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pki/ROADMAP.md
2026-09-27 14:12:06 -05:00

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Roadmap

Open work only. Shipped behavior is documented in README.md and Documentation/codemap.md, and open defects in FINDINGS.md. Completed milestones live in git history.

Items here are larger than a bug fix: they change an API, a contract, or the shape of the module. A defect that can be fixed in place belongs in FINDINGS.

Provider interface: context propagation

cryptoprov.Provider, KeyGenerator and KeyManager take no context.Context, so awskmscrypto and gcpkmscrypto call the cloud SDKs with context.Background() and a Sign can hang on a network stall. Add ctx to the interfaces (or context-aware variants), thread it through csr.Provider, authority.Issuer.Sign and jwt. Related: XPKI-024.

KMS encryption keys

awskmscrypto and gcpkmscrypto reject GenerateRSAKey purpose 2 and return no key for an ENCRYPT_DECRYPT key, since neither implements crypto.Decrypter (v1.0). A KMS-backed decrypter (AWS RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256, GCP RSA_DECRYPT_OAEP_*) needs KeyManager listing and GetKey to return a decrypter for such keys, and crypto11-compatible *rsa.OAEPOptions handling; add it when a caller needs KMS-held encryption keys.

DPoP: replay protection and access-token binding

dpop.VerifyConfig has an opt-in ReplayCache (in-memory only), ath and cnf.jkt binding, and a trusted ExternalURL (v1.0). Remaining:

  • a shared ReplayCache implementation (for example Redis SET NX with an expiry) for servers with several instances;
  • server-issued nonces (RFC 9449 §8/§9): generating and rotating DPoP-Nonce values and the use_dpop_nonce error. ExpectedNonce compares only a caller-provided value today.

JWKS client hardening

jwt.RemoteKeySet has an injected client, a timeout, a body limit and a refresh cooldown (v1.0). Remaining: TTL-based background refresh (honouring Cache-Control), so removed keys expire and new keys are picked up before the first miss, and ParserConfig fields for the RemoteKeySet options, which NewParser currently leaves at the defaults.

PKCS#11 session management

Remaining after v1.0: a context.Context-aware borrow (today a borrower at the session limit waits without a deadline, since crypto.Signer has no context). The deprecated exported BytesToUlong can be removed in the next major version, and PKCS11Object.Handle (stale after a logout since v1.0 refreshes handles internally) can become an accessor.

certutil bundler concurrency

Remaining after v1.0: coalescing concurrent AIA fetches of the same URL across calls (each call still fetches once), and replacing the exported mutable RootPool/IntermediatePool/KnownIssuers fields with accessors in the next major version. Encrypted PKCS#8 supports PBES2 with PBKDF2 and AES-CBC only; scrypt and PBES1 are not planned unless a caller needs them. Drop legacy RFC 1423 PEM decryption (x509.DecryptPEMBlock) once callers have migrated to PKCS#8.

Dependency hygiene

  • gopkg.in/yaml.v3 is archived; go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 is already an indirect dependency. Switch the four direct importers in one change.
  • golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf in dataprotection can move to crypto/hkdf.

dataprotection: versioned blobs and key rotation

NewSymmetric blobs are nonce || ciphertext || tag with no version or key id, so callers track which secret protected a blob and re-protect on read (v1.0 documents the limits: key material of 32 bytes or more, at most 2^32 messages per secret). Add a versioned format (version || key-id || nonce || ciphertext || tag), a multi-key provider that decrypts with retired secrets and encrypts with the current one, and a per-secret Protect counter or time-based rotation hook against the message budget; keep Unprotect accepting the legacy unversioned blob during migration.

Tooling and CI

  • Regenerate cmd/*/README.md from --help output and add per-command examples.