Files
s3/weed/s3api/s3api_sse_decrypt_test.go
zooqueen dd74d3e6d6 Replace AGPL MinIO fork with Apache-2.0 SeaweedFS fork; rebrand CLI weed->s3
hanzoai/s3 was an AGPL-3.0 MinIO fork whose network-copyleft blocks embedding
and reselling as a managed service. Replace it wholesale with a fork of
SeaweedFS (github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs, Apache-2.0, Go) which ships a
built-in S3 gateway + Filer.

- License: AGPL-3.0 -> Apache-2.0 (upstream LICENSE kept verbatim, incl.
  "Copyright 2025 Chris Lu"); NOTICE added crediting SeaweedFS. No AGPL/BUSL/
  SSPL/GPL or enterprise ("ee") files remain.
- Module: go.mod path set to github.com/hanzoai/s3 with a self-replace
  (replace github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs => ./) so the ~1800 internal Go files
  keep their upstream import paths with zero churn. Internal identifiers and
  import paths are intentionally NOT renamed.
- CLI rebrand: the binary is built as `s3` (was `weed`); root usage, per-command
  help/usage/flag strings, shell autocomplete program name, and the product name
  in CLI output now read "Hanzo S3" / `s3`. Users never see `weed`.
  (e.g. `s3 server`, `s3 filer`, `s3 master`, `s3 volume`, `s3 s3`, `s3 mount`.)
- Build: `make` (or `go build -o s3 ./weed`) builds the `s3` binary green;
  `cmd/weed-db` and `cmd/weed-sql` also build; `go vet ./weed/command/` clean.
- README/LLM.md rewritten for Hanzo S3; AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md symlinks preserved.
- Dropped a 33MB prebuilt Mach-O `stress` binary upstream had committed; `.gitignore`
  updated to ignore the `s3` build output.
2026-06-18 23:41:25 -07:00

