Files
python-sdk/pkg/hanzo-cli/hanzo_cli/auth.py
T
zeekayandHanzo Dev d08a7d5599 auth: verify tokens instead of asserting they exist
is_authenticated() was `load_token() is not None` — a string-presence check
that returned True for the literal "fake.not.a.real.jwt". Every permission
decision downstream of it was therefore a lie. This makes the client side of
Hanzo auth actually work, end to end. Builds on the /v1/iam prefix already on
main; the endpoint paths were necessary but not sufficient.

hanzo_iam.tokens — the ONE credential judge. Verifies the signature against
the issuer's published JWKS plus exp/iss/aud, and fails CLOSED: an unreachable
JWKS is not a pass, because a client that cannot check a signature does not
know the token is good. Reason codes distinguish "expired" from "offline".
`alg: none` is absent from the accepted list by construction. An opaque API
key cannot be judged offline, so it is confirmed against userinfo rather than
assumed valid for being a non-empty string.

hanzo_iam.oauth — a real login: authorization code + PKCE (S256) over a
loopback redirect, with a deadline. Not the device grant, which would be the
better CLI UX: iam implements RFC 8628 fully and advertises it, but no PUBLIC
client is registered, so POST /v1/iam/oauth/device answers 401 invalid_client
for hanzo-cli, hanzo-app, hanzo-cloud and hanzo-console alike. Registering one
public app is the whole server-side fix; shipping a device path that always
401s would be a lie in code. The password grant is out for the same reason
(401 invalid_client without a secret), so `--no-browser` now prints the URL
instead of prompting for a password it cannot use.

The loopback listener binds a REGISTERED redirect_uri. iam compares
redirect_uri by exact string and does not apply RFC 8252 §7.3 port-agnostic
loopback matching, so a CLI cannot pick a free ephemeral port — the previous
code bound 8399 (cli) and 8398 (bot), neither registered, and /authorize
refused both with a bare 400 before the user saw a login page. It listens on
127.0.0.1 and ::1 because the registered URIs spell "localhost", and sets
SO_REUSEADDR because the previous callback sits in TIME_WAIT for ~60s and
would otherwise EADDRINUSE a second login on a port nothing is using.

hanzo_iam.store — keyring first, else an atomic 0600 file. The old path did
write_text() then chmod(0600), so with umask 022 a bearer token sat at 0644
between the two calls. Now it is created private and renamed into place. The
PaaS session cache goes through the same writer.

Two definitions of IAMConfig existed; models.py's was the one every client
imported, so the endpoint properties main had just fixed on config.py's were
dead code. One now, in config.py, plus jwks_uri and device_endpoint.

The bot and CLI login copies are gone; both call the one flow. whoami and
`hanzo bot login` no longer print claims from an unverified decode — that
rendered an attacker-chosen identity as fact.

The Team tool refuses instead of pretending: api.hanzo.ai/team is the
marketing SPA (200 text/html), so raise_for_status() passed and .json() blew
up. There is no Team API; HANZO_TEAM_URL stays as the seam for when one ships.

PaaS token exchange reports its real diagnosis: POST /v1/auth/login 404s while
/v1/org and /v1/user 401, so the API is up and gated but the exchange route is
not deployed at that edge. No client-side workaround exists, so it says so.

Tests fail against the old behaviour, which is the point: 5 session tests fail
against the shipped is_authenticated and 4 store tests fail against
write-then-chmod. 134 pass alongside main's KMS suite.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-07-27 18:55:24 -07:00

