mirror of
https://github.com/hanzoai/python-sdk.git
synced 2026-10-27 04:20:09 +00:00
is_authenticated() was `load_token() is not None` — a string-presence check that returned True for the literal "fake.not.a.real.jwt". Every permission decision downstream of it was therefore a lie. This makes the client side of Hanzo auth actually work, end to end. Builds on the /v1/iam prefix already on main; the endpoint paths were necessary but not sufficient. hanzo_iam.tokens — the ONE credential judge. Verifies the signature against the issuer's published JWKS plus exp/iss/aud, and fails CLOSED: an unreachable JWKS is not a pass, because a client that cannot check a signature does not know the token is good. Reason codes distinguish "expired" from "offline". `alg: none` is absent from the accepted list by construction. An opaque API key cannot be judged offline, so it is confirmed against userinfo rather than assumed valid for being a non-empty string. hanzo_iam.oauth — a real login: authorization code + PKCE (S256) over a loopback redirect, with a deadline. Not the device grant, which would be the better CLI UX: iam implements RFC 8628 fully and advertises it, but no PUBLIC client is registered, so POST /v1/iam/oauth/device answers 401 invalid_client for hanzo-cli, hanzo-app, hanzo-cloud and hanzo-console alike. Registering one public app is the whole server-side fix; shipping a device path that always 401s would be a lie in code. The password grant is out for the same reason (401 invalid_client without a secret), so `--no-browser` now prints the URL instead of prompting for a password it cannot use. The loopback listener binds a REGISTERED redirect_uri. iam compares redirect_uri by exact string and does not apply RFC 8252 §7.3 port-agnostic loopback matching, so a CLI cannot pick a free ephemeral port — the previous code bound 8399 (cli) and 8398 (bot), neither registered, and /authorize refused both with a bare 400 before the user saw a login page. It listens on 127.0.0.1 and ::1 because the registered URIs spell "localhost", and sets SO_REUSEADDR because the previous callback sits in TIME_WAIT for ~60s and would otherwise EADDRINUSE a second login on a port nothing is using. hanzo_iam.store — keyring first, else an atomic 0600 file. The old path did write_text() then chmod(0600), so with umask 022 a bearer token sat at 0644 between the two calls. Now it is created private and renamed into place. The PaaS session cache goes through the same writer. Two definitions of IAMConfig existed; models.py's was the one every client imported, so the endpoint properties main had just fixed on config.py's were dead code. One now, in config.py, plus jwks_uri and device_endpoint. The bot and CLI login copies are gone; both call the one flow. whoami and `hanzo bot login` no longer print claims from an unverified decode — that rendered an attacker-chosen identity as fact. The Team tool refuses instead of pretending: api.hanzo.ai/team is the marketing SPA (200 text/html), so raise_for_status() passed and .json() blew up. There is no Team API; HANZO_TEAM_URL stays as the seam for when one ships. PaaS token exchange reports its real diagnosis: POST /v1/auth/login 404s while /v1/org and /v1/user 401, so the API is up and gated but the exchange route is not deployed at that edge. No client-side workaround exists, so it says so. Tests fail against the old behaviour, which is the point: 5 session tests fail against the shipped is_authenticated and 4 store tests fail against write-then-chmod. 134 pass alongside main's KMS suite. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
148 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
148 lines
4.4 KiB
Python
"""The ONE token store for Hanzo credentials.
|
|
|
|
Order of preference:
|
|
|
|
1. The OS keyring (Keychain / libsecret / Windows Credential Locker) when the
|
|
`keyring` package is installed AND a real backend is available.
|
|
2. ``~/.hanzo/auth/token.json``, created with mode 0600 ATOMICALLY.
