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zeekayandHanzo Dev d08a7d5599 auth: verify tokens instead of asserting they exist
is_authenticated() was `load_token() is not None` — a string-presence check
that returned True for the literal "fake.not.a.real.jwt". Every permission
decision downstream of it was therefore a lie. This makes the client side of
Hanzo auth actually work, end to end. Builds on the /v1/iam prefix already on
main; the endpoint paths were necessary but not sufficient.

hanzo_iam.tokens — the ONE credential judge. Verifies the signature against
the issuer's published JWKS plus exp/iss/aud, and fails CLOSED: an unreachable
JWKS is not a pass, because a client that cannot check a signature does not
know the token is good. Reason codes distinguish "expired" from "offline".
`alg: none` is absent from the accepted list by construction. An opaque API
key cannot be judged offline, so it is confirmed against userinfo rather than
assumed valid for being a non-empty string.

hanzo_iam.oauth — a real login: authorization code + PKCE (S256) over a
loopback redirect, with a deadline. Not the device grant, which would be the
better CLI UX: iam implements RFC 8628 fully and advertises it, but no PUBLIC
client is registered, so POST /v1/iam/oauth/device answers 401 invalid_client
for hanzo-cli, hanzo-app, hanzo-cloud and hanzo-console alike. Registering one
public app is the whole server-side fix; shipping a device path that always
401s would be a lie in code. The password grant is out for the same reason
(401 invalid_client without a secret), so `--no-browser` now prints the URL
instead of prompting for a password it cannot use.

The loopback listener binds a REGISTERED redirect_uri. iam compares
redirect_uri by exact string and does not apply RFC 8252 §7.3 port-agnostic
loopback matching, so a CLI cannot pick a free ephemeral port — the previous
code bound 8399 (cli) and 8398 (bot), neither registered, and /authorize
refused both with a bare 400 before the user saw a login page. It listens on
127.0.0.1 and ::1 because the registered URIs spell "localhost", and sets
SO_REUSEADDR because the previous callback sits in TIME_WAIT for ~60s and
would otherwise EADDRINUSE a second login on a port nothing is using.

hanzo_iam.store — keyring first, else an atomic 0600 file. The old path did
write_text() then chmod(0600), so with umask 022 a bearer token sat at 0644
between the two calls. Now it is created private and renamed into place. The
PaaS session cache goes through the same writer.

Two definitions of IAMConfig existed; models.py's was the one every client
imported, so the endpoint properties main had just fixed on config.py's were
dead code. One now, in config.py, plus jwks_uri and device_endpoint.

The bot and CLI login copies are gone; both call the one flow. whoami and
`hanzo bot login` no longer print claims from an unverified decode — that
rendered an attacker-chosen identity as fact.

The Team tool refuses instead of pretending: api.hanzo.ai/team is the
marketing SPA (200 text/html), so raise_for_status() passed and .json() blew
up. There is no Team API; HANZO_TEAM_URL stays as the seam for when one ships.

PaaS token exchange reports its real diagnosis: POST /v1/auth/login 404s while
/v1/org and /v1/user 401, so the API is up and gated but the exchange route is
not deployed at that edge. No client-side workaround exists, so it says so.

Tests fail against the old behaviour, which is the point: 5 session tests fail
against the shipped is_authenticated and 4 store tests fail against
write-then-chmod. 134 pass alongside main's KMS suite.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-07-27 18:55:24 -07:00

