Files
skills/public/hip-0077.html
zeekayandHanzo Dev 9e10c1c10e Each llms index points at the other two
hanzoskills.com/llms.txt now opens with the install line, the API
reference index and the company index, so an agent that lands on any
one of the three can find the rest.

robots.txt claimed 537 documents while llms.txt counts 920. The number
is gone from robots.txt; llms.txt derives it.

public/ is regenerated from scripts/site.py, which it had fallen
behind: the copy-prompt menu and agent bar were in the generator and
not in the committed pages. tests/site.mjs passes against the result.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-09-11 00:27:59 -07:00

479 lines
50 KiB
HTML
Raw Permalink Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en"><head>
<meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
<title>hip-0077</title>
<meta name="color-scheme" content="dark">
<style>
/* Committed to one visual world: a dark instrument panel. No light variant —
the dot field and the hairline rules only read on black, and a naive
inversion would wash both out. Every colour is painted explicitly so the page
never borrows a host background. */
@font-face{font-family:'Zen';src:url('/fonts/Zen-Variable.woff2') format('woff2');font-weight:100 900;font-style:normal;font-display:swap}
@font-face{font-family:'Zen';src:url('/fonts/Zen-Italic-Variable.woff2') format('woff2');font-weight:100 900;font-style:italic;font-display:swap}
@font-face{font-family:'Zen Mono';src:url('/fonts/ZenMono-Variable.woff2') format('woff2');font-weight:100 900;font-style:normal;font-display:swap}
@font-face{font-family:'Zen Mono';src:url('/fonts/ZenMono-Italic-Variable.woff2') format('woff2');font-weight:100 900;font-style:italic;font-display:swap}
@font-face{font-family:'Zen Pixel Square';src:url('/fonts/ZenPixel-Square.woff2') format('woff2');font-style:normal;font-display:swap}
:root{
--ink:#f4f4f2; --soft:#9c9c98; --faint:#6a6a66; --ground:#000; --panel:#0a0a0a;
--line:#232323; --line-hi:#3a3a3a; --accent:#f4f4f2;
--font-zen-sans:'Zen',-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,"Segoe UI",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;
--font-zen-mono:'Zen Mono',ui-monospace,"SF Mono",SFMono-Regular,Menlo,Consolas,monospace;
--font-zen-pixel-square:'Zen Pixel Square',monospace;
--mono:var(--font-zen-mono);
--sans:var(--font-zen-sans);
/* Controls are pills and surfaces are soft, as on hanzo.ai. */
--r:999px; --r-soft:14px;
}
*{box-sizing:border-box}
html{-webkit-text-size-adjust:100%}
body{margin:0;background:var(--ground);color:var(--ink);font-family:var(--sans);
font-size:16px;line-height:1.65;-webkit-font-smoothing:antialiased}
.wrap{max-width:60rem;margin:0 auto;padding:0 1.75rem}
/* The dot field. A halftone made of one repeating radial-gradient, faded out
along the diagonal by a mask so it reads as a wave rather than wallpaper. */
/* No overflow clip here: the dot field is inset to the box already, and a clip
would cut off the copy-prompt menu. */
.hero{position:relative;border-bottom:1px solid var(--line)}
.hero::before{content:"";position:absolute;inset:0;
background-image:radial-gradient(var(--line-hi) 1px, transparent 1px);
background-size:7px 7px;
-webkit-mask-image:linear-gradient(115deg,#000 0%,rgba(0,0,0,.55) 38%,transparent 72%);
mask-image:linear-gradient(115deg,#000 0%,rgba(0,0,0,.55) 38%,transparent 72%);
pointer-events:none}
.hero .wrap{position:relative;padding-top:5.5rem;padding-bottom:4rem}
nav{border-bottom:1px solid var(--line)}
nav .in{max-width:60rem;margin:0 auto;padding:1.1rem 1.75rem;display:flex;
justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;gap:1rem}
.brand{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.85rem;letter-spacing:.14em;
text-transform:uppercase;color:var(--ink);text-decoration:none;
display:inline-flex;align-items:center;gap:.6rem}
.brand i{font-style:normal;color:var(--faint)}
.mark{width:1.15em;height:1.15em;display:block;flex:0 0 auto}
nav a.up{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.72rem;letter-spacing:.14em;
text-transform:uppercase;color:var(--soft);text-decoration:none}
nav a.up:hover{color:var(--ink)}
h1{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:clamp(2rem,5.4vw,3.4rem);line-height:1.12;
letter-spacing:-.02em;margin:0 0 1.1rem;font-weight:500;text-wrap:balance}
h1 em{font-style:normal;color:var(--faint)}
.lede{color:var(--soft);font-size:1.05rem;max-width:52ch;margin:0 0 2.25rem}
.btns{display:flex;flex-wrap:wrap;gap:.7rem;margin:0 0 .5rem;align-items:center}
.btn{display:inline-flex;align-items:center;gap:.5rem;font-family:var(--mono);
font-size:.72rem;letter-spacing:.14em;text-transform:uppercase;
padding:.8rem 1.4rem;border:1px solid var(--line-hi);border-radius:var(--r);
color:var(--ink);text-decoration:none;background:transparent;cursor:pointer;
line-height:1.2;font-weight:400}
.btn:hover{background:#141414;text-decoration:none;border-color:var(--soft)}
.btn.solid{background:var(--ink);color:#000;border-color:var(--ink)}
.btn.solid:hover{background:#d8d8d4}
.btn .chev{width:.7em;height:.7em;flex:0 0 auto;transition:transform .15s ease}
.btn[aria-expanded="true"] .chev{transform:rotate(180deg)}
/* Copy-prompt selector. Each row copies the prompt for its own target. */
.copy{position:relative;display:inline-flex}
.menu{position:absolute;top:calc(100% + .5rem);left:0;z-index:20;min-width:21rem;
background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line-hi);border-radius:var(--r-soft);
padding:.4rem;display:flex;flex-direction:column;
box-shadow:0 12px 32px rgba(0,0,0,.75)}
.menu[hidden]{display:none}
.mi{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.7rem;width:100%;text-align:left;
padding:.62rem .8rem;border:0;border-radius:calc(var(--r-soft) - .35rem);
background:transparent;color:var(--ink);font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.76rem;