211 lines
7.4 KiB
Go

package s3api
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/rand"
"io"
"testing"
)
// TestSSECDecryptChunkView_NoOffsetAdjustment verifies that SSE-C decryption
// does NOT apply calculateIVWithOffset, preventing the critical bug where
// offset adjustment would cause CTR stream misalignment and data corruption.
func TestSSECDecryptChunkView_NoOffsetAdjustment(t *testing.T) {
// Setup: Create test data
plaintext := []byte("This is a test message for SSE-C decryption without offset adjustment")
customerKey := &SSECustomerKey{
Key: make([]byte, 32), // 256-bit key
KeyMD5: "test-key-md5",
}
// Generate random AES key
if _, err := rand.Read(customerKey.Key); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to generate random key: %v", err)
}
// Generate random IV for this "part"
randomIV := make([]byte, aes.BlockSize)
if _, err := rand.Read(randomIV); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to generate random IV: %v", err)
}
// Encrypt the plaintext using the random IV (simulating SSE-C multipart upload)
// This is what CreateSSECEncryptedReader does - uses the IV directly without offset
block, err := aes.NewCipher(customerKey.Key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create cipher: %v", err)
}
ciphertext := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, randomIV)
stream.XORKeyStream(ciphertext, plaintext)
partOffset := int64(1024) // Non-zero offset that should NOT be applied during SSE-C decryption
// TEST: Decrypt using stored IV directly (correct behavior)
decryptedReaderCorrect, err := CreateSSECDecryptedReader(
io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(ciphertext)),
customerKey,
randomIV, // Use stored IV directly - CORRECT
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create decrypted reader (correct): %v", err)
}
decryptedCorrect, err := io.ReadAll(decryptedReaderCorrect)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to read decrypted data (correct): %v", err)
}
// Verify correct decryption
if !bytes.Equal(decryptedCorrect, plaintext) {
t.Errorf("Correct decryption failed:\nExpected: %s\nGot: %s", plaintext, decryptedCorrect)
} else {
t.Logf("✓ Correct decryption (using stored IV directly) successful")
}
// ANTI-TEST: Decrypt using offset-adjusted IV (incorrect behavior - the bug)
adjustedIV, ivSkip := calculateIVWithOffset(randomIV, partOffset)
decryptedReaderWrong, err := CreateSSECDecryptedReader(
io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(ciphertext)),
customerKey,
adjustedIV, // Use adjusted IV - WRONG
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create decrypted reader (wrong): %v", err)
}
// Skip ivSkip bytes (as the buggy code would do)
if ivSkip > 0 {
io.CopyN(io.Discard, decryptedReaderWrong, int64(ivSkip))
}
decryptedWrong, err := io.ReadAll(decryptedReaderWrong)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to read decrypted data (wrong): %v", err)
}
// Verify that offset adjustment produces DIFFERENT (corrupted) output
if bytes.Equal(decryptedWrong, plaintext) {
t.Errorf("CRITICAL: Offset-adjusted IV produced correct plaintext! This shouldn't happen for SSE-C.")
} else {
t.Logf("✓ Verified: Offset-adjusted IV produces corrupted data (as expected for SSE-C)")
maxLen := 20
if len(plaintext) < maxLen {
maxLen = len(plaintext)
}
t.Logf(" Plaintext: %q", plaintext[:maxLen])
maxLen2 := 20
if len(decryptedWrong) < maxLen2 {
maxLen2 = len(decryptedWrong)
}
t.Logf(" Corrupted: %q", decryptedWrong[:maxLen2])
}
}
// TestSSEKMSDecryptChunkView_RequiresOffsetAdjustment verifies that SSE-KMS
// decryption DOES require calculateIVWithOffset, unlike SSE-C.
func TestSSEKMSDecryptChunkView_RequiresOffsetAdjustment(t *testing.T) {
// Setup: Create test data
plaintext := []byte("This is a test message for SSE-KMS decryption with offset adjustment")
// Generate base IV and key
baseIV := make([]byte, aes.BlockSize)
key := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(baseIV); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to generate base IV: %v", err)
}
if _, err := rand.Read(key); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to generate key: %v", err)
}
chunkOffset := int64(2048) // Simulate chunk at offset 2048
// Encrypt using base IV + offset (simulating SSE-KMS multipart upload)
adjustedIV, ivSkip := calculateIVWithOffset(baseIV, chunkOffset)
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create cipher: %v", err)
}
ciphertext := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, adjustedIV)
// Skip ivSkip bytes in the encryption stream if needed
if ivSkip > 0 {
dummy := make([]byte, ivSkip)
stream.XORKeyStream(dummy, dummy)
}
stream.XORKeyStream(ciphertext, plaintext)
// TEST: Decrypt using base IV + offset adjustment (correct for SSE-KMS)
adjustedIVDecrypt, ivSkipDecrypt := calculateIVWithOffset(baseIV, chunkOffset)
blockDecrypt, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create cipher for decryption: %v", err)
}
decrypted := make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
streamDecrypt := cipher.NewCTR(blockDecrypt, adjustedIVDecrypt)
// Skip ivSkip bytes in the decryption stream
if ivSkipDecrypt > 0 {
dummy := make([]byte, ivSkipDecrypt)
streamDecrypt.XORKeyStream(dummy, dummy)
}
streamDecrypt.XORKeyStream(decrypted, ciphertext)
// Verify correct decryption with offset adjustment
if !bytes.Equal(decrypted, plaintext) {
t.Errorf("SSE-KMS decryption with offset adjustment failed:\nExpected: %s\nGot: %s", plaintext, decrypted)
} else {
t.Logf("✓ SSE-KMS decryption with offset adjustment successful")
}
// ANTI-TEST: Decrypt after applying the offset twice (incorrect range path behavior)
doubleAdjustedIV, doubleSkip := calculateIVWithOffset(adjustedIV, chunkOffset)
blockDoubleWrong, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create cipher for double-adjusted decryption: %v", err)
}
decryptedDoubleWrong := make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
streamDoubleWrong := cipher.NewCTR(blockDoubleWrong, doubleAdjustedIV)
if doubleSkip > 0 {
dummy := make([]byte, doubleSkip)
streamDoubleWrong.XORKeyStream(dummy, dummy)
}
streamDoubleWrong.XORKeyStream(decryptedDoubleWrong, ciphertext)
if bytes.Equal(decryptedDoubleWrong, plaintext) {
t.Errorf("CRITICAL: Double-adjusted IV produced correct plaintext! SSE-KMS chunk offset must be applied exactly once.")
} else {
t.Logf("✓ Verified: double-adjusted IV produces corrupted data (range path must not pre-adjust)")
}
// ANTI-TEST: Decrypt using base IV directly (incorrect for SSE-KMS)
blockWrong, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create cipher for wrong decryption: %v", err)
}
decryptedWrong := make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
streamWrong := cipher.NewCTR(blockWrong, baseIV) // Use base IV directly - WRONG for SSE-KMS
streamWrong.XORKeyStream(decryptedWrong, ciphertext)
// Verify that NOT using offset adjustment produces corrupted output
if bytes.Equal(decryptedWrong, plaintext) {
t.Errorf("CRITICAL: Base IV without offset produced correct plaintext! SSE-KMS requires offset adjustment.")
} else {
t.Logf("✓ Verified: Base IV without offset produces corrupted data (as expected for SSE-KMS)")
}
}
// TestSSEDecryptionDifferences documents the key differences between SSE types
func TestSSEDecryptionDifferences(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("SSE-C: Random IV per part → Use stored IV DIRECTLY (no offset)")
t.Log("SSE-KMS: Base IV + offset → MUST call calculateIVWithOffset(baseIV, offset)")
t.Log("SSE-S3: Base IV + offset → Stores ADJUSTED IV, use directly")
// This test documents the critical differences and serves as executable documentation
}