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Found by recording a real page in a real browser and grepping the payload for canaries, which is the only test that can find these. All three passed review and passed the suite. maskAllInputs is NOT "mask everything". rrweb reads `true` as "use MY hardcoded type list instead of yours", and that list has no `hidden` — so the table this package passed was discarded and a hidden input's value serialized in full. A CSRF token rode out in the FullSnapshot of a login form (reproduced, canary `CSRF-LEAK-CANARY-…`). Passing `false` plus our own complete table keeps the decision in maskInput(), which already refuses SECURE_TYPES whatever the mode says. Same policy, one authority, and `hidden`/`checkbox`/`radio`/`file` are in the table now — the types carrying a value the user never typed and never sees. A secret key was accepted. `publishable()` existed and only the beacon path consulted it, so an `sk-` key was refused on unload and sent in an Authorization header on every other batch. The test named "refuses to start without a publishable key" only ever asserted the empty string. record() now refuses any non-`pk-` key, so a secret has no carrier out of the browser rather than one carrier that happens to refuse it. The rrweb escape hatch is spread first, so an option the gate does not NAME is one the caller can still set. recordCrossOriginIframes (another origin's DOM, which our policy cannot reach inside to mask), collectFonts and plugins are now pinned, as are blockClass/ignoreClass/maskTextClass — renaming those silently disarms every rr-block already written into the app's markup. Each fix has a test that fails against the previous commit; verified by running the new tests against it (4 failed, 66 passed). Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>