494 lines
18 KiB
Python

"""Hanzo authentication session — shared auth bridge for MCP platform tools.
Resolves a credential, VERIFIES it, and hands out authenticated service
clients (KMS, PaaS, IAM).
Credential resolution order:
1. HANZO_AUTH_TOKEN env var (explicit override)
2. HANZO_API_KEY env var (opaque API key)
3. The token store (OS keyring, else ~/.hanzo/auth/token.json at 0600)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import json
import time
import logging
from typing import Any
from pathlib import Path
from hanzo_iam import store
from hanzo_iam.oauth import DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID, DEFAULT_IAM_URL, DEFAULT_ORG
from hanzo_iam.models import OIDC_JWKS_PATH, OIDC_USERINFO_PATH
from hanzo_iam.tokens import (
BAD_SIGNATURE,
JWKS_UNREACHABLE,
NO_CREDENTIAL,
OK,
OPAQUE,
Verification,
)
from hanzo_iam.tokens import verify as verify_jwt
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
DEFAULT_APP = "hanzo-app"
# Kept for callers that report where credentials live. The store owns writing.
TOKEN_DIR = store.TOKEN_DIR
TOKEN_FILE = store.TOKEN_FILE
def _env(name: str) -> str:
"""Read an IAM_* env var, normalising absence to the empty string."""
return os.getenv(name) or ""
class HanzoSession:
"""Singleton session providing authenticated clients to platform tools."""
_instance: HanzoSession | None = None
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._token_data: dict[str, Any] | None = None
self._iam_client: Any | None = None
self._kms_client: Any | None = None
@classmethod
def get(cls) -> HanzoSession:
"""Get or create the singleton session."""
if cls._instance is None:
cls._instance = cls()
return cls._instance
@classmethod
def reset(cls) -> None:
"""Reset the singleton (for testing)."""
if cls._instance:
cls._instance.close()
cls._instance = None
# -- Token loading -------------------------------------------------------
def _load_token_from_disk(self) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Load stored token from the credential store."""
return store.load()
def _save_token(self, data: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""Persist token data. The store picks keyring or an atomic 0600 file."""
store.save(data)
def load_token(self) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Load token using the resolution chain.
Returns token data dict or None if not authenticated.
"""
if self._token_data:
return self._token_data
# 1. Explicit token override
auth_token = os.getenv("HANZO_AUTH_TOKEN")
if auth_token:
self._token_data = {
"access_token": auth_token,
"source": "env:HANZO_AUTH_TOKEN",
}
return self._token_data
# 2. API key
api_key = os.getenv("HANZO_API_KEY")
if api_key:
self._token_data = {
"access_token": api_key,
"source": "env:HANZO_API_KEY",
}
return self._token_data
# 3. Stored token from `hanzo login`
token_data = self._load_token_from_disk()
if token_data and token_data.get("access_token"):
token_data["source"] = f"store:{store.backend()}"
self._token_data = token_data
return self._token_data
return None
# -- Token state ---------------------------------------------------------
def has_credential(self) -> bool:
"""Report whether ANY credential is present. Says nothing about validity."""
return self.load_token() is not None
def verify(self) -> Verification:
"""Judge the held credential against the issuer's published keys.
This is the real check. `is_authenticated()` used to be
`load_token() is not None`, which returned True for the literal string
"fake.not.a.real.jwt" and made every downstream authorization decision
in this package meaningless.
Fails CLOSED: if the JWKS cannot be fetched we do not know the token is
good, so we do not claim it is. The reason code distinguishes that from
an actually-bad token.
"""
token_data = self.load_token()
if not token_data:
return Verification(False, NO_CREDENTIAL, "no credential found")
token = token_data.get("access_token") or ""
server_url = (token_data.get("server_url") or DEFAULT_IAM_URL).rstrip("/")
result = verify_jwt(
token,
jwks_uri=f"{server_url}{OIDC_JWKS_PATH}",
issuer=server_url,
)
if result.reason == OPAQUE:
# An API key is a real credential that simply cannot be judged
# offline. Ask the issuer instead of guessing.
return self._verify_opaque(token, server_url)
return result
def _verify_opaque(self, token: str, server_url: str) -> Verification:
"""Confirm an opaque credential by calling userinfo — the authority."""
import httpx
try:
resp = httpx.get(
f"{server_url}{OIDC_USERINFO_PATH}",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
timeout=10.0,
)
except httpx.HTTPError as e:
return Verification(False, JWKS_UNREACHABLE, f"cannot reach {server_url}: {e}")
if resp.status_code == 200 and "json" in resp.headers.get("content-type", ""):
return Verification(True, OK, claims=resp.json())
return Verification(
False,
BAD_SIGNATURE,
f"issuer rejected the credential ({resp.status_code})",
)
def is_authenticated(self) -> bool:
