Four MIT collections ported — growthOS, openclaw-marketing-skills, Marketing-Skills and pm-skills — as 160 skills, 12 agents and 45 commands, each naming its origin in its own frontmatter so the tree can be checked against THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES rather than trusted. Sixteen names appeared in more than one collection and none of the copies were identical; the longest wins, which lands on the more developed text where they genuinely diverge. A fifth collection is deliberately absent. awesome-growth-hacking-skills carries NO licence, which leaves its author every right by default — and it is a list of links rather than a collection of skills, so there is nothing in it to port and no permission to port it with. It is cited as a directory to read. THE CONNECTOR SKILLS ARE REWRITTEN, not ported. They arrived installing vendor SDKs, running OAuth flows of their own, and ending with long-lived credentials in JSON files under .agents/ and ~/.growthos/ at mode 600. That is a secret on a disk with no rotation path, protected from other users and not from the agent — and one auth implementation per skill. Hanzo holds these connectors in Go, per user, sealed in KMS, so `connect` is the one home for the flow and the platform skills defer to it by provider id: google_ads, meta_ads, x. It is reachable as HTTP or as MCP tools at api.hanzo.ai/v1/mcp — the same routes, typed once in Go, so a tool and a curl cannot disagree. Two had nothing real behind them and now say so. There is no search_console provider, so that skill names what does answer the same questions (google_analytics, google_bigquery) and states that the remedy is a provider in hanzoai/cloud rather than a vendor SDK here. And getxapi-connect was a wrapper around a paid reseller of X's public data with the vendor's key in an env var; it is `listen` now, on our own x connector — a skill named after a vendor makes the vendor the capability and dies with it. The skills referenced paths that only existed inside the source repo, so the shared material they read is ported to reference/ and the paths rewritten. Three skills need the growthOS APPLICATION rather than its data; per the estate's own split an application belongs in hanzoai/ads, social, email or sms as a cloud plugin, so those three say what they need instead of carrying an import that resolves to nothing. Third-party product names are out of our prose and kept in the notices, which is where the licence requires them and the only place they belong. A skill's persona names a role, not somebody else's product. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
4.2 KiB
Sub-case: security review
A specialisation of the parent engine. The anchor changes, and one refutation rule is inverted relative to correctness — read that section before running this sub-case alongside another.
Anchor: source → trust boundary → sink, with an attacker who controls the source.
The agreement being tested is between what a component trusts and what an attacker can supply. Where correctness asks "can this happen", security asks "can someone make this happen on purpose" — and an adversary will construct the unlikely execution deliberately.
Where the procedure lives
/security-audit-static owns the full specialised procedure — entry-point mapping, the four
high-value paths, the keep/drop rule with its attacker-and-victim test, the OWASP Top 10 coverage
backstop, and the high-miss checklist. Run it rather than restating it. This file exists to say
what changes when security is selected as a dimension of a code review, and to supply the part of the
engine that survives when the application has no web surface at all.
The universal core
Applies to a CLI, a library, a daemon, a build tool — anything without an HTTP handler in sight.
- Trust boundaries — every point where data crosses from a less-trusted origin into a more-trusted context: arguments, environment, config files, stdin, filenames, archive members, network responses, plugin and extension surfaces, deserialised state, and model output.
- Sinks — where a value becomes an instruction rather than data: process execution, dynamic evaluation, query construction, path resolution, template rendering, deserialisation, outbound requests, permission and role writes, and logging.
- Injection by representation confusion — a value interpreted in the syntax of the sink rather than as an opaque datum. Encode for the sink, not at the input. This is the same disagreement as correctness lens 10 (representation and information loss), with an adversary steering it.
- Validator/consumer differentials — the check and the use disagree about what the value means: unanchored patterns, prefix allowlists, normalisation applied on one side only, validation on one representation and execution on another.
- Fail-open paths — error, timeout, cancellation, cache-miss and boundary branches that default to allow. Correctness lens 12 finds these; security decides what they cost.
- Secrets and sensitive data in transit to the wrong place — logs, traces, error bodies, temporary files, crash dumps, and anything an unprivileged local user can read.
- Privilege and identity — which principal an operation runs as, whether the check and the action name the same object, and what happens when they do not.
The inverted refutation rule
Under correctness, a defect that harms only the person who triggered it is still a defect. Under security it usually is not a finding: if the only victim is the attacker, on their own machine, account, tenant or data, and no shared system or privilege boundary is crossed, drop it.
The carve-outs where that refutation is forbidden — outbound-network sinks, shared billing or
quota, data exposure, cross-tenant or cross-principal flows, and server-side execution or rendering —
are listed in /security-audit-static. Use its list; do not reinvent one.
Do not let the two rules leak into each other. Running both dimensions in one review, keep the tests separate per finding: a defect dropped as a security finding may still be a correctness finding with a real consequence, and should be reported as one.
What makes a security finding
The parent skill's five requirements, with the trigger read adversarially:
- A supported obligation — the trust assumption, and what establishes it.
- A feasible execution — including who the attacker is and what they control.
- A concrete contradiction — the boundary that fails to hold.
- An observable consequence — naming the victim, who must not be only the attacker.
- An examined counterargument — a real check at the sink, an unreachable path, an upstream validator, or a non-dangerous sink.
Findings are code-review results, not confirmed exploits. Say so.