letter-spacing:.04em;text-decoration:none;cursor:pointer;line-height:1.3;
white-space:nowrap}
.mi:hover,.mi:focus-visible{background:#181818;outline:none}
.mi .mark{width:1.05rem;height:1.05rem;color:var(--soft)}
.mi:hover .mark{color:var(--ink)}
.mi u{margin-left:auto;color:var(--faint);text-decoration:none;font-size:.68rem;
letter-spacing:.1em;text-transform:uppercase}
/* Works-with bar: one scrolling row, name and mark per agent. */
.strip{border-bottom:1px solid var(--line);background:var(--panel)}
.strip .in{max-width:60rem;margin:0 auto;padding:.9rem 1.75rem;display:flex;
align-items:center;gap:1.25rem;font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.72rem;
letter-spacing:.1em;text-transform:uppercase;color:var(--faint)}
.strip b{color:var(--soft);font-weight:400;flex:0 0 auto;
border-right:1px solid var(--line);padding-right:1.25rem;align-self:stretch;
display:flex;align-items:center}
.bar{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.5rem;flex:1 1 auto;min-width:0;
overflow-x:auto;scrollbar-width:none;scroll-snap-type:x proximity;
-webkit-overflow-scrolling:touch;
-webkit-mask-image:linear-gradient(90deg,#000 calc(100% - 3rem),transparent);
mask-image:linear-gradient(90deg,#000 calc(100% - 3rem),transparent)}
.bar::-webkit-scrollbar{display:none}
.agent{display:inline-flex;align-items:center;gap:.45rem;flex:0 0 auto;
padding:.4rem .85rem;border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:var(--r);
color:var(--soft);white-space:nowrap;scroll-snap-align:start;
text-decoration:none;background:var(--ground)}
.agent:hover{color:var(--ink);border-color:var(--line-hi);text-decoration:none}
.agent .mark{width:.95rem;height:.95rem}
h2{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:1.1rem;letter-spacing:-.01em;margin:2.75rem 0 .75rem;font-weight:500}
h3{font-size:1rem;margin:2rem 0 .5rem;font-weight:600}
h4,h5,h6{font-size:.94rem;margin:1.5rem 0 .5rem;font-weight:600}
p{margin:0 0 1rem;max-width:70ch}
ul,ol{margin:0 0 1rem;padding-left:1.35rem;max-width:70ch}
li{margin:.22rem 0}
a{color:var(--ink);text-decoration:underline;text-underline-offset:3px;
text-decoration-color:var(--line-hi)}
a:hover{text-decoration-color:var(--ink)}
a:focus-visible{outline:1px solid var(--ink);outline-offset:3px}
code{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.85em;background:var(--panel);
border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:5px;padding:.1em .36em}
pre{background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);padding:1rem 1.1rem;
border-radius:var(--r-soft);overflow-x:auto;margin:0 0 1.25rem}
pre code{background:none;border:0;padding:0;font-size:.82rem;line-height:1.7}
blockquote{margin:0 0 1rem;padding-left:1rem;border-left:1px solid var(--line-hi);color:var(--soft)}
hr{border:0;border-top:1px solid var(--line);margin:2.5rem 0}
table{border-collapse:collapse;width:100%;margin:0 0 1.25rem;font-size:.92rem;
display:block;overflow-x:auto}
th,td{border:1px solid var(--line);padding:.5rem .7rem;text-align:left}
.curl{display:block;background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);
border-radius:var(--r-soft);padding:.95rem 1.1rem;font-family:var(--mono);
font-size:.8rem;color:var(--soft);overflow-x:auto;margin:0 0 2.5rem;
white-space:pre;line-height:1.9}
.curl b{color:var(--ink);font-weight:400}
.curl i{font-style:normal;color:var(--faint)}
/* index */
#q{width:100%;padding:.85rem 1.2rem;font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.85rem;color:var(--ink);
background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:var(--r);margin:0 0 .6rem}
#q::placeholder{color:var(--faint);text-transform:uppercase;letter-spacing:.1em;font-size:.72rem}
#q:focus{outline:none;border-color:var(--soft)}
#count{color:var(--faint);font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.72rem;letter-spacing:.1em;
text-transform:uppercase;margin:0 0 2rem}
.cat{margin:2.5rem 0 .5rem;font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.7rem;letter-spacing:.16em;
text-transform:uppercase;color:var(--faint);border-bottom:1px solid var(--line);
padding-bottom:.45rem}
.row{display:block;padding:.6rem .9rem;margin:0 -.9rem;border-bottom:1px solid var(--line);
border-radius:var(--r-soft);text-decoration:none}
.row:hover{background:#0a0a0a}
.nm{font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.84rem;color:var(--ink);display:block}
.ds{color:var(--soft);font-size:.9rem;display:block;margin-top:.12rem}
footer{margin-top:4rem;padding:2rem 0 4rem;border-top:1px solid var(--line);
color:var(--faint);font-size:.85rem}
footer a{color:var(--soft)}
.fmap{display:grid;gap:1.75rem;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit,minmax(11rem,1fr));
margin:0 0 2rem;font-size:.85rem}
.fmap b{display:block;font-family:var(--mono);font-size:.68rem;letter-spacing:.16em;
text-transform:uppercase;color:var(--faint);font-weight:400;margin:0 0 .6rem;
border-bottom:1px solid var(--line);padding-bottom:.4rem}
.fmap a{display:inline-block;color:var(--ink);text-decoration:none;margin:.3rem .35rem 0 0}
.fmap a:hover{text-decoration:underline}
.fmap div{color:var(--faint);line-height:1.5}
.fend{border-top:1px solid var(--line);padding-top:1.25rem;font-size:.82rem}
@media (max-width:640px){
.hero .wrap{padding-top:3.25rem;padding-bottom:2.75rem}
.btns{gap:.5rem}
.btn{padding:.75rem 1.15rem;font-size:.68rem}
.copy,.copy .btn{width:100%;justify-content:center}
.menu{left:0;right:0;min-width:0}
.strip .in{flex-direction:column;align-items:flex-start;gap:.6rem;padding:.9rem 1.75rem}
.strip b{border-right:0;padding-right:0}
.bar{width:100%}
}
</style>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/markdown" href="/hip-0077.md">
<link rel="icon" href="/favicon.svg">
<link rel="canonical" href="https://hanzoskills.com/hip-0077">
</head>
<!-- Reading this with a machine? Every page here is also plain markdown.
