Files
s3/weed/s3api/s3api_inline_policy_condition_test.go
zooqueen dd74d3e6d6 Replace AGPL MinIO fork with Apache-2.0 SeaweedFS fork; rebrand CLI weed->s3
hanzoai/s3 was an AGPL-3.0 MinIO fork whose network-copyleft blocks embedding
and reselling as a managed service. Replace it wholesale with a fork of
SeaweedFS (github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs, Apache-2.0, Go) which ships a
built-in S3 gateway + Filer.

- License: AGPL-3.0 -> Apache-2.0 (upstream LICENSE kept verbatim, incl.
  "Copyright 2025 Chris Lu"); NOTICE added crediting SeaweedFS. No AGPL/BUSL/
  SSPL/GPL or enterprise ("ee") files remain.
- Module: go.mod path set to github.com/hanzoai/s3 with a self-replace
  (replace github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs => ./) so the ~1800 internal Go files
  keep their upstream import paths with zero churn. Internal identifiers and
  import paths are intentionally NOT renamed.
- CLI rebrand: the binary is built as `s3` (was `weed`); root usage, per-command
  help/usage/flag strings, shell autocomplete program name, and the product name
  in CLI output now read "Hanzo S3" / `s3`. Users never see `weed`.
  (e.g. `s3 server`, `s3 filer`, `s3 master`, `s3 volume`, `s3 s3`, `s3 mount`.)
- Build: `make` (or `go build -o s3 ./weed`) builds the `s3` binary green;
  `cmd/weed-db` and `cmd/weed-sql` also build; `go vet ./weed/command/` clean.
- README/LLM.md rewritten for Hanzo S3; AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md symlinks preserved.
- Dropped a 33MB prebuilt Mach-O `stress` binary upstream had committed; `.gitignore`
  updated to ignore the `s3` build output.
2026-06-18 23:41:25 -07:00

278 lines
12 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"testing"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/pb/iam_pb"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/policy_engine"
s3_constants "github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3_constants"
"github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/weed/s3api/s3err"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// In-process reproducers for aws:SourceIp condition handling on inline policies.
//
// These exercise the full chain: PutUserPolicy/PutGroupPolicy → reload →
// VerifyActionPermission against a synthetic HTTP request whose RemoteAddr is
// 127.0.0.1. The whole point is to prove that the Condition block is honored
// (or, before the fix lands, that it is silently dropped).
const inlineCondTestBucket = "inline-cond-bucket"
func inlineCondPolicyDoc(cidr string) string {
return `{
"Version":"2012-10-17",
"Statement":[{
"Effect":"Allow",
"Action":"s3:*",
"Resource":["arn:aws:s3:::` + inlineCondTestBucket + `","arn:aws:s3:::` + inlineCondTestBucket + `/*"],
"Condition":{"IpAddress":{"aws:SourceIp":"` + cidr + `"}}
}]
}`
}
// inlineCondRequest builds a minimal request that VerifyActionPermission can
// evaluate: RemoteAddr set so extractSourceIP returns 127.0.0.1, and the bucket
// path so GetBucketAndObject (if reached) is unambiguous.
func inlineCondRequest(t *testing.T, method string) *http.Request {
t.Helper()
req, err := http.NewRequest(method, "http://s3.amazonaws.com/"+inlineCondTestBucket+"/obj", nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Host = "s3.amazonaws.com"
req.RemoteAddr = "127.0.0.1:54321"
return req
}
// seedInlineCondUser puts a user "alice" with a single access key into both
// api.mockConfig and the credential store, then reloads the in-memory IAM so
// identity lookups observe her. Returns the loaded Identity.
func seedInlineCondUser(t *testing.T, api *EmbeddedIamApiForTest) *Identity {
t.Helper()
if api.mockConfig == nil {
api.mockConfig = &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
}
api.mockConfig.Identities = append(api.mockConfig.Identities, &iam_pb.Identity{
Name: "alice",
Credentials: []*iam_pb.Credential{
{AccessKey: "AKIAALICE", SecretKey: "alice-secret"},
},
})
require.NoError(t, api.credentialManager.SaveConfiguration(context.Background(), api.mockConfig))
require.NoError(t, api.iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager())
ident := api.iam.lookupByIdentityName("alice")
require.NotNil(t, ident, "alice must be loaded after reload")
return ident
}
// TestUserInlinePolicySourceIpCondition_Denies is the primary reproducer: a
// user inline policy with an aws:SourceIp condition that does NOT match the
// caller's source IP must result in AccessDenied. Today this passes (bug)
// because PutUserPolicy flattens the document into ident.Actions and the
// Condition block is dropped.
func TestUserInlinePolicySourceIpCondition_Denies(t *testing.T) {
api := NewEmbeddedIamApiForTest()
api.mockConfig = &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
seedInlineCondUser(t, api)
// Allow s3:* on the bucket only when SourceIp is in 198.51.100.0/24 (TEST-NET-2).
