mirror of
https://github.com/hanzoai/visor.git
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Make existing mutex and atomic ownership explicit for networking state. Annotate self-locking helpers and synchronous forwarding paths, keeping queue references and callback lifetime requirements in their comments. Document collection, callback and helper identity limits where the checker cannot enforce the existing ownership contract. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
739 lines
23 KiB
Go
739 lines
23 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2018 The gVisor Authors.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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package tcp
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import (
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"container/list"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"encoding/binary"
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"fmt"
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"hash"
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"io"
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"time"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/header"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/ports"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/seqnum"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/tcpip/stack"
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"gvisor.dev/gvisor/pkg/waiter"
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)
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const (
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// tsLen is the length, in bits, of the timestamp in the SYN cookie.
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tsLen = 8
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// tsMask is a mask for timestamp values (i.e., tsLen bits).
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tsMask = (1 << tsLen) - 1
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// tsOffset is the offset, in bits, of the timestamp in the SYN cookie.
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tsOffset = 24
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// hashMask is the mask for hash values (i.e., tsOffset bits).
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hashMask = (1 << tsOffset) - 1
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// maxTSDiff is the maximum allowed difference between a received cookie
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// timestamp and the current timestamp. If the difference is greater
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// than maxTSDiff, the cookie is expired.
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maxTSDiff = 2
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)
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var (
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// mssTable is a slice containing the possible MSS values that we
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// encode in the SYN cookie with two bits.
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mssTable = []uint16{536, 1300, 1440, 1460}
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)
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func encodeMSS(mss uint16) uint32 {
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for i := len(mssTable) - 1; i > 0; i-- {
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if mss >= mssTable[i] {
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return uint32(i)
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}
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}
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return 0
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}
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// listenContext is used by a listening endpoint to store state used while
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// listening for connections. This struct is allocated by the listen goroutine
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// and must not be accessed or have its methods called concurrently as they
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// may mutate the stored objects.
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type listenContext struct {
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stack *stack.Stack
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protocol *protocol
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// rcvWnd is the receive window that is sent by this listening context
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// in the initial SYN-ACK.
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rcvWnd seqnum.Size
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// nonce are random bytes that are initialized once when the context
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// is created and used to seed the hash function when generating
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// the SYN cookie.
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nonce [2][sha1.BlockSize]byte
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// listenEP is a reference to the listening endpoint associated with
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// this context. Can be nil if the context is created by the forwarder.
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listenEP *Endpoint
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hasherMu hasherMutex
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// hasher is the hash function used to generate a SYN cookie.
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//
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// +checklocks:hasherMu
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hasher hash.Hash
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// v6Only is true if listenEP is a dual stack socket and has the
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// IPV6_V6ONLY option set.
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v6Only bool
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// netProto indicates the network protocol(IPv4/v6) for the listening
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// endpoint.
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netProto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber
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}
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// timeStamp returns an 8-bit timestamp with a granularity of 64 seconds.
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func timeStamp(clock tcpip.Clock) uint32 {
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return uint32(clock.NowMonotonic().Sub(tcpip.MonotonicTime{}).Seconds()) >> 6 & tsMask
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}
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// newListenContext creates a new listen context.
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func newListenContext(stk *stack.Stack, protocol *protocol, listenEP *Endpoint, rcvWnd seqnum.Size, v6Only bool, netProto tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber) *listenContext {
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l := &listenContext{
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stack: stk,
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protocol: protocol,
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rcvWnd: rcvWnd,
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hasher: sha1.New(),
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v6Only: v6Only,
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netProto: netProto,
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listenEP: listenEP,
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}
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for i := range l.nonce {
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(stk.SecureRNG().Reader, l.nonce[i][:]); err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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}
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return l
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}
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// cookieHash calculates the cookieHash for the given id, timestamp and nonce
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// index. The hash is used to create and validate cookies.