This one: https://hanzoskills.com/hip-0077.md
Index: https://hanzoskills.com/llms.txt
Corpus: https://hanzoskills.com/all.md
Append .md to any path for the markdown twin. -->
<body>
<nav><div class="in">
<a class="brand" href="/"><svg class="mark" viewBox="0 0 67 67" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M22.21 67V44.6369H0V67H22.21Z"/><path d="M66.7038 22.3184H22.2534L0.0878906 44.6367H44.4634L66.7038 22.3184Z"/><path d="M22.21 0H0V22.3184H22.21V0Z"/><path d="M66.7198 0H44.5098V22.3184H66.7198V0Z"/><path d="M66.7198 67V44.6369H44.5098V67H66.7198Z"/></svg> HANZO<i>SKILLS</i></a>
<a class="up" href="/">All skills</a>
</div></nav>
<div class="wrap">
<h1>hip-0077</h1><p class="lede">HIP-77: Mesh Identity, Gossip &amp; Payments (PQ). Status Final. Hanzo architectural specification.</p><h1>HIP-0077: Mesh Identity, Gossip &amp; Payments (PQ)</h1>
<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p>HIP-0069 made every Hanzo service discoverable on the LAN via one mDNS type. HIP-0077 layers three things on top so the mesh extends past the broadcast domain and becomes a settlement substrate, end-to-end post-quantum:</p>
<ol><li><strong>Identity.</strong> Every device, MCP, container, browser and node derives</li></ol>
<p> its keypair from a single HD mnemonic. The signing key is <strong>ML-DSA-65</strong> (NIST FIPS 204, the same primitive Lux consensus already uses for per-validator identity signatures). The ML-DSA-derived address rides in the mDNS TXT record; the ZAP handshake carries the full pubkey + a fresh signature over a server-supplied nonce; peers verify before accepting traffic.</p>
<ol><li><strong>Gossip.</strong> For cross-LAN propagation peers publish the same</li></ol>
<p> identity + capability record to the Lux consensus mesh on network <code>1337</code> (primary / dev) or whichever network the tenant pins. One read of the gossip set is equivalent to an mDNS browse, but globally.</p>
<ol><li><strong>Payments.</strong> The same identity is a Lux account. Any tool call on</li></ol>
<p> the mesh can carry a price; the consumer signs a promise; the provider signs a receipt; settlement happens on chain. The first 200 device indices derived from the <code>LIGHT_MNEMONIC</code> are pre-funded in the network <code>1337</code> genesis from the P/X-chain LIGHT_MNEMONIC balance, so a fresh laptop or container joining the local mesh has working credit immediately — no manual top-up.</p>
<p>Net effect: one mnemonic in your environment, a hundred-plus devices each with unique PQ identity and a balance, all discoverable and billable across the LAN via mDNS and across the WAN via Lux consensus, without any config file.</p>
<h2>Motivation</h2>
<p>HIP-0069 solved discovery; it stopped there deliberately. After shipping it four needs surfaced immediately:</p>
<ul><li><strong>mDNS does not cross subnets.</strong> Browsing <code>_hanzo._tcp.local.</code> from</li></ul>
<p> a laptop on home wifi never sees the Hanzo Desktop on the office LAN or the bare-metal node in a datacentre. A small overlay is needed to relay records.</p>
<ul><li><strong>No identity verification.</strong> Anyone on the same broadcast domain can</li></ul>
<p> advertise <code>role=kms</code> with a forged <code>server_id</code>. The TXT <code>auth=iam</code> field tells consumers what to expect, but does not bind the record itself to a key. A signed handshake fixes this.</p>
<ul><li><strong>No settlement.</strong> Hanzo Containers and the HMM compute DEX</li></ul>
<p> (HIP-0008) both presuppose a way for one peer to pay another for work. The mesh already exposes the work as MCP tool calls; the missing piece is per-call billing keyed to the same device identity used for discovery.</p>
<ul><li><strong>No &quot;just works&quot; out of the box.</strong> A new device joining the local</li></ul>
<p> network needs an account with balance before it can pay for inference, storage or any other priced call. Manual funding for every laptop / container / phone is friction we can remove with a genesis pre-allocation tied to the well-known dev mnemonic.</p>
<p>The cleanest answer reuses infrastructure that already exists:</p>
<ul><li><strong>Lux HD wallets</strong> for deterministic key derivation.</li><li><strong>ML-DSA-65</strong> for post-quantum signatures, taken from</li></ul>
<p> <code>github.com/luxfi/pulsar/sign</code> and already wired into Lux consensus via <code>config.PQMode</code>.</p>
<ul><li><strong>Lux consensus</strong> (Quasar family — <code>protocol/photon</code>, <code>wave</code>,</li></ul>
<p> <code>focus</code>, <code>prism</code>, <code>ray</code>, <code>field</code>, <code>quasar</code>) for cross-LAN gossip with BFT finality. Five PQ modes are available (see table below); the Hanzo mesh defaults to the strongest.</p>
<ul><li><strong>AI Coin</strong> (HIP-0001) settled on the same accounts.</li><li><strong>Genesis pre-allocation</strong> native to the Lux node genesis tool.</li></ul>
<p>No new chains, no new crypto, no new naming.</p>
<h3>Lux consensus PQ modes</h3>
<p><code>lux/consensus/config/pq_mode.go</code> exposes the full PQ design space as five orthogonal modes. Every mode keeps BLS-12-381 as the classical fast path; PQ layers stack on top. The names are picked so each canonical mode is the sub-protocol that defines its post-quantum surface.</p>
<h4>The matrix</h4>
<p>| <code>PQMode</code> | env | classical | threshold lattice | per-validator PQ | rollup | DKG required | suitable for open public chain? | |------------------|------------|-----------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------| | <code>PQModeBLS</code> | <code>bls</code> | BLS | — | — | — | none | no (no PQ) | | <code>PQModeCorona</code> | <code>corona</code> | BLS | Corona / <strong>BLAKE3</strong> (academic) | — | — | trusted dealer | <strong>no</strong> (no DKG-with-rotation) | | <code>PQModePulsar</code> | <code>pulsar</code> | BLS | Pulsar / <strong>SHA-3 cSHAKE256</strong> (prod) | — | — | Pedersen DKG over R\_q + proactive resharing | yes | | <code>PQModeQuasar</code> | <code>quasar</code> | BLS | Pulsar / SHA-3 | ML-DSA-65 (rolled) | Groth16 / Z-Chain | Pedersen DKG over R\_q + proactive resharing | yes (<strong>default</strong>) | | <code>PQModeMLDSA</code> | <code>mldsa</code> | BLS | — | ML-DSA-65 raw | — | none | yes (audit-grade fallback) |</p>
<p>Two production progressions:</p>
<pre><code>public chains, open validator set: BLS → Pulsar → Quasar
fixed federations / bridge MPC: BLS → Corona</code></pre>
<p><code>MLDSA</code> is an audit-grade side path: every validator&#x27;s raw ML-DSA-65 sig in every cert (~N·3309 B). Use it transitionally if the Z-Chain Groth16 witness isn&#x27;t wired yet, or when an external auditor needs the per-validator log.</p>
<h4>Pulsar vs Corona — what&#x27;s actually different</h4>
<p>Both implement the same 2-round LWE threshold-signature <strong>core algorithm</strong>. They diverge on the hash family and the production lifecycle:</p>