"""True only when the held credential actually verifies."""
return self.verify().valid
def get_iam_token(self) -> str | None:
"""Get the current IAM access token."""
token_data = self.load_token()
if token_data:
return token_data.get("access_token")
return None
def get_token_info(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Describe the current auth state. `authenticated` reflects VERIFICATION.
It used to reflect credential presence, so `auth status` cheerfully
reported a garbage token as a working login.
"""
token_data = self.load_token()
if not token_data:
return {"authenticated": False, "reason": NO_CREDENTIAL}
result = self.verify()
info: dict[str, Any] = {
"authenticated": result.valid,
"reason": result.reason,
"source": token_data.get("source", "unknown"),
"store": store.backend(),
}
if not result.valid:
info["detail"] = result.detail
# Expiry, from the token's own exp when we could read it, else the
# locally recorded issue time.
exp = result.claims.get("exp")
if exp:
info["expires_at"] = int(exp)
info["expired"] = time.time() > float(exp)
else:
login_time = token_data.get("login_time", 0)
expires_in = token_data.get("expires_in", 0)
if login_time and expires_in:
info["expires_at"] = login_time + expires_in
info["expired"] = time.time() > info["expires_at"]
# Add org/app info if available
if token_data.get("organization"):
info["organization"] = token_data["organization"]
if token_data.get("application"):
info["application"] = token_data["application"]
if token_data.get("server_url"):
info["server_url"] = token_data["server_url"]
return info
# -- Token refresh -------------------------------------------------------
def refresh_token(self) -> bool:
"""Attempt to refresh an expired token.
Returns True if refresh succeeded.
"""
token_data = self._load_token_from_disk()
if not token_data or not token_data.get("refresh_token"):
return False
try:
from hanzo_iam import IAMClient, IAMConfig
config = IAMConfig(
server_url=token_data.get("server_url", DEFAULT_IAM_URL),
client_id=token_data.get("client_id", DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID),
client_secret="",
organization=token_data.get("organization", DEFAULT_ORG),
application=token_data.get("application", DEFAULT_APP),
)
client = IAMClient(config=config)
tokens = client.refresh_token(token_data["refresh_token"])
client.close()
new_data = {
**token_data,
"access_token": tokens.access_token,
"refresh_token": tokens.refresh_token or token_data["refresh_token"],
"id_token": getattr(tokens, "id_token", ""),
"expires_in": tokens.expires_in,
"login_time": int(time.time()),
}
self._save_token(new_data)
self._token_data = new_data
self._token_data["source"] = f"store:{store.backend()}"
logger.info("Token refreshed successfully")
return True
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Token refresh failed: {e}")
return False
# -- Service clients -----------------------------------------------------
def get_iam_client(self) -> Any:
"""Get an authenticated IAMClient."""
if self._iam_client:
return self._iam_client
from hanzo_iam import IAMClient, IAMConfig
token_data = self.load_token()
if not token_data:
raise RuntimeError("Not authenticated. Run 'hanzo login' first.")
# If we have M2M credentials
client_id = _env("IAM_CLIENT_ID")
client_secret = _env("IAM_CLIENT_SECRET")
if client_id and client_secret:
config = IAMConfig(
server_url=_env("IAM_URL") or DEFAULT_IAM_URL,
client_id=client_id,
client_secret=client_secret,
organization=_env("IAM_ORG") or DEFAULT_ORG,
application=_env("IAM_APP") or DEFAULT_APP,
)
self._iam_client = IAMClient(config=config)
else:
config = IAMConfig(
server_url=token_data.get("server_url", DEFAULT_IAM_URL),
client_id=token_data.get("client_id", ""),
client_secret="",
organization=token_data.get("organization", DEFAULT_ORG),
application=token_data.get("application", DEFAULT_APP),
)
self._iam_client = IAMClient(
config=config,
bearer_token=token_data["access_token"],
)
return self._iam_client
def get_kms_client(self) -> Any:
"""Get an authenticated KMSClient."""
if self._kms_client:
return self._kms_client
from hanzo_kms import KMSClient
# KMSClient() reads HANZO_KMS_URL / _ORG / _CLIENT_ID / _CLIENT_SECRET
# / _TOKEN itself -- see hanzo_kms.settings_from_env.
self._kms_client = KMSClient()
return self._kms_client
def get_paas_client(self) -> Any:
"""Get an authenticated PaaS client via IAM token exchange."""
import httpx
token_data = self.load_token()
if not token_data:
raise RuntimeError("Not authenticated. Run 'hanzo login' first.")
base_url = os.getenv("HANZO_PAAS_URL", "https://platform.hanzo.ai").rstrip("/")
iam_token = token_data["access_token"]
# Check for cached PaaS session
session_file = Path.home() / ".hanzo" / "paas" / "session.json"
if session_file.exists():
try:
session = json.loads(session_file.read_text())
if session.get("at"):
# Validate cached session
with httpx.Client(base_url=base_url, timeout=10.0) as tmp:
resp = tmp.get(
"/v1/org",