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//
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// +checklocksexclude:l.hasherMu
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func (l *listenContext) cookieHash(id stack.TransportEndpointID, ts uint32, nonceIndex int) uint32 {
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// Initialize block with fixed-size data: local ports and v.
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var payload [8]byte
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(payload[0:], id.LocalPort)
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(payload[2:], id.RemotePort)
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(payload[4:], ts)
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// Feed everything to the hasher.
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l.hasherMu.Lock()
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l.hasher.Reset()
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// Per hash.Hash.Writer:
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//
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// It never returns an error.
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l.hasher.Write(payload[:])
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l.hasher.Write(l.nonce[nonceIndex][:])
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l.hasher.Write(id.LocalAddress.AsSlice())
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l.hasher.Write(id.RemoteAddress.AsSlice())
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// Finalize the calculation of the hash and return the first 4 bytes.
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h := l.hasher.Sum(nil)
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l.hasherMu.Unlock()
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return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(h[:])
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}
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// createCookie creates a SYN cookie for the given id and incoming sequence
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// number.
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//
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// +checklocksexclude:l.hasherMu
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func (l *listenContext) createCookie(id stack.TransportEndpointID, seq seqnum.Value, data uint32) seqnum.Value {
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ts := timeStamp(l.stack.Clock())
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v := l.cookieHash(id, 0, 0) + uint32(seq) + (ts << tsOffset)
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v += (l.cookieHash(id, ts, 1) + data) & hashMask
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return seqnum.Value(v)
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}
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// isCookieValid checks if the supplied cookie is valid for the given id and
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// sequence number. If it is, it also returns the data originally encoded in the
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// cookie when createCookie was called.
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//
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// +checklocksexclude:l.hasherMu
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func (l *listenContext) isCookieValid(id stack.TransportEndpointID, cookie seqnum.Value, seq seqnum.Value) (uint32, bool) {
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ts := timeStamp(l.stack.Clock())
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v := uint32(cookie) - l.cookieHash(id, 0, 0) - uint32(seq)
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cookieTS := v >> tsOffset
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if ((ts - cookieTS) & tsMask) > maxTSDiff {
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return 0, false
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}
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return (v - l.cookieHash(id, cookieTS, 1)) & hashMask, true
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}
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// createConnectingEndpoint creates a new endpoint in a connecting state, with
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// the connection parameters given by the arguments. The newly created endpoint
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// will be locked.
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// +checklocksacquire:n.mu
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func (l *listenContext) createConnectingEndpoint(s *segment, rcvdSynOpts header.TCPSynOptions, queue *waiter.Queue) (n *Endpoint, _ tcpip.Error) {
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// Create a new endpoint.
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netProto := l.netProto
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if netProto == 0 {
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netProto = s.pkt.NetworkProtocolNumber
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}
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route, err := l.stack.FindRoute(s.pkt.NICID, s.pkt.Network().DestinationAddress(), s.pkt.Network().SourceAddress(), s.pkt.NetworkProtocolNumber, false /* multicastLoop */)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err // +checklocksignore
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}
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n = newEndpoint(l.stack, l.protocol, netProto, queue)
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n.mu.Lock()
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n.ops.SetV6Only(l.v6Only)
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n.TransportEndpointInfo.ID = s.id
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n.boundNICID = s.pkt.NICID
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n.route = route
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n.effectiveNetProtos = []tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber{s.pkt.NetworkProtocolNumber}
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n.ops.SetReceiveBufferSize(int64(l.rcvWnd), false /* notify */)
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n.amss = calculateAdvertisedMSS(n.userMSS, n.route)
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n.setEndpointState(StateConnecting)
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n.maybeEnableTimestamp(rcvdSynOpts)
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n.maybeEnableSACKPermitted(rcvdSynOpts)
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n.initGSO()
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// Bootstrap the auto tuning algorithm. Starting at zero will result in
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// a large step function on the first window adjustment causing the
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// window to grow to a really large value.