178 lines
5.2 KiB
Python

"""Authentication and token management for Hanzo CLI.
This module is a thin adapter over `hanzo_iam` — the ONE implementation of the
login flow (`hanzo_iam.oauth`), the token store (`hanzo_iam.store`) and token
verification (`hanzo_iam.tokens`). It used to carry a second, divergent copy of
all three; the copy posted to the unprefixed /oauth/token (a 200 HTML page on
hanzo.id), sent no PKCE, and waited for its callback in an unbounded loop.
Credential chain:
1. IAM_CLIENT_ID + IAM_CLIENT_SECRET env vars (machine-to-machine)
2. The stored token from `hanzo login`
3. Exit with help
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
from typing import Any
import click
from hanzo_iam import IAMClient, IAMConfig, oauth, store, tokens
from hanzo_iam.models import OIDC_JWKS_PATH
DEFAULT_IAM_URL = oauth.DEFAULT_IAM_URL
DEFAULT_ORG = oauth.DEFAULT_ORG
DEFAULT_APP = "hanzo-app"
DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID = oauth.DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID
TOKEN_FILE = store.TOKEN_FILE
def _save_token(data: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
return store.save(data)
def _load_token() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
return store.load()
def _clear_token() -> None:
store.clear()
def _env(name: str) -> str:
"""Read env var (IAM_*)."""
return os.getenv(name) or ""
def _iam_url() -> str:
return _env("IAM_URL") or DEFAULT_IAM_URL
def _iam_org() -> str:
return _env("IAM_ORG") or DEFAULT_ORG
def _iam_app() -> str:
return _env("IAM_APP") or DEFAULT_APP
def _iam_client_id() -> str:
return _env("IAM_CLIENT_ID") or DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID
def get_client(ctx: click.Context | None = None) -> IAMClient:
"""Build an IAMClient using the credential chain.
1. Env vars IAM_CLIENT_ID + IAM_CLIENT_SECRET
2. Stored bearer token from `hanzo login`
3. Exit with instructions
"""
client_id = _env("IAM_CLIENT_ID")
client_secret = _env("IAM_CLIENT_SECRET")
if client_id and client_secret:
config = IAMConfig(
server_url=_iam_url(),
client_id=client_id,
client_secret=client_secret,
organization=_iam_org(),
application=_iam_app(),
)
return IAMClient(config=config)
# Try stored token
token_data = _load_token()
if token_data and token_data.get("access_token"):
config = IAMConfig(
server_url=token_data.get("server_url", _iam_url()),
client_id=token_data.get("client_id", ""),
client_secret="",
organization=token_data.get("organization", _iam_org()),
application=token_data.get("application", _iam_app()),
)
return IAMClient(
config=config,
bearer_token=token_data["access_token"],
)
click.echo(
"Not authenticated. Run 'hanzo login' or set IAM_CLIENT_ID"
" + IAM_CLIENT_SECRET environment variables.",
err=True,
)
sys.exit(1)
def get_token_info() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Return stored token info for whoami."""
return _load_token()
def verify_token_data(data: dict[str, Any] | None) -> tokens.Verification:
"""Judge a token dict — stored or freshly issued. The ONE verification seam
for this CLI, so `whoami`, `login` and every command agree on what valid
means."""
if not data or not data.get("access_token"):
return tokens.Verification(False, tokens.NO_CREDENTIAL, "no credential found")
server_url = (data.get("server_url") or _iam_url()).rstrip("/")
return tokens.verify(
data["access_token"],
jwks_uri=f"{server_url}{OIDC_JWKS_PATH}",
issuer=server_url,
)
def verify_token() -> tokens.Verification:
"""Judge the stored credential."""
return verify_token_data(_load_token())
def browser_login(port: int | None = None, open_browser: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Sign in through the browser (authorization code + PKCE) and store it.
`port` selects among the redirect URIs registered on the IAM application.
It cannot be an arbitrary port: iam compares redirect_uri by exact string,
so an unregistered one is refused with a bare 400 before the user ever sees
a login page.
"""
uris = oauth.LOOPBACK_REDIRECTS
if port is not None:
wanted = [u for u in uris if f":{port}/" in u]
if not wanted:
raise click.ClickException(
f"Port {port} is not a registered redirect URI. Registered: "
+ ", ".join(uris)
)
uris = tuple(wanted)
token_data = oauth.login(
server_url=_iam_url(),
client_id=_iam_client_id(),
organization=_iam_org(),
redirect_uris=uris,
open_browser=open_browser,
on_url=lambda u: click.echo(f"Open this URL to sign in:\n\n {u}\n"),
)
token_data["application"] = _iam_app()
# Verify BEFORE storing: a token we cannot check is not one to keep and
# later present as proof of identity.
result = verify_token_data(token_data)
if not result.valid:
raise click.ClickException(
f"IAM issued a token this client cannot verify ({result.reason}:"
f" {result.detail}). Not storing it."
)
token_data["stored_in"] = _save_token(token_data)
return token_data
def logout() -> None:
"""Clear stored credentials."""
_clear_token()