<p>| dimension | Corona (<code>github.com/luxfi/corona</code>) | Pulsar (<code>github.com/luxfi/pulsar</code>) | |--------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------| | canonical hash | <strong>BLAKE3</strong> (academic upstream) | <strong>SHA-3 (cSHAKE256 / KMAC256 / TupleHash256, FIPS 202 + SP 800-185)</strong> | | DKG | trusted dealer (fixed federation) | Pedersen DKG over R\_q with proper hiding | | validator rotation | none (re-run trusted dealer) | proactive secret resharing (<code>pulsar/reshare/</code>) | | target deployment | bridge MPC, audit, KATs | open public chains (Lux primary network, Hanzo mesh) | | NIST profile? | no (BLAKE3 not in FIPS 202 family) | yes (every primitive in the FIPS 202 / SP 800-185 family) | | fork history | upstream academic port | production fork that <strong>will keep diverging</strong> as protocol matures |</p>
<p>The modes are kept distinct on purpose: an open public chain that reused Corona&#x27;s trusted-dealer DKG would be unable to rotate its validator set without a manual ceremony, and an audit fixture that wanted byte-identical KATs against the academic spec needs the BLAKE3 path. We treat them as first-class siblings, not as &quot;old vs new&quot; — the helpers <code>PQMode.HashProfile()</code>, <code>PQMode.DKGRequired()</code> and <code>PQMode.SuitableForPublicChain()</code> make the distinction queryable.</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>NIST submission posture.</strong> The Pulsar SHA-3 profile is the only hash configuration eligible for any NIST-track submission (MPTC IR 8214C §4.6 lists the approved symmetric primitives: AES, Ascon, SHA-2, SHA-3, SHAKE/cSHAKE, HMAC/KMAC/CMAC/GMAC). BLAKE3 deltas, including <code>Pulsar-BLAKE3</code> legacy and Corona&#x27;s BLAKE3 academic profile, are <strong>product/experimental</strong> profiles only. Pulsar keeps the BLAKE3 suite non-normative and marked &quot;NOT for production&quot;; Corona&#x27;s BLAKE3 profile is fixed-federation only and never intended for the Lux primary network.</p></blockquote>
<h4>Canonical <code>HashSuiteID</code> encoding</h4>
<p>There is one canonical wire representation of the hash-suite identifier across the Lux + Hanzo tree: a <code>uint8</code> byte, defined in <code>lux/consensus/config/pq_mode.go</code> (and mirrored on the cert wire in <code>lux/consensus/pkg/wire/candidate.go</code>). The currently-assigned values are:</p>
<p>| byte | name | meaning | |--------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | <code>0x00</code> | <code>HashSuiteNone</code> | no hash-family commitment (BLS-only certs) | | <code>0x01</code> | <code>HashSuiteSHA3NIST</code> | FIPS 202 + SP 800-185 family (SHAKE256 / cSHAKE256 / KMAC256 / TupleHash256) — the normative production suite | | <code>0x02</code> | <code>HashSuiteBLAKE3Legacy</code> | academic / federation-MPC profile; non-normative for NIST |</p>
<p><code>consensus/config.HashSuiteID</code> is the <strong>single source of truth</strong>. The wire copy in <code>consensus/pkg/wire.HashSuiteID</code> is a structural mirror for cert-envelope serialisation; downstream code MUST NOT define a third encoding. The byte is bound into the cert transcript (see <code>Certificate.TranscriptHash</code> and <code>quasar.computeRoundDigest</code>) so that flipping the byte post-signing breaks signature verification, not just a string-equality check.</p>
<p>The Warp 2.0 envelope (<code>lux/warp/envelope.go</code>) currently carries a <code>HashSuiteID string</code> field defaulting to <code>&quot;Pulsar-SHA3&quot;</code>. This is a <strong>deprecated</strong> parallel encoding inherited from the pre-pin era. It MUST migrate to the canonical <code>uint8</code> form by the <strong>2026-Aug-31 encoding-freeze gate</strong>:</p>
<ul><li>Producers SHOULD start emitting envelopes with the byte-form field</li></ul>
<p> (<code>HashSuiteID uint8</code>) in parallel during the transition window.</p>
<ul><li>Consumers MUST accept either form during the window and reject</li></ul>
<p> envelopes that disagree across the two forms.</p>
<ul><li>After 2026-Aug-31, the string form is removed; envelopes carrying</li></ul>
<p> only the legacy string field are rejected with <code>ErrEnvelopeBadSuiteID</code>. The default value <code>&quot;Pulsar-SHA3&quot;</code> maps exactly to <code>HashSuiteSHA3NIST (0x01)</code>; the legacy <code>&quot;Pulsar-BLAKE3&quot;</code> maps to <code>HashSuiteBLAKE3Legacy (0x02)</code>.</p>
<p>The migration MUST NOT change the value bound into the transcript hash of any cert produced before the freeze; the wire layout changes, the signed bytes do not.</p>
<h4>Configuration</h4>
<p>Three equivalent ways:</p>
<pre><code class="lang-go">// Explicit (any of the five modes):
params := config.DefaultParams().WithPQMode(config.PQModeQuasar)
// Boolean shorthand (collapses to extremes):
params := config.DefaultParams().WithPostQuantum(true)
// true -&gt; PQModeQuasar (strongest available)
// false -&gt; PQModeBLS (classical)
// for the middle three (corona / pulsar / mldsa) call WithPQMode.
// Env override (highest priority, no rebuild needed):
// LUX_CONSENSUS_PQ_MODE=quasar
mode, _ := config.PQModeFromEnv(config.PQModeQuasar)</code></pre>
<p><code>config.PQModeFromEnv</code> parses any canonical name or alias.</p>
<h3>PQ defaults for Hanzo mesh networks</h3>
<p>Network <code>1337</code> (primary local / dev) and any tenant network minted under HIP-0077 MUST default to <code>PostQuantum = true</code> (= <code>PQModeQuasar</code>). Rationale:</p>
<ul><li>The mesh&#x27;s identity layer already uses ML-DSA-65; the consensus</li></ul>
<p> layer running anything less than <code>Pulsar</code> would be a strictly weaker link in the same chain of trust.</p>
<ul><li>Corona keeps cert size O(1), so the cost of going from <code>Pulsar</code></li></ul>
<p> to <code>Quasar</code> is one extra threshold signature per finality round — well inside the budget for a mesh that expects ms-grade finality on a few-dozen-validator quorum.</p>
<ul><li>Defense-in-depth: a future break of either ML-DSA or Corona</li></ul>
<p> (lattice cryptanalysis advance) does not lose the mesh; <code>Quasar</code> is the only mode that survives loss of one lattice primitive.</p>
<p>Operators with a hard latency budget MAY opt down to <code>Pulsar</code> (threshold lattice only, no Z-Chain witness). Those needing every validator&#x27;s raw ML-DSA signature in the cert (auditor flow) MAY opt sideways to <code>MLDSA</code> — at the price of N·3309 B per cert. They MUST NOT opt down to <code>BLS</code> (no PQ surface) or <code>Corona</code> (trusted-dealer DKG, unsuitable for an open validator set) while participating in any production Hanzo mesh.</p>
<p>Decision tree for operators:</p>
<pre><code>open public chain (epoch rotation, no trusted dealer)?
