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62 lines
1.6 KiB
TeX
62 lines
1.6 KiB
TeX
\section{Security Analysis}
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\subsection{Threat Model}
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Hanzo addresses three threat categories:
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\subsubsection{Quantum Threats}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{Harvest now, decrypt later}: Adversary records encrypted traffic for future quantum decryption
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\item \textbf{Key compromise}: Quantum computer breaks classical ECDH/RSA keys
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\item \textbf{Signature forgery}: Quantum attacks on ECDSA signatures
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\end{itemize}
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Mitigations:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item ML-KEM-768/1024 for key establishment
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\item ML-DSA-65/87 for digital signatures
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\item Hybrid mode for defense-in-depth
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\end{itemize}
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\subsubsection{Confidential Computing}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{TEE side channels}: Cache timing, speculative execution
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\item \textbf{Memory snooping}: DMA attacks on unencrypted GPU memory
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\item \textbf{Attestation bypass}: Forged measurements
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\end{itemize}
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Mitigations:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Privacy tier 4: GPU TEE-I/O with encrypted NVLink
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\item KBS attestation verification
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\item DEK wrapping with ML-KEM
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\end{itemize}
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\subsubsection{Network Attacks}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{Eclipse attacks}: Isolate node from honest peers
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\item \textbf{Sybil attacks}: Create multiple fake identities
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\item \textbf{DDoS}: Overwhelm node resources
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\end{itemize}
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Mitigations:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item LibP2P peer discovery with reputation
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\item Wave consensus quorum requirements
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\item Rate limiting on API endpoints
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Formal Verification}
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Future work includes:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item TLA+ specification of consensus protocol
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\item Coq proofs for PQC key derivation
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\item CAVP validation for FIPS algorithms
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\end{itemize}
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