headers={"Authorization": session["at"]},
)
if resp.status_code != 401:
return _PaaSClientWrapper(base_url, session["at"], session.get("rt"))
except Exception:
pass
# Exchange IAM token for PaaS session.
#
# MEASURED, not assumed: platform.hanzo.ai answers POST /v1/auth/login
# with a bodyless 404, while /v1/org and /v1/user answer 401 — so the
# PaaS API is up and gated, but the token-exchange route in front of it
# is not deployed. The paas repo does mount it (platform/server.js:62 →
# routes/auth.js) and it expects {gitUser:{provider,providerUserId,...}},
# not the {provider,accessToken} this client used to send. Two faults,
# and the deployment one cannot be fixed from here.
#
# So: fail with the actual diagnosis. Guessing a payload against a route
# that 404s would just move the confusion downstream.
with httpx.Client(base_url=base_url, timeout=30.0) as tmp:
resp = tmp.post(
"/v1/auth/login",
json={"provider": "hanzo", "accessToken": iam_token},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
if resp.status_code == 404:
raise RuntimeError(
f"PaaS token exchange is not deployed: POST {base_url}/v1/auth/login"
" returned 404 while /v1/org returns 401. The route exists in the"
" paas repo (platform/server.js -> routes/auth.js) but is not"
" reachable at this edge. No client-side workaround exists."
)
if resp.status_code == 401:
raise RuntimeError("IAM token rejected by PaaS. Sign in again.")
resp.raise_for_status()
if "json" not in resp.headers.get("content-type", ""):
raise RuntimeError(
f"PaaS login returned {resp.headers.get('content-type')} instead of"
" JSON — the request reached a web page, not the API."
)
data = resp.json()
at = data.get("at", "")
rt = data.get("rt", "")
if not at:
raise RuntimeError("PaaS login succeeded but no session token returned.")
# Cache session under the same 0600-atomic discipline as the IAM token —
# a PaaS session cookie is a bearer credential too.
session_file = Path.home() / ".hanzo" / "paas" / "session.json"
store._write_private(
session_file,
json.dumps({"at": at, "rt": rt, "login_time": int(time.time())}, indent=2),
)
return _PaaSClientWrapper(base_url, at, rt)
# -- Lifecycle -----------------------------------------------------------
def close(self) -> None:
"""Close all held clients."""
if self._iam_client and hasattr(self._iam_client, "close"):
self._iam_client.close()
if self._kms_client and hasattr(self._kms_client, "close"):
self._kms_client.close()
self._iam_client = None
self._kms_client = None
self._token_data = None
# -- Logout --------------------------------------------------------------
def login(self, **kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Run the interactive login, persist the result, and return its info.
Verification happens BEFORE the token is stored: a token we cannot
check is not one we should keep and later present as proof of identity.
"""
from hanzo_iam import oauth
token_data = oauth.login(**kwargs)
server_url = token_data["server_url"]
result = verify_jwt(
token_data["access_token"],
jwks_uri=f"{server_url}{OIDC_JWKS_PATH}",
issuer=server_url,
)
if not result.valid:
raise RuntimeError(
f"IAM issued a token this client cannot verify ({result.reason}:"
f" {result.detail}). Refusing to store it."
)
self._save_token(token_data)
self.close()
self._token_data = None
return {"claims": result.claims, "store": store.backend()}
@staticmethod
def logout() -> None:
"""Clear stored credentials from every backend."""
store.clear()
session_file = Path.home() / ".hanzo" / "paas" / "session.json"
if session_file.exists():
session_file.unlink()
class _PaaSClientWrapper:
"""Lightweight async-friendly wrapper over PaaS REST API."""
def __init__(self, base_url: str, access_token: str, refresh_token: str | None = None):
self.base_url = base_url
self._at = access_token
self._rt = refresh_token
def _headers(self) -> dict[str, str]:
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": "hanzo-mcp/0.1"}
if self._at:
headers["Authorization"] = self._at
if self._rt:
headers["Refresh-Token"] = self._rt
return headers
def request(self, method: str, path: str, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
"""Make an HTTP request to PaaS API."""
import httpx
with httpx.Client(base_url=self.base_url, timeout=30.0) as client:
resp = client.request(method, path, headers=self._headers(), **kwargs)
if resp.status_code >= 400:
try:
err = resp.json()
msg = err.get("error", resp.text)
except Exception:
msg = resp.text
raise RuntimeError(f"PaaS error {resp.status_code}: {msg}")
if not resp.content or resp.status_code == 204:
return {}
return resp.json()
def get(self, path: str) -> Any:
return self.request("GET", path)
def post(self, path: str, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
return self.request("POST", path, **kwargs)
def put(self, path: str, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
return self.request("PUT", path, **kwargs)
def delete(self, path: str) -> Any:
return self.request("DELETE", path)