no — fixed federation / bridge MPC
→ corona (academic BLAKE3, trusted dealer)
yes ↓
need any PQ?
no → bls (benchmark only; rejected on prod meshes)
yes ↓
need defense-in-depth (two lattice constructions)?
yes → quasar (Hanzo mesh default; degrades to mldsa if Z-Chain not wired)
no ↓
need every validator&#x27;s raw sig in the cert for audit?
yes → mldsa (per-validator ML-DSA, N*3309 B)
no → pulsar (production threshold lattice, SHA-3, O(1) cert)</code></pre>
<h3>Pulsar-M-65 production profile</h3>
<p>Pulsar-M (the M-LWE / ML-DSA-compatible threshold variant) is parameterised at the three FIPS 204 levels: <code>Pulsar-M-44</code>, <code>Pulsar-M-65</code>, <code>Pulsar-M-87</code>. The per-use-case mapping is fixed:</p>
<p>| use case | profile | rationale | |-----------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------| | Mainnet finality (per-block) | Pulsar-M-65 | NIST PQ Cat 3, balanced | | High-value roots (governance, bridges) | Pulsar-M-87 | NIST PQ Cat 5, low frequency | | Devnet / testnet / CI | Pulsar-M-44 | NIST PQ Cat 2, fast | | Audit / FIPS-only fallback | raw ML-DSA-65 | single-party, FIPS 204 module | | Federation / bridge MPC | Corona | trusted dealer, no DKG cost |</p>
<p><code>Pulsar-M-65</code> is the public-chain default. <code>Pulsar-M-87</code> is reserved for roots that ship at epoch / governance / bridge cadence (low TPS, high value). <code>Pulsar-M-44</code> is <strong>forbidden on the Lux primary network and any production Hanzo mesh</strong> — devnet / CI only — because Category 2 is below the floor Hanzo commits to for any chain that anchors real balances.</p>
<p>The fallback profiles (<code>raw ML-DSA-65</code> and <code>Corona</code>) MUST NOT be silently substituted for the Pulsar-M production profile on a public chain. They are explicit operator opt-ins, gated through the existing <code>PQMode</code> selection (<code>mldsa</code> and <code>corona</code> respectively).</p>
<h2>Specification</h2>
<h3>Identity</h3>
<p>Every device in the mesh derives its key material from one mnemonic in priority order: <code>MNEMONIC</code> &gt; <code>LUX_MNEMONIC</code> &gt; <code>LIGHT_MNEMONIC</code>. The last is the public dev fallback (<code>&quot;light light light light light light light light light light light energy&quot;</code>) used on network-id <code>&gt;= 1337</code>. Production deployments MUST set <code>MNEMONIC</code>.</p>
<p>The mnemonic produces a master seed via BIP-39 → BIP-32. From that seed two parallel keypairs exist for each device index <code>n</code>:</p>
<p>| derived | path | curve / scheme | use | |----------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------| | <code>device_pq_key[n]</code> | <code>m / 44&#x27; / 9000&#x27; / nid&#x27; / 0 / n</code> | ML-DSA-65 | Mesh identity: TXT address, handshake &amp; receipt signing | | <code>device_lux_key[n]</code> | <code>m / 44&#x27; / 9000&#x27; / nid&#x27; / 1 / n</code> | secp256k1 | Lux account: AI Coin balance, on-chain settlement |</p>
<ul><li><code>9000&#x27;</code> is the Lux SLIP-44 coin type.</li><li><code>nid&#x27;</code> is the Hanzo mesh network id (<code>1337&#x27;</code> for the primary local</li></ul>
<p> mesh; other values for tenant clusters).</p>
<ul><li>Branch <code>0</code> (PQ signing) and branch <code>1</code> (Lux account) keep mesh keys</li></ul>
<p> separate from spend keys.</p>
<ul><li>The ML-DSA-65 keypair is deterministically expanded from the BIP-32</li></ul>
<p> child seed via <code>SHAKE-256(seed)</code> → ML-DSA keygen RNG, per the procedure in <code>lux/crypto/mldsa</code> (single source of truth).</p>
<p>Per device:</p>
<p>| value | derivation | |-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| | <code>mldsa_pubkey</code> | verify key of <code>device_pq_key[n]</code> (~1952 B) | | <code>mldsa_address</code> | <code>RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(mldsa_pubkey))</code> → 20 bytes, hex-encoded | | <code>lux_address</code> | standard Lux account derivation from <code>device_lux_key[n]</code> |</p>
<p>The 20-byte <code>mldsa_address</code> is the short identifier carried in mDNS; the full pubkey is exchanged at handshake time where size doesn&#x27;t matter.</p>
<h3>mDNS TXT changes</h3>
<p>HIP-0069&#x27;s TXT record gains ONE REQUIRED key for <code>auth != none</code> roles and OPTIONAL for <code>auth=none</code>:</p>
<p>| key | example | |-----------|--------------------------------------| | <code>mldsa</code> | <code>&lt;40-hex-char address&gt;</code> |</p>
<p>We deliberately do NOT put a per-record ML-DSA signature in TXT — ML-DSA-65 signatures are ~3309 bytes, hostile to multicast. Binding is established at handshake time instead (next section). The TXT <code>mldsa</code> field is a public commitment: a server forging a stranger&#x27;s address can&#x27;t complete the handshake (doesn&#x27;t have the private key); a server using its own address is just a regular new peer.</p>
<h3>ZAP handshake</h3>
<p><code>MSG_HANDSHAKE_OK</code> from the server now carries a 32-byte random <code>nonce</code>. The client follows with a new message:</p>
<pre><code>MSG_AUTH = 0x03
payload = {
pubkey: &lt;ML-DSA-65 verify key, base64&gt;,
sig: &lt;ML-DSA.Sign(device_pq_key, server_id || nonce || client_role)&gt;,
}</code></pre>
<p>Server verifies:</p>
<ol><li><code>RIPEMD-160(SHA-256(pubkey)) == TXT.mldsa</code> (or, for inbound peers</li></ol>
<p> discovered via gossip, against the gossip record&#x27;s address).</p>
<ol><li><code>ML-DSA.Verify(pubkey, server_id || nonce || client_role, sig)</code>.</li></ol>
<p>Either check failing → server closes the socket. For roles with <code>auth=none</code> (<code>static</code>, <code>gateway</code> brochures) the auth round is SKIPPED entirely and any anonymous client is accepted.</p>
<p>This adds one round-trip on connect and one ~3.3 KB frame; for a long-lived ZAP session that&#x27;s negligible.</p>
<h3>Gossip — Lux consensus overlay</h3>
