mirror of
https://github.com/lux-apps/papers.git
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zeekay
dd93cb41f7
Sweep across the non-Tier-1 paper catalogue (Tier-1 owned by parallel
agent and excluded). All 113 processed papers already had luxcover
wired up; this commit fixes 14 build breakers and produces fresh
PDFs across the catalogue.
Fixes:
- lux-blockchain-scaling-laws: em-dash inside lstlisting -> --
- lux-corona-pq: stale \input pointing at 03-the-corona-scheme renamed
to 03-the-corona-scheme (file already renamed on disk)
- lux-lattice-cryptography-primer: same Corona->Corona rename
- lux-formal-verification-lean4: Lean source uses unicode (×, ∀, ∃, ∈,
∧, ∨, ∩, ≠, ⟨, ⟩, ·, ¬) inside lstlistings. Added a literate map
so listings render the math glyphs without UTF-8 fault.
- lux-id-did-specification: ✓/✗ in tabular replaced with \ding{51}
/ \ding{55} (pifont). Added pifont package.
- lux-ntt-simd-implementation: middle-dot in Go assembly listings;
added literate {·}{\textperiodcentered}.
- lux-ntt-transform: μ, ×, –, — in regular text (no T1 fontenc).
Replaced with $\mu$/$\times$/--/--- via unicode->latex sweep.
- lux-perpetuals-derivatives, lux-quantum-consensus,
lux-quasar-consensus, lux-tee-computing-mesh: same unicode->latex
sweep across body text. Also fixed broken math segment
`$L_{avg} = 10$\times$$` -> `$L_{avg} = 10\times$`.
- lux-zchain: emoji glyphs in roadmap table replaced with
parenthetical text.
- lux-triple-proof-consensus: dropped duplicate \usepackage{geometry}
that clashed with luxcover (geometry option clash).
- pq: defined missing \Rq macro.
PDFs rebuilt for the full Tier-2/3 set.
Excluded (Tier-1, parallel agent): lp-073-pulsar, lp-stricte2epq,
dag-evm-formal, lp-010-quasar-stm-{3,4}, lp-020-quasar-consensus,
lux-institutional-custody, lux-nist-mptc-submission, pqsafe-il5,
pq-rns, plus shared/ and lps/.
89 lines
2.8 KiB
TeX
89 lines
2.8 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{../shared/luxcover}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts,amsthm}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{listings}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usepackage{float}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{array}
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\usepackage{tabularx}
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\input{../shared/lstlang}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit,calc}
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\hypersetup{colorlinks=true,linkcolor=black,citecolor=blue,urlcolor=blue}
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\lstset{
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basicstyle=\ttfamily\scriptsize,
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breaklines=true,
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frame=single,
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numbers=left,
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numberstyle=\tiny\color{gray},
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keywordstyle=\color{blue!70!black}\bfseries,
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commentstyle=\color{green!50!black}\itshape,
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stringstyle=\color{red!60!black},
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showstringspaces=false,
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}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}[section]
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}[section]
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}[section]
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\newtheorem{invariant}{Invariant}[section]
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\title{LP-102: Encrypted SQLite Replication Standard\\(age + Replicate)}
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\author{
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Zach Kelling\thanks{Corresponding author: [email protected]}\\
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\textit{Lux Industries}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{2026}
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\begin{document}
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\luxcoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We define the standard for durable, encrypted SQLite database replication
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across the Lux ecosystem using age (X25519) encryption and continuous
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WAL-based streaming to S3-compatible storage. Per-organization SQLite
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databases running on Hanzo Base are the canonical data model for
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application state in Lux services. Kubernetes pods are ephemeral.
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Persistent Volume Claims fail. This proposal specifies an encrypted
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replication layer---\texttt{hanzoai/replicate} (a Litestream fork with
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age end-to-end encryption)---that provides sub-second WAL shipping to
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S3-compatible object stores with per-principal key isolation derived
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through HKDF from a master key held in KMS. The chain remains the source
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of truth for securities and on-chain state; this standard addresses the
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complementary durability requirement for application state: sessions,
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preferences, audit logs, KYC documents, and compliance records. We
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specify the encryption scheme, the replication protocol, the sidecar
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deployment pattern, the key hierarchy, and the recovery procedure.
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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%% ============================================================
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-motivation}
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\input{sections/03-specification}
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\input{sections/04-architecture}
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\input{sections/05-security-considerations}
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\input{sections/06-reference-implementation}
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\input{sections/07-post-quantum-security}
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\input{sections/08-compatibility}
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\input{sections/09-operational-considerations}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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