// 127.0.0.1 must not match, so the action must be denied.
_, iamErr := api.PutUserPolicy(api.mockConfig, url.Values{
"UserName": {"alice"},
"PolicyName": {"OnlyFromTestNet"},
"PolicyDocument": {inlineCondPolicyDoc("198.51.100.0/24")},
})
require.Nil(t, iamErr, "PutUserPolicy must succeed")
require.NoError(t, api.PutS3ApiConfiguration(api.mockConfig))
require.NoError(t, api.iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager())
ident := api.iam.lookupByIdentityName("alice")
require.NotNil(t, ident)
req := inlineCondRequest(t, http.MethodPut)
got := api.iam.VerifyActionPermission(req, ident, s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, inlineCondTestBucket, "obj")
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, got,
"PutObject from 127.0.0.1 must be denied: the user inline policy's aws:SourceIp condition (198.51.100.0/24) does not match")
}
// TestUserInlinePolicySourceIpCondition_Allows is the companion: with a
// matching CIDR (127.0.0.0/8), the same call must succeed.
func TestUserInlinePolicySourceIpCondition_Allows(t *testing.T) {
api := NewEmbeddedIamApiForTest()
api.mockConfig = &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
seedInlineCondUser(t, api)
_, iamErr := api.PutUserPolicy(api.mockConfig, url.Values{
"UserName": {"alice"},
"PolicyName": {"FromLoopback"},
"PolicyDocument": {inlineCondPolicyDoc("127.0.0.0/8")},
})
require.Nil(t, iamErr)
require.NoError(t, api.PutS3ApiConfiguration(api.mockConfig))
require.NoError(t, api.iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager())
ident := api.iam.lookupByIdentityName("alice")
require.NotNil(t, ident)
req := inlineCondRequest(t, http.MethodPut)
got := api.iam.VerifyActionPermission(req, ident, s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, inlineCondTestBucket, "obj")
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrNone, got,
"PutObject from 127.0.0.1 must be allowed: the user inline policy's aws:SourceIp condition (127.0.0.0/8) matches")
}
// TestGroupInlinePolicy_PutAndEnforce verifies that PutGroupPolicy is supported
// (no longer returns NotImplemented) and that an aws:SourceIp condition on the
// resulting inline policy is honored for group members.
func TestGroupInlinePolicy_PutAndEnforce(t *testing.T) {
api := NewEmbeddedIamApiForTest()
api.mockConfig = &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
seedInlineCondUser(t, api)
// Groups live in their own credential-store namespace (CreateGroup, not
// SaveConfiguration). Seed devs+alice via the dedicated API and refresh
// through the framework hook so both mockConfig.Groups and iam.groups
// observe the new group.
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, api.credentialManager.CreateGroup(ctx, &iam_pb.Group{
Name: "devs",
Members: []string{"alice"},
}))
require.NoError(t, api.refreshIAMConfiguration())
// PutGroupPolicy must succeed. This is the call that returns
// NotImplemented today; this test will fail with that error.
_, iamErr := api.PutGroupPolicy(api.mockConfig, url.Values{
"GroupName": {"devs"},
"PolicyName": {"DevsFromLoopback"},
"PolicyDocument": {inlineCondPolicyDoc("198.51.100.0/24")},
})
require.Nil(t, iamErr, "PutGroupPolicy must succeed; got: %+v", iamErr)
require.NoError(t, api.iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager())
ident := api.iam.lookupByIdentityName("alice")
require.NotNil(t, ident)
// Deny path: condition does not match the loopback caller.
req := inlineCondRequest(t, http.MethodPut)
got := api.iam.VerifyActionPermission(req, ident, s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, inlineCondTestBucket, "obj")
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, got,
"group member from 127.0.0.1 must be denied when the group inline policy's aws:SourceIp condition (198.51.100.0/24) does not match")
// Round-trip via the store: list & get must observe the new inline policy.
listResp, iamErr := api.ListGroupPolicies(api.mockConfig, url.Values{"GroupName": {"devs"}})
require.Nil(t, iamErr)
assert.Contains(t, listResp.ListGroupPoliciesResult.PolicyNames, "DevsFromLoopback")
getResp, iamErr := api.GetGroupPolicy(api.mockConfig, url.Values{
"GroupName": {"devs"}, "PolicyName": {"DevsFromLoopback"},
})
require.Nil(t, iamErr)
assert.Contains(t, getResp.GetGroupPolicyResult.PolicyDocument, "aws:SourceIp",
"GetGroupPolicy must round-trip the Condition block")
// Flip the policy to the matching CIDR and verify the allow path.