<p>Every device that wants to be reachable beyond its LAN runs a Lux consensus light client and publishes one record per role into a well-known namespace on network <code>&lt;nid&gt;</code>:</p>
<pre><code>namespace: hanzo/mesh/v1/&lt;nid&gt;/&lt;org&gt;
key: &lt;mldsa_address&gt;/&lt;role&gt;/&lt;server_id&gt;
value: {
addrs: [&quot;wss://hostname:port/&quot;, &quot;...&quot;],
proto: &quot;zap/1&quot;,
capabilities: [&quot;mcp&quot;,&quot;browser-bridge&quot;,&quot;...&quot;],
version: &quot;1.2.3&quot;,
pubkey: &lt;ML-DSA-65 verify key&gt;,
expires_at: &lt;unix-seconds&gt;,
sig: &lt;ML-DSA.Sign over canonical fields&gt;,
}</code></pre>
<p>Discovery rule:</p>
<ul><li><strong>Local first.</strong> Always browse <code>_hanzo._tcp.local.</code> for ≤ 2 s.</li><li><strong>Then gossip.</strong> Pull the namespace once at startup, then subscribe</li></ul>
<p> for deltas (Lux consensus&#x27;s standard subscription path — <code>wave</code> deltas committed under the <code>field</code> driver).</p>
<ul><li><strong>Dedup by <code>mldsa_address</code>.</strong> If the same address shows up on both</li></ul>
<p> LAN and gossip, prefer the LAN address (lower latency, smaller billed bytes).</p>
<p><code>expires_at</code> MUST be ≤ 5 minutes from publish; a peer refreshes its record well before expiry. The consensus pruner drops expired entries so the namespace stays bounded.</p>
<p>Use of consensus is intentional: the records are state that we want ordered, verifiable, and resistant to partition. We are not building a new gossip layer.</p>
<h3>Auto-funding the first 200 devices</h3>
<p>The Lux node genesis builder for network <code>1337</code> (and any other mesh network that opts in) MUST pre-allocate balance to the first 200 addresses derived from <code>LIGHT_MNEMONIC</code> on the <strong>Lux</strong> branch (<code>device_lux_key[0..199]</code>). Allocation tables:</p>
<p>| chain | source | per-address allocation | |-------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------| | P | LIGHT_MNEMONIC P-chain genesis balance × 0.001 | 1 000 LUX (testnet units) | | X | LIGHT_MNEMONIC X-chain genesis balance × 0.001 | 1 000 LUX (testnet units) | | C | LIGHT_MNEMONIC C-chain (EVM) balance × 0.001 | 1 000 LUX (testnet units) |</p>
<p>Numbers are per-network parameters; the table above is the network <code>1337</code> default. Real production networks pick their own.</p>
<p>Why 200: empirically covers &quot;one developer&#x27;s fleet&quot; — laptop, desktop, phone, ~10 dev containers, ~10 browsers, plus headroom for short-lived ephemeral containers. Past 200, devices fund themselves from one of the funded principal accounts via standard Lux transfers — still automatic, but on-chain.</p>
<p>Implementation lives in <code>lux/genesis</code> and is invoked once at network boot. Sibling tooling in <code>hanzo-cli</code>:</p>
<pre><code>$ hanzo dev fund-status
device lux_address balance
0 lux1qzv...3kx 1000.0 LUX
1 lux1qd9...8mq 1000.0 LUX
…
199 lux1qy7...0aw 1000.0 LUX</code></pre>
<p>A device pulls its index from <code>HANZO_DEVICE_INDEX</code> (default <code>0</code>, distinct per machine via container UUID hash mod 200). On first boot it queries its own balance; if zero, it transfers from a sibling-funded device or surfaces a clear &quot;you&#x27;ve exceeded the auto-funded set, top up&quot; error.</p>
<h3>Payments</h3>
<p>Each MCP tool MAY advertise a price in its description object:</p>
<pre><code class="lang-json">{
&quot;name&quot;: &quot;engine.completion&quot;,
&quot;description&quot;: &quot;...&quot;,
&quot;inputSchema&quot;: {...},
&quot;price&quot;: { &quot;unit&quot;: &quot;1_token_in_out&quot;, &quot;currency&quot;: &quot;AI&quot;, &quot;amount&quot;: &quot;0.0001&quot; }
}</code></pre>
<p>Currency is HIP-0001 AI Coin by default; tenant clusters MAY use other Lux-native assets.</p>
<p>Call protocol:</p>
<ol><li>Consumer issues <code>tools/call</code> with a <code>payment</code> field carrying a</li></ol>
<p> signed <em>promise</em> — <code>{ from_lux, to_lux, max_cost, nonce, mldsa_sig }</code> — payable on settlement.</p>
<ol><li>Provider runs the tool, computes actual cost (within <code>max_cost</code>),</li></ol>
<p> returns the result plus a <em>receipt</em> — <code>{ promise_hash, actual_cost, mldsa_sig }</code> signed by <code>device_pq_key</code>.</p>
<ol><li>Either party MAY submit the (promise, receipt) pair to the</li></ol>
<p> payments contract on network <code>&lt;nid&gt;</code>. The contract verifies both ML-DSA signatures and transfers <code>actual_cost</code> from <code>from_lux</code> to <code>to_lux</code>.</p>
<p>For sub-cent calls the receipt sits in a buffer; the provider batches receipts and submits one settlement transaction per epoch (amortising the on-chain cost across thousands of calls). HIP-0018 defines the wider payments surface; this section pins the receipt shape to MCP tool calls specifically.</p>
<p>Refunds, disputes, and slashing for forged receipts: see HIP-0018.</p>
<h3>AI mining</h3>
<p>A device that wants to monetise spare compute publishes an MCP role (<code>role=engine</code>, <code>role=node</code>, etc.) advertising prices below market. HMM (HIP-0008) reads the gossip namespace and routes inference jobs to the cheapest verified peer matching the request&#x27;s capability set. Verification is via the same receipt mechanism: the provider&#x27;s ML-DSA signature on the (input, output) pair is sufficient for honest clients; clients suspecting a Byzantine provider may run a quorum of three peers and slash any minority answer.</p>
<h3>Containers as the compute unit</h3>
<p>Zoo/Hanzo Container runtime (<code>hanzoai/container</code>) MUST, at boot:</p>
<ol><li>Derive its <code>device_pq_key</code> and <code>device_lux_key</code> using</li></ol>
<p> <code>&lt;device_index&gt;</code> = the container&#x27;s stable UUID hashed to a u32 (mod 200 for the auto-funded slot; or &gt; 200 if the orchestrator pre-allocated).</p>