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initWnd := n.initialReceiveWindow()
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n.rcvQueueMu.Lock()
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n.RcvAutoParams.PrevCopiedBytes = initWnd
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n.rcvQueueMu.Unlock()
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return n, nil
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}
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// startHandshake creates a new endpoint in connecting state and then sends
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// the SYN-ACK for the TCP 3-way handshake. It returns the state of the
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// handshake in progress, which includes the new endpoint in the SYN-RCVD
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// state.
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//
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// On success, a handshake h is returned.
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//
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// NOTE: h.ep.mu is not held and must be acquired if any state needs to be
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// modified.
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//
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// Precondition: if l.listenEP != nil, l.listenEP.mu must be locked.
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func (l *listenContext) startHandshake(s *segment, opts header.TCPSynOptions, queue *waiter.Queue, owner tcpip.PacketOwner) (h *handshake, _ tcpip.Error) {
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// Create new endpoint.
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irs := s.sequenceNumber
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isn := generateSecureISN(s.id, l.stack.Clock(), l.protocol.seqnumSecret)
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ep, err := l.createConnectingEndpoint(s, opts, queue)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err // +checklocksignore
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}
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ep.owner = owner
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// listenEP is nil when listenContext is used by tcp.Forwarder.
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deferAccept := time.Duration(0)
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if l.listenEP != nil {
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if l.listenEP.EndpointState() != StateListen {
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// Ensure we release any registrations done by the newly
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// created endpoint.
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ep.mu.Unlock()
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ep.Close()
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return nil, &tcpip.ErrConnectionAborted{} // +checklocksignore
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}
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// Propagate any inheritable options from the listening endpoint
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// to the newly created endpoint.
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l.listenEP.propagateInheritableOptionsLocked(ep) // +checklocksforce:ep.mu
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if !ep.reserveTupleLocked() {
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ep.mu.Unlock()
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ep.Close()
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return nil, &tcpip.ErrConnectionAborted{} // +checklocksignore
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}
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deferAccept = l.listenEP.deferAccept
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}
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// Register new endpoint so that packets are routed to it.
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if err := ep.stack.RegisterTransportEndpoint(
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ep.effectiveNetProtos,
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ProtocolNumber,
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ep.TransportEndpointInfo.ID,
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ep,
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ep.boundPortFlags,
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ep.boundBindToDevice,
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); err != nil {
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ep.mu.Unlock()
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ep.Close()
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ep.drainClosingSegmentQueue()
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return nil, err // +checklocksignore
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}
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ep.isRegistered = true
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// Initialize and start the handshake.
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h = ep.newPassiveHandshake(isn, irs, opts, deferAccept)
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h.listenEP = l.listenEP
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h.start()
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h.ep.mu.Unlock()
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return h, nil
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}
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// performHandshake performs a TCP 3-way handshake. On success, the new
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// established endpoint is returned.
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//
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// Precondition: if l.listenEP != nil, l.listenEP.mu must be locked.
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func (l *listenContext) performHandshake(s *segment, opts header.TCPSynOptions, queue *waiter.Queue, owner tcpip.PacketOwner) (*Endpoint, tcpip.Error) {
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waitEntry, notifyCh := waiter.NewChannelEntry(waiter.WritableEvents)
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queue.EventRegister(&waitEntry)
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defer queue.EventUnregister(&waitEntry)
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h, err := l.startHandshake(s, opts, queue, owner)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// performHandshake is used by the Forwarder which will block till the
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// handshake either succeeds or fails. We do this by registering for
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// events above and block on the notification channel.
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<-notifyCh
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ep := h.ep
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ep.mu.Lock()
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if !ep.EndpointState().connected() {
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ep.stack.Stats().TCP.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment()
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ep.stats.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment()
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ep.h = nil
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ep.mu.Unlock()
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ep.Close()
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ep.notifyAborted()
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ep.drainClosingSegmentQueue()
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err := ep.LastError()
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if err == nil {
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// If err was nil then return the best error we can to indicate
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// a connection failure.
