mirror of
https://github.com/hanzoai/s3.git
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zooqueen
dd74d3e6d6
hanzoai/s3 was an AGPL-3.0 MinIO fork whose network-copyleft blocks embedding
and reselling as a managed service. Replace it wholesale with a fork of
SeaweedFS (github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs, Apache-2.0, Go) which ships a
built-in S3 gateway + Filer.
- License: AGPL-3.0 -> Apache-2.0 (upstream LICENSE kept verbatim, incl.
"Copyright 2025 Chris Lu"); NOTICE added crediting SeaweedFS. No AGPL/BUSL/
SSPL/GPL or enterprise ("ee") files remain.
- Module: go.mod path set to github.com/hanzoai/s3 with a self-replace
(replace github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs => ./) so the ~1800 internal Go files
keep their upstream import paths with zero churn. Internal identifiers and
import paths are intentionally NOT renamed.
- CLI rebrand: the binary is built as `s3` (was `weed`); root usage, per-command
help/usage/flag strings, shell autocomplete program name, and the product name
in CLI output now read "Hanzo S3" / `s3`. Users never see `weed`.
(e.g. `s3 server`, `s3 filer`, `s3 master`, `s3 volume`, `s3 s3`, `s3 mount`.)
- Build: `make` (or `go build -o s3 ./weed`) builds the `s3` binary green;
`cmd/weed-db` and `cmd/weed-sql` also build; `go vet ./weed/command/` clean.
- README/LLM.md rewritten for Hanzo S3; AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md symlinks preserved.
- Dropped a 33MB prebuilt Mach-O `stress` binary upstream had committed; `.gitignore`
updated to ignore the `s3` build output.
103 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
103 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package s3api
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import "testing"
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func TestVerifyKeyCommitment_DefaultAcceptsMissing(t *testing.T) {
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// Default behaviour mirrors AWS: a missing commitment field is treated
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// as a legacy object and accepted. This is the cushion that lets
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// operators upgrade without breaking pre-commitment uploads.
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prev := requireKeyCommitment.Load()
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t.Cleanup(func() { requireKeyCommitment.Store(prev) })
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requireKeyCommitment.Store(false)
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if err := VerifyKeyCommitment([]byte("k"), []byte("iv"), "AES256", nil); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("default path should accept missing commitment, got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestVerifyKeyCommitment_StrictRejectsMissing(t *testing.T) {
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// Strict mode: any object whose metadata lacks the commitment field is
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// rejected. Closes the silent-downgrade vector — an attacker who can
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// strip the commitment from metadata can no longer bypass verification.
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prev := requireKeyCommitment.Load()
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t.Cleanup(func() { requireKeyCommitment.Store(prev) })
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requireKeyCommitment.Store(true)
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err := VerifyKeyCommitment([]byte("k"), []byte("iv"), "AES256", nil)
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("strict mode should reject missing commitment; got nil error")
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}
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}
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func TestVerifyKeyCommitment_StrictAcceptsValidCommitment(t *testing.T) {
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// Strict mode does not change the verification outcome for objects that
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// do carry a commitment — the only behavioural delta is the missing
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// case.
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prev := requireKeyCommitment.Load()
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t.Cleanup(func() { requireKeyCommitment.Store(prev) })
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requireKeyCommitment.Store(true)
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key := []byte("strict-mode-test-key")
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// IV here is just an opaque input to the HMAC commitment; the test
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// doesn't pass it into AES-CTR so it doesn't have to be the AES block
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// size. The 16 bytes match the AES block size to keep the literal
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// realistic.
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iv := []byte("strict-mode-iv16")
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commit := ComputeKeyCommitment(key, iv, "AES256")
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if err := VerifyKeyCommitment(key, iv, "AES256", commit); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("strict mode should accept valid commitment, got: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestVerifyKeyCommitment_RejectsTamperedKey(t *testing.T) {
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// Real attack shape: an attacker who can mutate object metadata cannot
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// craft a valid commitment without the original key. The verify path
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// must catch it whether they tamper with the key, the IV, or the
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// algorithm — all three are bound by the HMAC.
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prev := requireKeyCommitment.Load()
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t.Cleanup(func() { requireKeyCommitment.Store(prev) })
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requireKeyCommitment.Store(false)
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originalKey := []byte("legit-key-for-commitment")
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iv := []byte("commitment-iv-16")
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algo := "AES256"
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commit := ComputeKeyCommitment(originalKey, iv, algo)
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t.Run("tampered key", func(t *testing.T) {
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if err := VerifyKeyCommitment([]byte("attacker-substituted-key"), iv, algo, commit); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("verify must reject when the key changed but commitment did not")
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}
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})
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t.Run("tampered IV", func(t *testing.T) {
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if err := VerifyKeyCommitment(originalKey, []byte("attacker-iv-16!!"), algo, commit); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("verify must reject when the IV changed but commitment did not")
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}
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})
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t.Run("tampered algorithm", func(t *testing.T) {
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if err := VerifyKeyCommitment(originalKey, iv, "AES128", commit); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("verify must reject when the algorithm changed but commitment did not")
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}
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})
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t.Run("tampered commitment", func(t *testing.T) {
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bad := append([]byte{}, commit...)
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bad[0] ^= 0x01
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if err := VerifyKeyCommitment(originalKey, iv, algo, bad); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("verify must reject when the commitment itself was flipped")
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}
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})
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}
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func TestSetRequireKeyCommitment(t *testing.T) {
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prev := requireKeyCommitment.Load()
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t.Cleanup(func() { requireKeyCommitment.Store(prev) })
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SetRequireKeyCommitment(true)
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if !requireKeyCommitment.Load() {
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t.Fatal("SetRequireKeyCommitment(true) did not propagate to the atomic")
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}
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SetRequireKeyCommitment(false)
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if requireKeyCommitment.Load() {
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t.Fatal("SetRequireKeyCommitment(false) did not propagate to the atomic")
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}
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}
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