<ol><li>Publish via <code>_hanzo._tcp.local.</code> on the host network and (if the</li></ol>
<p> network policy allows) gossip.</p>
<ol><li>Sign every <code>tools/call</code> receipt with <code>device_pq_key</code>.</li></ol>
<p>When the container exits cleanly, it withdraws its gossip record; when it crashes, the <code>expires_at</code> window evicts it within 5 minutes.</p>
<h3>Backwards compatibility</h3>
<p>A peer advertising HIP-0069 TXT without <code>mldsa</code> is refused for every role that carries authority. <code>auth=none</code> names a peer that asks for nothing and is answered in kind; it is not a grace period.</p>
<p>The on-chain gossip namespace and the auto-funding pre-allocation are pure additions. Devices opting out of gossip remain visible on their own LAN only — degraded but functional.</p>
<h2>Reference implementation</h2>
<p>Per language, one new module sits beside the HIP-0069 binding:</p>
<p>| layer | package | |--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------| | Identity | <code>hanzo-zap-identity</code> (Python, TS, Go, Rust, Swift) | | Gossip | <code>hanzo-zap-gossip</code> (thin client over <code>luxfi/consensus</code>) | | Payments | <code>hanzo-zap-pay</code> (consumer + provider helpers) |</p>
<p>Genesis tooling: <code>lux/genesis</code> gains a <code>--hanzo-auto-fund</code> flag for network builders that pre-allocates the first 200 device addresses.</p>
<p><code>hanzo-mcp</code> MUST import all three runtime bindings; non-MCP roles MAY import only the subset they use (a static-asset server doesn&#x27;t need payments).</p>
<p>Reference repos: <code>~/work/zap/identity</code>, <code>~/work/zap/gossip</code>, <code>~/work/zap/pay</code>. ML-DSA-65 primitive is reused from <code>~/work/lux/crypto/mldsa</code> — exactly one ML-DSA implementation in the Hanzo + Lux tree.</p>
<h2>Security considerations</h2>
<ul><li><strong>Mnemonic blast radius.</strong> One mnemonic keys every device. Loss</li></ul>
<p> means total compromise. The <code>MNEMONIC</code> env var MUST come from KMS in production deployments; never plaintext on disk. The <code>LIGHT_MNEMONIC</code> is public-by-design and used only on dev / primary local networks.</p>
<ul><li><strong>Handshake replay.</strong> TXT <code>mldsa</code> is a static address; a sniffed</li></ul>
<p> TXT is not exploitable because the connecting peer must produce a fresh ML-DSA signature over the server-supplied nonce. Roles with <code>auth=none</code> (<code>static</code>, <code>gateway</code> brochures) skip auth because nothing sensitive is exposed.</p>
<ul><li><strong>Receipt forgery.</strong> A provider could over-bill via a fake receipt.</li></ul>
<p> Receipts are ML-DSA-signed by the same key that signed the discovery handshake, so the consumer can refuse and the on-chain contract rejects unsigned receipts. For high-value calls, the consumer SHOULD request a quorum.</p>
<ul><li><strong>Gossip spam.</strong> A malicious peer could flood the namespace with</li></ul>
<p> bogus records. Lux consensus rate-limits per account at the protocol level; per-<code>mldsa_address</code> write-throttle is applied during the <code>wave</code> voting round.</p>
<ul><li><strong>Network-id confusion.</strong> <code>1337</code> is reserved for dev. Production</li></ul>
<p> tenants MUST use a network-id assigned by the Hanzo registry. Consumers SHOULD pin <code>nid</code> at startup; cross-network bridging requires explicit operator opt-in.</p>
<ul><li><strong>Auto-funded blast radius.</strong> The first 200 LIGHT_MNEMONIC indices</li></ul>
<p> are publicly known; their balances on network <code>1337</code> are testnet-only and have no value beyond the dev mesh. Production networks MUST NOT pre-allocate from a public mnemonic.</p>
<ul><li><strong>PQ-only path.</strong> Per HIP-0005, classical schemes (Ed25519, BLS</li></ul>
<p> alone) MUST NOT appear in the handshake-auth or receipt-signing path. ML-DSA-65 is the single primitive. BLS may continue to appear in consensus aggregation per Quasar <code>PQModeBLSPlusMLDSA</code>.</p>
<h2>Adoption order</h2>
<ol><li>Identity-only: <code>hanzo_zap_mdns.publish</code> ships ML-DSA address in</li></ol>
<p> TXT (small change). Consumers log-but-accept missing addresses for one release, then enforce.</p>
<ol><li>Handshake: ZAP server + client gain the AUTH step. Roll out</li></ol>
<p> server-side first (accept-anonymous), then client-side (always sign), then make server-side reject anonymous for auth-required roles.</p>
<ol><li>Genesis pre-fund: land in <code>lux/genesis</code> for network <code>1337</code> and any</li></ol>
<p> new tenant network being launched after this date.</p>
<ol><li>Gossip: <code>hanzo-mcp</code>, <code>hanzo-desktop</code>, <code>hanzo-node</code> add the Lux</li></ol>
<p> light client.</p>
<ol><li>Payments: <code>hanzo-engine</code> first (highest call volume); HMM routes</li></ol>
<p> real load through receipts; remaining roles enable as priced APIs come online.</p>
<ol><li>Containers: <code>hanzoai/container</code> gains the boot-time identity step;</li></ol>
<p> downstream zoo / hanzo deployments inherit automatically.</p>
<p>Each step is a 5-to-30-line change in the service&#x27;s startup path, mirroring the HIP-0069 adoption shape. One mnemonic, three bindings, six steps.</p>
<h2>NIST process posture</h2>
<p>NIST does three separate things; conflating them produces wrong expectations:</p>