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err = &tcpip.ErrConnectionAborted{}
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}
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return nil, err
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}
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ep.isConnectNotified = true
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// Transfer any state from the completed handshake to the endpoint.
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//
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// Update the receive window scaling. We can't do it before the
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// handshake because it's possible that the peer doesn't support window
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// scaling.
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ep.rcv.RcvWndScale = ep.h.effectiveRcvWndScale()
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// Clean up handshake state stored in the endpoint so that it can be
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// GCed.
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ep.h = nil
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ep.mu.Unlock()
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return ep, nil
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}
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// propagateInheritableOptionsLocked propagates any options set on the listening
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// endpoint to the newly created endpoint.
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//
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// +checklocks:e.mu
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// +checklocks:n.mu
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func (e *Endpoint) propagateInheritableOptionsLocked(n *Endpoint) {
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n.userTimeout = e.userTimeout
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n.portFlags = e.portFlags
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n.boundBindToDevice = e.boundBindToDevice
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n.boundPortFlags = e.boundPortFlags
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n.userMSS = e.userMSS
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n.ops.SetMark(e.ops.GetMark())
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}
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// reserveTupleLocked reserves an accepted endpoint's tuple.
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//
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// Precondition: e.propagateInheritableOptionsLocked has been called.
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//
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// +checklocks:e.mu
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func (e *Endpoint) reserveTupleLocked() bool {
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dest := tcpip.FullAddress{
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Addr: e.TransportEndpointInfo.ID.RemoteAddress,
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Port: e.TransportEndpointInfo.ID.RemotePort,
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}
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portRes := ports.Reservation{
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Networks: e.effectiveNetProtos,
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Transport: ProtocolNumber,
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Addr: e.TransportEndpointInfo.ID.LocalAddress,
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Port: e.TransportEndpointInfo.ID.LocalPort,
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Flags: e.boundPortFlags,
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BindToDevice: e.boundBindToDevice,
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Dest: dest,
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}
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if !e.stack.ReserveTuple(portRes) {
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e.stack.Stats().TCP.FailedPortReservations.Increment()
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return false
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}
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e.isPortReserved = true
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e.boundDest = dest
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return true
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}
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// notifyAborted wakes up any waiters on registered, but not accepted
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// endpoints.
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//
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// This is strictly not required normally as a socket that was never accepted
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// can't really have any registered waiters except when stack.Wait() is called
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// which waits for all registered endpoints to stop and expects an EventHUp.
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func (e *Endpoint) notifyAborted() {
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e.waiterQueue.Notify(waiter.EventHUp | waiter.EventErr | waiter.ReadableEvents | waiter.WritableEvents)
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}
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func (e *Endpoint) acceptQueueIsFull() bool {
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e.acceptMu.Lock()
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full := e.acceptQueue.isFull()
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e.acceptMu.Unlock()
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return full
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}
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// +stateify savable
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type acceptQueue struct {
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// NB: this could be an endpointList, but ilist only permits endpoints to
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// belong to one list at a time, and endpoints are already stored in the
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// dispatcher's list.
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endpoints list.List `state:".([]*Endpoint)"`
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// pendingEndpoints is a set of all endpoints for which a handshake is
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// in progress.
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pendingEndpoints map[*Endpoint]struct{}
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// capacity is the maximum number of endpoints that can be in endpoints.
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capacity int
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}
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func (a *acceptQueue) isFull() bool {
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return a.endpoints.Len() >= a.capacity
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}
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// handleListenSegment is called when a listening endpoint receives a segment
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// and needs to handle it.
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//
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// +checklocks:e.mu
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// +checklocksexclude:ctx.hasherMu
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func (e *Endpoint) handleListenSegment(ctx *listenContext, s *segment) tcpip.Error {
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e.rcvQueueMu.Lock()
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rcvClosed := e.RcvClosed
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e.rcvQueueMu.Unlock()
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if rcvClosed || s.flags.Contains(header.TCPFlagSyn|header.TCPFlagAck) {
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// If the endpoint is shutdown, reply with reset.