|
|
|
|
"Atomically" is the whole point of the fallback. The code this replaces did
|
|
``write_text()`` then ``chmod(0600)``: between those two calls the file exists
|
|
at ``0666 & ~umask`` — commonly 0644 — holding a bearer token. Any process on
|
|
the box could read it in that window. Here the bytes are written to a
|
|
private temp file that is created 0600 by `mkstemp` and never named
|
|
``token.json`` until it is already correct, then `os.replace` swaps it in.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
import json
|
|
import os
|
|
import stat
|
|
import tempfile
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
from typing import Any
|
|
|
|
TOKEN_DIR = Path.home() / ".hanzo" / "auth"
|
|
TOKEN_FILE = TOKEN_DIR / "token.json"
|
|
|
|
# Keyring coordinates. <org>-<app> naming, matching IAM.
|
|
KEYRING_SERVICE = "hanzo-cli"
|
|
KEYRING_USERNAME = "default"
|
|
|
|
FILE_MODE = 0o600
|
|
DIR_MODE = 0o700
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _keyring() -> Any | None:
|
|
"""Return a usable keyring module, or None.
|
|
|
|
Installed-but-headless is the common case on a server: `keyring` imports
|
|
fine and then raises on first use. Probing the backend here means the file
|
|
fallback is chosen deliberately rather than discovered mid-write.
|
|
"""
|
|
try:
|
|
import keyring
|
|
from keyring.backends.fail import Keyring as FailKeyring
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return None
|
|
try:
|
|
if isinstance(keyring.get_keyring(), FailKeyring):
|
|
return None
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
return None
|
|
return keyring
|
|
|
|
|
|
def save(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
|
"""Persist token data. Returns the backend used: "keyring" or "file"."""
|
|
blob = json.dumps(data, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
|
|
|
|
kr = _keyring()
|
|
if kr is not None:
|
|
try:
|
|
kr.set_password(KEYRING_SERVICE, KEYRING_USERNAME, blob)
|
|
# A stale plaintext copy is still a plaintext copy.
|
|
_unlink_file()
|
|
return "keyring"
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
pass # fall through to the file store
|
|
|
|
_write_private(TOKEN_FILE, blob)
|
|
return "file"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def load() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
|
"""Read stored token data, or None when nothing is stored."""
|
|
kr = _keyring()
|
|
if kr is not None:
|
|
try:
|
|
blob = kr.get_password(KEYRING_SERVICE, KEYRING_USERNAME)
|
|
if blob:
|
|
return json.loads(blob)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
if not TOKEN_FILE.exists():
|
|
return None
|
|
try:
|
|
return json.loads(TOKEN_FILE.read_text())
|
|
except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError):
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def clear() -> None:
|
|
"""Remove stored credentials from every backend."""
|
|
kr = _keyring()
|
|
if kr is not None:
|
|
try:
|
|
kr.delete_password(KEYRING_SERVICE, KEYRING_USERNAME)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
pass
|
|
_unlink_file()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def backend() -> str:
|
|
"""Name the backend a save would use right now — for `auth status`."""
|
|
return "keyring" if _keyring() is not None else "file"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def file_mode() -> int | None:
|
|
"""Permission bits of the token file, or None when it does not exist."""
|
|
try:
|
|
return stat.S_IMODE(TOKEN_FILE.stat().st_mode)
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
return None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _unlink_file() -> None:
|
|
try:
|
|
TOKEN_FILE.unlink()
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _write_private(path: Path, text: str) -> None:
|
|
"""Write `text` to `path` so it is NEVER world- or group-readable.
|
|
|
|
mkstemp creates at 0600 before any byte is written, and os.replace is
|
|
atomic within a filesystem — a reader either sees the old file or the new
|
|
one, never a partial or over-permissive one.
|
|
"""
|
|
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=DIR_MODE)
|
|
# mkdir's mode is ignored when the directory already exists, so an
|
|
# inherited-permissive ~/.hanzo/auth is tightened here too.
|
|
os.chmod(path.parent, DIR_MODE)
|
|
|
|
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=str(path.parent), prefix=".token-", suffix=".tmp")
|
|
try:
|
|
os.fchmod(fd, FILE_MODE) # explicit: do not inherit mkstemp's guarantee by luck
|
|
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
|
|
f.write(text)
|
|
f.flush()
|
|
os.fsync(f.fileno())
|
|
os.replace(tmp, path)
|
|
except BaseException:
|
|
os.unlink(tmp)
|
|
raise
|