<p>| process | what it does for us | reality in 2026 | |---|---|---| | FIPS PQC standardization (FIPS 203/204/205/206/207, SP 800-208) | algorithm becomes a NIST-approved primitive | See per-standard table below. ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) are the two FIPS-final PQ signatures today; XMSS / LMS (SP 800-208) cover the stateful-HBS lane. | | MPTC threshold call (NIST IR 8214C) | threshold schemes submitted as reference material for public analysis | <strong>active now.</strong> IR 8214C published January 2026. First-call package deadline expected 2026-Nov-16; preview writeup deadline 2026-Jul-20. 26 first-round preview writeups already submitted from 23 teams. | | CAVP / CMVP | a specific module implementing approved algorithms is FIPS 140-3 validated | unchanged. CMVP requires an applicable approved standard + an ACVP / CAVP test path. A non-standard threshold variant cannot ride this lane until NIST creates an applicable approved threshold standard. |</p>
<p>NIST PQC standardisation snapshot (2026-05):</p>
<p>| standard | algorithm | role | status | |---|---|---|---| | FIPS 203 | ML-KEM (formerly Kyber) | KEM | final, August 2024 | | FIPS 204 | ML-DSA (formerly Dilithium) | signature | final, August 2024 | | FIPS 205 | SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+) | signature, hash-based | final, August 2024 | | FIPS 206 | FN-DSA (formerly Falcon) | signature | IPD published 2025-10; public-comment period closed 2026-01; final draft pending | | FIPS 207 (planned) | HQC-KEM | KEM, code-based backup to ML-KEM | selected 2025-03; draft expected 2026-2027 | | SP 800-208 | XMSS / LMS (stateful HBS) | signature, hash-based | final; approved with stateful-key-management caveats |</p>
<h3>Per-mode NIST positioning</h3>
<p>| Pulsar-M (M-LWE) | target Class N1 (signing) + N4 (ML keygen / DKG) — IF the threshold-produced signature verifies under unmodified FIPS 204 ML-DSA.Verify. Output interchangeability is the headline pitch. Falls back to Class S if interchangeability cannot be achieved. | | Pulsar (R-LWE) | target Class S1/S4 — special threshold-friendly primitive. Not output-interchangeable with any NIST-approved primitive. Submitted alongside Pulsar-M but with a different framing. | | Corona (R-LWE academic) | not submitted. Federation-MPC use case only. Trusted-dealer DKG + BLAKE3 hash both rule it out of MPTC. | | ML-DSA-65 raw | already FIPS 204; we ship as the audit / FIPS-spirit fallback (the <code>mldsa</code> PQMode). No NIST submission needed; we just consume the standard. | | BLS-12-381 | not on any NIST track. Used for the classical fast path only; no FIPS claim. |</p>
<p>Pulsar-M boots as <code>~/work/lux/pulsar-m</code>. The repo structure follows NIST IR 8214C §5 package requirements: technical specification, reference implementation, experimental-evaluation report, notes on patent claims, open-source license, build/test/benchmark scripts, I/O test vectors, public repository.</p>
<h3>Calendar</h3>
<pre><code>NOW → 2026-Jul-20 preview writeup
2026-Jul-21 → 2026-Aug first reference impl + KATs
2026-Sep experimental-evaluation report + ePrint v0.1
2026-Oct external cryptanalysis engagement begins (rolling)
2026-Nov-16 MPTC package submission (NIST first call)
2027 public-analysis response, revisions
2028+ if NIST publishes an approved threshold standard, CMVP track opens</code></pre>
<h2>Related HIPs — layered architecture</h2>
<blockquote><p>The Z-Chain PQ rollup is specified in HIP-0078; the Q-Chain finality block format is in HIP-0079; the Pulsar-M threshold-signing primitive is in HIP-0084. This HIP (0077) is the umbrella; refer to the three child HIPs for the layered architecture.</p></blockquote>
<h2>References</h2>
<p>Canonical citations (verified against ePrint and conference proceedings):</p>
<ul><li><strong>Corona</strong>, Boschini, Kaviani, Lai, Malavolta, Takahashi, Tibouchi —</li></ul>
<p> <em>&quot;Corona: Practical Two-Round Threshold Signatures from Learning with Errors&quot;</em> — Cryptology ePrint Archive 2024/1113.</p>
<ul><li><strong>GKS24</strong>, Gür, Katz, Silde — *&quot;Two-Round Threshold Lattice-Based</li></ul>
<p> Signatures from Threshold Homomorphic Encryption&quot;* — PQCrypto 2024, ePrint 2023/1318.</p>
<ul><li><strong>DOTT21</strong>, Damgård, Orlandi, Takahashi, Tibouchi — *&quot;Two-Round</li></ul>
<p> n-out-of-n and Multi-Signatures and Trapdoor Commitment from Lattices&quot;* — PKC 2021, ePrint 2020/1110.</p>
<ul><li><strong>HJKY97</strong>, Herzberg, Jakobsson, Jarecki, Krawczyk, Yung — *&quot;Proactive</li></ul>
<p> public key and signature systems&quot;* — ACM CCS 1997. Mobile-adversary model for proactive resharing.</p>
<ul><li><strong>FIPS 204</strong>, NIST — *&quot;Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature</li></ul>
<p> Standard&quot;* — August 2024.</p>
<ul><li><strong>FIPS 202</strong> + <strong>SP 800-185</strong>, NIST — SHA-3 family + cSHAKE / KMAC /</li></ul>
<p> TupleHash derived functions.</p>
<ul><li><strong>NIST IR 8214C</strong>, NIST — *&quot;First Call for Multi-Party Threshold</li></ul>
<p> Schemes&quot;* — January 2026.</p>
<ul><li><strong>Olingo</strong>, ePrint 2025/1789 — competing threshold ML-DSA candidate.</li><li><strong>THED</strong>, ePrint 2026/638 — competing threshold lattice signature.</li></ul>
<p>Tracked in <code>~/work/lux/pulsar-m/spec/references.bib</code> so the spec PDF and the HIP both cite from the same authoritative source.</p>
<footer>
<div class="fmap">
<div><b>Build</b>
<a href="https://hanzo.app">hanzo.app</a> app builder
<a href="https://hanzo.codes">hanzo.codes</a> code with an agent
<a href="https://hanzoskills.com">hanzoskills.com</a> what an agent reads</div>
<div><b>Run</b>
<a href="https://console.hanzo.ai">console.hanzo.ai</a> cloud console
<a href="https://api.hanzo.ai">api.hanzo.ai</a> the API</div>
<div><b>Account</b>
<a href="https://hanzo.id">hanzo.id</a> sign in
<a href="https://pay.hanzo.ai">pay.hanzo.ai</a> top up
<a href="https://billing.hanzo.ai">billing.hanzo.ai</a> invoices and usage</div>
<div><b>Company</b>
<a href="https://hanzo.ai">hanzo.ai</a> canonical
<a href="https://hanzo.ventures">hanzo.ventures</a> ventures</div>
</div>
<div class="fend"><a href="/hip-0077.md">This page as plain text</a> · <a href="/llms.txt">Index for agents</a></div>
</footer>
</div></body></html>