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//
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// RFC 793 section 3.4 page 35 (figure 12) outlines that a RST
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// must be sent in response to a SYN-ACK while in the listen
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// state to prevent completing a handshake from an old SYN.
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return replyWithReset(e.stack, s, e.sendTOS, e.ipv4TTL, e.ipv6HopLimit)
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}
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switch {
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case s.flags.Contains(header.TCPFlagRst):
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e.stack.Stats().DroppedPackets.Increment()
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return nil
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case s.flags.Contains(header.TCPFlagSyn):
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if e.acceptQueueIsFull() {
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e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowSynDrop.Increment()
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e.stats.ReceiveErrors.ListenOverflowSynDrop.Increment()
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e.stack.Stats().DroppedPackets.Increment()
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return nil
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}
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opts := parseSynSegmentOptions(s)
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useSynCookies, err := func() (bool, tcpip.Error) {
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var alwaysUseSynCookies tcpip.TCPAlwaysUseSynCookies
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if err := e.stack.TransportProtocolOption(header.TCPProtocolNumber, &alwaysUseSynCookies); err != nil {
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panic(fmt.Sprintf("TransportProtocolOption(%d, %T) = %s", header.TCPProtocolNumber, alwaysUseSynCookies, err))
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}
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if alwaysUseSynCookies {
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return true, nil
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}
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e.acceptMu.Lock()
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defer e.acceptMu.Unlock()
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// The capacity of the accepted queue would always be one greater than the
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// listen backlog. But, the SYNRCVD connections count is always checked
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// against the listen backlog value for Linux parity reason.
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// https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/7acac4b3196/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h#L280
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if len(e.acceptQueue.pendingEndpoints) == e.acceptQueue.capacity-1 {
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return true, nil
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}
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|
|
h, err := ctx.startHandshake(s, opts, &waiter.Queue{}, e.owner)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
e.stack.Stats().TCP.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment()
|
|
e.stats.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment()
|
|
return false, err
|
|
}
|
|
e.acceptQueue.pendingEndpoints[h.ep] = struct{}{}
|
|
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if !useSynCookies {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
net := s.pkt.Network()
|
|
route, err := e.stack.FindRoute(s.pkt.NICID, net.DestinationAddress(), net.SourceAddress(), s.pkt.NetworkProtocolNumber, false /* multicastLoop */)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
defer route.Release()
|
|
|
|
// Send SYN without window scaling because we currently
|
|
// don't encode this information in the cookie.
|
|
//
|
|
// Enable Timestamp option if the original syn did have
|
|
// the timestamp option specified.
|
|
//
|
|
// Use the user supplied MSS on the listening socket for
|
|
// new connections, if available.
|
|
synOpts := header.TCPSynOptions{
|
|
WS: -1,
|
|
TS: opts.TS,
|
|
TSEcr: opts.TSVal,
|
|
MSS: calculateAdvertisedMSS(e.userMSS, route),
|
|
}
|
|
if opts.TS {
|
|
offset := e.protocol.tsOffset(net.DestinationAddress(), net.SourceAddress())
|
|
now := e.stack.Clock().NowMonotonic()
|
|
synOpts.TSVal = offset.TSVal(now)
|
|
}
|
|
cookie := ctx.createCookie(s.id, s.sequenceNumber, encodeMSS(opts.MSS))
|
|
fields := tcpFields{
|
|
id: s.id,
|
|
ttl: calculateTTL(route, e.ipv4TTL, e.ipv6HopLimit),
|
|
tos: e.sendTOS,
|
|
flags: header.TCPFlagSyn | header.TCPFlagAck,
|
|
seq: cookie,
|
|
ack: s.sequenceNumber + 1,
|
|
rcvWnd: ctx.rcvWnd,
|
|
df: e.pmtud == tcpip.PMTUDiscoveryWant || e.pmtud == tcpip.PMTUDiscoveryDo || e.pmtud == tcpip.PMTUDiscoveryProbe,
|
|
expOptVal: e.getExperimentOptionValue(route),
|
|
}
|
|
if err := e.sendSynTCP(route, fields, synOpts); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowSynCookieSent.Increment()
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
case s.flags.Contains(header.TCPFlagAck):
|
|
iss := s.ackNumber - 1
|
|
irs := s.sequenceNumber - 1
|
|
|
|
// As an edge case when SYN-COOKIES are in use and we receive a
|
|
// segment that has data and is valid we should check if it
|
|
// already matches a created endpoint and redirect the segment
|
|
// rather than try and create a new endpoint. This can happen
|
|
// where the final ACK for the handshake and other data packets
|
|
// arrive at the same time and are queued to the listening
|
|
// endpoint before the listening endpoint has had time to
|
|
// process the first ACK and create the endpoint that matches
|
|
// the incoming packet's full 5 tuple.