_, iamErr = api.PutGroupPolicy(api.mockConfig, url.Values{
"GroupName": {"devs"},
"PolicyName": {"DevsFromLoopback"},
"PolicyDocument": {inlineCondPolicyDoc("127.0.0.0/8")},
})
require.Nil(t, iamErr)
require.NoError(t, api.iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager())
ident = api.iam.lookupByIdentityName("alice")
require.NotNil(t, ident)
got = api.iam.VerifyActionPermission(inlineCondRequest(t, http.MethodPut), ident,
s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, inlineCondTestBucket, "obj")
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrNone, got,
"group member from 127.0.0.1 must be allowed when the group inline policy's aws:SourceIp condition (127.0.0.0/8) matches")
// Cleanup: DeleteGroupPolicy must also be implemented and must drop the
// engine registration so the action is no longer permitted via this group.
_, iamErr = api.DeleteGroupPolicy(api.mockConfig, url.Values{
"GroupName": {"devs"}, "PolicyName": {"DevsFromLoopback"},
})
require.Nil(t, iamErr, "DeleteGroupPolicy must succeed")
require.NoError(t, api.iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager())
ident = api.iam.lookupByIdentityName("alice")
require.NotNil(t, ident)
got = api.iam.VerifyActionPermission(inlineCondRequest(t, http.MethodPut), ident,
s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, inlineCondTestBucket, "obj")
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, got,
"after DeleteGroupPolicy, the group inline policy must no longer grant access")
}
// TestUserInlinePolicy_ConditionDiscriminatesAllowVsDeny pairs allow and deny
// against the same user with the same Actions list. If the engine path is not
// in use, both calls would hit the legacy Actions branch and both would be
// allowed; the discriminator is that switching the CIDR must flip the result.
func TestUserInlinePolicy_ConditionDiscriminatesAllowVsDeny(t *testing.T) {
api := NewEmbeddedIamApiForTest()
api.mockConfig = &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
seedInlineCondUser(t, api)
// Allow from loopback first: must succeed.
_, iamErr := api.PutUserPolicy(api.mockConfig, url.Values{
"UserName": {"alice"},
"PolicyName": {"P"},
"PolicyDocument": {inlineCondPolicyDoc("127.0.0.0/8")},
})
require.Nil(t, iamErr)
require.NoError(t, api.PutS3ApiConfiguration(api.mockConfig))
require.NoError(t, api.iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager())
ident := api.iam.lookupByIdentityName("alice")
require.NotNil(t, ident)
got := api.iam.VerifyActionPermission(inlineCondRequest(t, http.MethodPut), ident,
s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, inlineCondTestBucket, "obj")
require.Equal(t, s3err.ErrNone, got, "policy with matching CIDR must allow")
// Replace with non-matching CIDR: must now deny. Same user, same action,
// same Actions list (Admin:bucket). Only the Condition block changed.
_, iamErr = api.PutUserPolicy(api.mockConfig, url.Values{
"UserName": {"alice"},
"PolicyName": {"P"},
"PolicyDocument": {inlineCondPolicyDoc("198.51.100.0/24")},
})
require.Nil(t, iamErr)
require.NoError(t, api.PutS3ApiConfiguration(api.mockConfig))
require.NoError(t, api.iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager())
ident = api.iam.lookupByIdentityName("alice")
require.NotNil(t, ident)
got = api.iam.VerifyActionPermission(inlineCondRequest(t, http.MethodPut), ident,
s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, inlineCondTestBucket, "obj")
require.Equal(t, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, got,
"flipping aws:SourceIp to a non-matching CIDR must flip the decision; "+
"this proves the engine (not the legacy Actions list) drives the outcome")
}
// TestUserInlinePolicy_ReloadFromStore verifies that after the IAM is reloaded
// (simulating a restart), the stored user inline policy is re-registered and
// its Condition block is still enforced. Catches a regression where the engine
// state is rebuilt only from managed policies, not inline ones.
func TestUserInlinePolicy_ReloadFromStore(t *testing.T) {
api := NewEmbeddedIamApiForTest()
api.mockConfig = &iam_pb.S3ApiConfiguration{}
seedInlineCondUser(t, api)
// Persist an inline policy via the credential store directly, bypassing
// the API. This is the on-disk state a fresh process boots into.
var doc policy_engine.PolicyDocument
require.NoError(t, doc.UnmarshalJSON([]byte(inlineCondPolicyDoc("198.51.100.0/24"))))
require.NoError(t, api.credentialManager.PutUserInlinePolicy(
context.Background(), "alice", "OnlyFromTestNet", doc))
// Simulate restart: full reload from credential store.
require.NoError(t, api.iam.LoadS3ApiConfigurationFromCredentialManager())
ident := api.iam.lookupByIdentityName("alice")
require.NotNil(t, ident)
req := inlineCondRequest(t, http.MethodPut)
got := api.iam.VerifyActionPermission(req, ident, s3_constants.ACTION_WRITE, inlineCondTestBucket, "obj")
assert.Equal(t, s3err.ErrAccessDenied, got,
"after reload, the persisted user inline policy's aws:SourceIp condition must still be honored")
}