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Voting power.} Governance weight is computed as:
|
|
\begin{equation}
|
|
v_i = \alpha \cdot s_i + (1 - \alpha) \cdot h_i,
|
|
\end{equation}
|
|
where $s_i$ is the amount staked by participant $i$, $h_i$ is the amount held
|
|
(unstaked), and $\alpha = 0.7$ gives stakers greater influence, rewarding active
|
|
network participation over passive holding.
|
|
|
|
\paragraph{Proposal lifecycle.} Proposals follow a three-phase process:
|
|
discussion (7 days), voting (7 days), and execution (7-day timelock). A security
|
|
council (5-of-9 multi-sig) can veto malicious proposals and pause the network in
|
|
emergencies.
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Fee Reduction}
|
|
\label{sec:fees}
|
|
|
|
Holding HANZO in a fee-reduction contract on platform.hanzo.ai reduces API fees
|
|
according to a tiered schedule:
|
|
|
|
\begin{table}[H]
|
|
\centering
|
|
\small
|
|
\begin{tabular}{rrl}
|
|
\toprule
|
|
\textbf{HANZO Held} & \textbf{Fee Discount} & \textbf{Tier} \\
|
|
\midrule
|
|
$\geq$ 1,000 & 10\% & Bronze \\
|
|
$\geq$ 10,000 & 20\% & Silver \\
|
|
$\geq$ 100,000 & 30\% & Gold \\
|
|
$\geq$ 500,000 & 40\% & Platinum \\
|
|
$\geq$ 1,000,000 & 50\% & Diamond \\
|
|
\bottomrule
|
|
\end{tabular}
|
|
\caption{Fee discount tiers. Tokens in the fee-reduction contract are liquid (withdrawable with 7-day cooldown) but count toward governance weight.}
|
|
\label{tab:fees}
|
|
\end{table}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{Revenue Sharing}
|
|
\label{sec:revshare}
|
|
|
|
HANZO stakers receive a share of platform revenue. Revenue is collected in HANZO
|
|
(from compute payments) and distributed weekly:
|
|
|
|
\begin{equation}
|
|
r_i = \frac{s_i}{\sum_j s_j} \cdot R \cdot (1 - \beta - \zeta),
|
|
\end{equation}
|
|
where $R$ is total weekly revenue, $\beta = 0.10$ is the treasury share, and
|
|
$\zeta = 0.25$ is the burn rate. The remaining 65\% flows to stakers.
|
|
|
|
% ============================================================================
|