|
|
netProtos := []tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber{s.pkt.NetworkProtocolNumber}
|
|
// If the local address is an IPv4 Address then also look for IPv6
|
|
// dual stack endpoints.
|
|
if s.id.LocalAddress.To4() != (tcpip.Address{}) {
|
|
netProtos = []tcpip.NetworkProtocolNumber{header.IPv4ProtocolNumber, header.IPv6ProtocolNumber}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, netProto := range netProtos {
|
|
if newEP := e.stack.FindTransportEndpoint(netProto, ProtocolNumber, s.id, s.pkt.NICID); newEP != nil && newEP != e {
|
|
tcpEP := newEP.(*Endpoint)
|
|
if !tcpEP.EndpointState().connected() {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if !tcpEP.enqueueSegment(s) {
|
|
// Just silently drop the segment as we failed
|
|
// to queue, we don't want to generate a RST
|
|
// further below or try and create a new
|
|
// endpoint etc.
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
tcpEP.notifyProcessor()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Since SYN cookies are in use this is potentially an ACK to a
|
|
// SYN-ACK we sent but don't have a half open connection state
|
|
// as cookies are being used to protect against a potential SYN
|
|
// flood. In such cases validate the cookie and if valid create
|
|
// a fully connected endpoint and deliver to the accept queue.
|
|
//
|
|
// If not, silently drop the ACK to avoid leaking information
|
|
// when under a potential syn flood attack.
|
|
//
|
|
// Validate the cookie.
|
|
data, ok := ctx.isCookieValid(s.id, iss, irs)
|
|
if !ok || int(data) >= len(mssTable) {
|
|
e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowInvalidSynCookieRcvd.Increment()
|
|
e.stack.Stats().DroppedPackets.Increment()
|
|
|
|
// When not using SYN cookies, as per RFC 793, section 3.9, page 64:
|
|
// Any acknowledgment is bad if it arrives on a connection still in
|
|
// the LISTEN state. An acceptable reset segment should be formed
|
|
// for any arriving ACK-bearing segment. The RST should be
|
|
// formatted as follows:
|
|
//
|
|
// <SEQ=SEG.ACK><CTL=RST>
|
|
//
|
|
// Send a reset as this is an ACK for which there is no
|
|
// half open connections and we are not using cookies
|
|
// yet.
|
|
//
|
|
// The only time we should reach here when a connection
|
|
// was opened and closed really quickly and a delayed
|
|
// ACK was received from the sender.
|
|
return replyWithReset(e.stack, s, e.sendTOS, e.ipv4TTL, e.ipv6HopLimit)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Keep hold of acceptMu until the new endpoint is in the accept queue (or
|
|
// if there is an error), to guarantee that we will keep our spot in the
|
|
// queue even if another handshake from the syn queue completes.
|
|
e.acceptMu.Lock()
|
|
if e.acceptQueue.isFull() {
|
|
// Silently drop the ack as the application can't accept
|
|
// the connection at this point. The ack will be
|
|
// retransmitted by the sender anyway and we can
|
|
// complete the connection at the time of retransmit if
|
|
// the backlog has space.
