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is_authenticated() was `load_token() is not None` — a string-presence check that returned True for the literal "fake.not.a.real.jwt". Every permission decision downstream of it was therefore a lie. This makes the client side of Hanzo auth actually work, end to end. Builds on the /v1/iam prefix already on main; the endpoint paths were necessary but not sufficient. hanzo_iam.tokens — the ONE credential judge. Verifies the signature against the issuer's published JWKS plus exp/iss/aud, and fails CLOSED: an unreachable JWKS is not a pass, because a client that cannot check a signature does not know the token is good. Reason codes distinguish "expired" from "offline". `alg: none` is absent from the accepted list by construction. An opaque API key cannot be judged offline, so it is confirmed against userinfo rather than assumed valid for being a non-empty string. hanzo_iam.oauth — a real login: authorization code + PKCE (S256) over a loopback redirect, with a deadline. Not the device grant, which would be the better CLI UX: iam implements RFC 8628 fully and advertises it, but no PUBLIC client is registered, so POST /v1/iam/oauth/device answers 401 invalid_client for hanzo-cli, hanzo-app, hanzo-cloud and hanzo-console alike. Registering one public app is the whole server-side fix; shipping a device path that always 401s would be a lie in code. The password grant is out for the same reason (401 invalid_client without a secret), so `--no-browser` now prints the URL instead of prompting for a password it cannot use. The loopback listener binds a REGISTERED redirect_uri. iam compares redirect_uri by exact string and does not apply RFC 8252 §7.3 port-agnostic loopback matching, so a CLI cannot pick a free ephemeral port — the previous code bound 8399 (cli) and 8398 (bot), neither registered, and /authorize refused both with a bare 400 before the user saw a login page. It listens on 127.0.0.1 and ::1 because the registered URIs spell "localhost", and sets SO_REUSEADDR because the previous callback sits in TIME_WAIT for ~60s and would otherwise EADDRINUSE a second login on a port nothing is using. hanzo_iam.store — keyring first, else an atomic 0600 file. The old path did write_text() then chmod(0600), so with umask 022 a bearer token sat at 0644 between the two calls. Now it is created private and renamed into place. The PaaS session cache goes through the same writer. Two definitions of IAMConfig existed; models.py's was the one every client imported, so the endpoint properties main had just fixed on config.py's were dead code. One now, in config.py, plus jwks_uri and device_endpoint. The bot and CLI login copies are gone; both call the one flow. whoami and `hanzo bot login` no longer print claims from an unverified decode — that rendered an attacker-chosen identity as fact. The Team tool refuses instead of pretending: api.hanzo.ai/team is the marketing SPA (200 text/html), so raise_for_status() passed and .json() blew up. There is no Team API; HANZO_TEAM_URL stays as the seam for when one ships. PaaS token exchange reports its real diagnosis: POST /v1/auth/login 404s while /v1/org and /v1/user 401, so the API is up and gated but the exchange route is not deployed at that edge. No client-side workaround exists, so it says so. Tests fail against the old behaviour, which is the point: 5 session tests fail against the shipped is_authenticated and 4 store tests fail against write-then-chmod. 134 pass alongside main's KMS suite. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
113 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
113 lines
3.8 KiB
Python
"""Configuration for Hanzo IAM client."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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from typing import ClassVar
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from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
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from hanzo_iam.models import (
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OIDC_AUTHORIZE_PATH,
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OIDC_DEVICE_PATH,
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OIDC_JWKS_PATH,
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OIDC_TOKEN_PATH,
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OIDC_USERINFO_PATH,
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)
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class IAMConfig(BaseModel):
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"""Configuration for Hanzo IAM client.
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Can be initialized directly or from environment variables via from_env().
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"""
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model_config = ConfigDict(frozen=True)
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# Canonical environment variable prefix. There is exactly one prefix —
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# no upstream-brand aliases, no per-org fallbacks. See
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# ~/work/hanzo/iam/CLAUDE.md "Configuration" section.
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ENV_PREFIX: ClassVar[str] = "IAM_"
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server_url: str = Field(description="IAM server URL (e.g., https://hanzo.id)")
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client_id: str = Field(description="OAuth2 client ID")
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client_secret: str = Field(default="", description="OAuth2 client secret")
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organization: str = Field(default="hanzo", description="IAM organization name")
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application: str = Field(default="app", description="IAM application name")
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certificate: str = Field(
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default="", description="JWT verification certificate (PEM)"
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)
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@classmethod
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def from_env(cls, prefix: str | None = None) -> IAMConfig:
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"""Create config from environment variables.
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The canonical prefix is ``IAM_`` (no upstream-brand aliases, no
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per-org variants). The ``prefix`` argument exists for advanced
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callers that scope multiple IAM clients in a single process; new
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code should leave it at the default.
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Environment variables (with the default prefix):
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IAM_ENDPOINT - IAM server URL (preferred)
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IAM_CLIENT_ID - OAuth2 client ID
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IAM_CLIENT_SECRET - OAuth2 client secret
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IAM_ORG - Organization name
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IAM_APP - Application name
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IAM_CERT - JWT verification certificate (PEM content or file path)
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"""
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p = prefix or cls.ENV_PREFIX
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server_url = os.environ.get(f"{p}ENDPOINT", "")
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client_id = os.environ.get(f"{p}CLIENT_ID", "")
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client_secret = os.environ.get(f"{p}CLIENT_SECRET", "")
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organization = os.environ.get(f"{p}ORG", "hanzo")
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application = os.environ.get(f"{p}APP", "app")
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# Certificate can be content or file path
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cert_val = os.environ.get(f"{p}CERT", "")
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if cert_val and not cert_val.startswith("-----BEGIN"):
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# Treat as file path
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cert_path = os.path.expanduser(cert_val)
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if os.path.isfile(cert_path):
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with open(cert_path) as f:
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cert_val = f.read()
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return cls(
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server_url=server_url,
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client_id=client_id,
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client_secret=client_secret,
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organization=organization,
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application=application,
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certificate=cert_val,
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)
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@property
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def base_url(self) -> str:
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"""Server URL with any trailing slash removed."""
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return self.server_url.rstrip("/")
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@property
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def token_endpoint(self) -> str:
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"""OAuth2 token endpoint URL."""
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return f"{self.base_url}{OIDC_TOKEN_PATH}"
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@property
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def authorize_endpoint(self) -> str:
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"""OAuth2 authorization endpoint URL."""
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return f"{self.base_url}{OIDC_AUTHORIZE_PATH}"
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@property
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def device_endpoint(self) -> str:
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"""RFC 8628 device authorization endpoint URL."""
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return f"{self.base_url}{OIDC_DEVICE_PATH}"
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@property
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def jwks_uri(self) -> str:
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"""JWKS URL used to verify tokens this issuer signed."""
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return f"{self.base_url}{OIDC_JWKS_PATH}"
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@property
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def userinfo_endpoint(self) -> str:
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"""OIDC UserInfo endpoint URL (HIP-0111 canonical path)."""
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return f"{self.base_url}{OIDC_USERINFO_PATH}"
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