|
|
e.acceptMu.Unlock()
|
|
e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowAckDrop.Increment()
|
|
e.stats.ReceiveErrors.ListenOverflowAckDrop.Increment()
|
|
e.stack.Stats().DroppedPackets.Increment()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e.stack.Stats().TCP.ListenOverflowSynCookieRcvd.Increment()
|
|
// Create newly accepted endpoint and deliver it.
|
|
rcvdSynOptions := header.TCPSynOptions{
|
|
MSS: mssTable[data],
|
|
// Disable Window scaling as original SYN is
|
|
// lost.
|
|
WS: -1,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// When syn cookies are in use we enable timestamp only
|
|
// if the ack specifies the timestamp option assuming
|
|
// that the other end did in fact negotiate the
|
|
// timestamp option in the original SYN.
|
|
if s.parsedOptions.TS {
|
|
rcvdSynOptions.TS = true
|
|
rcvdSynOptions.TSVal = s.parsedOptions.TSVal
|
|
rcvdSynOptions.TSEcr = s.parsedOptions.TSEcr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n, err := ctx.createConnectingEndpoint(s, rcvdSynOptions, &waiter.Queue{})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
e.acceptMu.Unlock()
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Propagate any inheritable options from the listening endpoint
|
|
// to the newly created endpoint.
|
|
e.propagateInheritableOptionsLocked(n)
|
|
|
|
if !n.reserveTupleLocked() {
|
|
n.mu.Unlock()
|
|
e.acceptMu.Unlock()
|
|
n.Close()
|
|
|
|
e.stack.Stats().TCP.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment()
|
|
e.stats.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Register new endpoint so that packets are routed to it.
|
|
if err := n.stack.RegisterTransportEndpoint(
|
|
n.effectiveNetProtos,
|
|
ProtocolNumber,
|
|
n.TransportEndpointInfo.ID,
|
|
n,
|
|
n.boundPortFlags,
|
|
n.boundBindToDevice,
|
|
); err != nil {
|
|
n.mu.Unlock()
|
|
e.acceptMu.Unlock()
|
|
n.Close()
|
|
|
|
e.stack.Stats().TCP.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment()
|
|
e.stats.FailedConnectionAttempts.Increment()
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n.isRegistered = true
|
|
net := s.pkt.Network()
|
|
n.TSOffset = n.protocol.tsOffset(net.DestinationAddress(), net.SourceAddress())
|
|
|
|
// Switch state to connected.
|
|
n.isConnectNotified = true
|
|
h := handshake{
|
|
ep: n,
|
|
iss: iss,
|
|
ackNum: irs + 1,
|
|
rcvWnd: seqnum.Size(n.initialReceiveWindow()),
|
|
sndWnd: s.window,
|
|
rcvWndScale: e.rcvWndScaleForHandshake(),
|
|
sndWndScale: rcvdSynOptions.WS,
|
|
mss: rcvdSynOptions.MSS,
|
|
sampleRTTWithTSOnly: true,
|
|
}
|
|
h.ep.AssertLockHeld(n)
|
|
h.transitionToStateEstablishedLocked(s)
|
|
n.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
// Requeue the segment if the ACK completing the handshake has more info
|
|
// to be processed by the newly established endpoint.
|
|
if (s.flags.Contains(header.TCPFlagFin) || s.payloadSize() > 0) && n.enqueueSegment(s) {
|
|
n.notifyProcessor()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e.stack.Stats().TCP.PassiveConnectionOpenings.Increment()
|
|
|
|
// Deliver the endpoint to the accept queue.
|
|
e.acceptQueue.endpoints.PushBack(n)
|
|
e.acceptMu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
e.waiterQueue.Notify(waiter.ReadableEvents)
|
|
return nil
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
e.stack.Stats().DroppedPackets.Increment()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|